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Abstract 
 
This research conducts an in-depth analysis into the recent trend for creating 
re-performances, interrogating the relationship between re-performance and 
issues of death, loss and memorial. The interrogation is underpinned by a 
combination of philosophical and psychoanalytic discourses on mourning and 
loss with performance studies theories, particularly those relating to re-
performance and the documentation of performance. Thus, it draws on work by 
performance studies scholars, such as Peggy Phelan, Diana Taylor, and 
Rebecca Schneider and philosophers, including Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva 
and Simon Critchley, to develop an original framework for theorising re-
performance. By positioning these discourses in relation to one another, this 
research examines a new area of investigation within the field of performance 
studies. The thesis questions whether re-performance strengthens and at the 
same time destabilises performances relationship to death and its status as an 
ephemeral art form. It argues that re-performance creates a bodily archive, in 
which performances can be stored, and that it, therefore, prevents them from 
disappearing. Through its analysis of re-performance related work by artists 
including Martin O’Brien, Sheree Rose, Bob Flanagan, Ron Athey, Julie 
Tolentino, Hannah Wilke and Jo Spence, this research equates this process of 
re-performance with acts of mourning and memorial. It asserts that re-
performance enables performance to prepare us for loss because although the 
initial performance disappears, it leaves behind echoes, traces and specters. 
The thesis goes on to argue that these echoes and traces can be used to 
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create re-performances which are haunted by the specter of the initial or earlier 
versions of the performance. Hence, whilst acts of re-performance bring the 
past back to life, they also provide performance with a future. Linking this to 
notions of mourning, the thesis contends that both acts of mourning and acts of 
re-performance are transformative and are therefore predicated towards both 
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Introduction - Why this Research? 
 
This thesis develops a novel approach to exploring the relationship between 
performance and death 1 , with particular reference to re-performance. Re-
performance, often referred to as re-enactment (an issue that I will discuss later 
on in this introduction) is a recent trend in performance art. As Rebecca 
Schneider explains “Reenactment” is a term that has entered into increased 
circulation in late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century art, theatre, and 
performance circles’ (2011: 2). Its influence has been particularly seen in 
performance art, which is interesting when considered in relation to the fact that 
when performance art began some artists refused to document their work.2 
Schneider emphasises the relationship between re-performance and 
performance art when she states that, ‘The practice of re-playing or re-doing a 
precedent event, artwork, or act has exploded in performance based art’ (2011: 
2). As such, it is necessary to examine the impact re-performance has on our 
understanding of performance. This necessity is born not only out of the 
increased interest in the practice of re-performance, as highlighted by Jones 
and Heathfield in their 2012 text Perform, Repeat, Record in which they 
examine instances of re-performance including ‘Yoko Ono’s redoing of her most 
                                                 
1 This thesis’ focus on death is specifically related to human death and does not 
include animal death, which has been explored by some performance artists. 
2 Although in the United Kingdom the term live art would normally be used to describe 
the performances that this thesis investigates, I have chosen to use Performance Art 
instead because many of the artists and performances that are analysed come from an 
American context and are linked to the 1960’s and 70’s when Performance Art was 
more widely used.  
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famous performance, the mid-1960s Cut Piece’ which they assert is a 
‘prominent examples of this recent trend’ (2012: 89 emphasis in original). It is 
also necessary because of what Philip Auslander describes as the ‘ontological 
characteristic’ of performance ‘its disappearance’ (1999: 112). Many 
Performance Studies scholars, including Peggy Phelan, have argued that 
performance is ephemeral. Indeed Erika Fischer-Lichte states that during the 
1960’s and 70’s there was a ‘performative turn in the arts, abandoning 
commercialized artifacts and commodified works of art in favour of transient and 
ephemeral performances’ (2008: 70). The recent trend for re-performance, I 
assert, threatens to destabilise performance’s ontology by preventing it from 
disappearing and, therefore, destabilising the emphasis on de-commodification 
that Fischer-Litche has highlighted. It is this element of danger and 
destabilisation that makes re-performance such a crucial area of research.  
 The notion that re-performance destabilises the ontology of performance 
is particularly pertinent as we currently live in a world in which everything 
appears to be changing and the threat of annihilation is ever present. This may 
have always be the case, but modern technology and weaponry are developing 
at such a fast pace that is seems almost impossible to keep up. We live in a 
world in which everything perishes, and this perishability is a global issue. 
Global warming and the issue of plastic waste emphasise the ways in which 
even the very planet on which we live can be considered to be in peril. There 
are also other threats including: nuclear war, terrorism and more daily acts of 
violence, such as gun and knife crime, all of which can make life feel fleeting 
and fragile. It is in this context, the thesis argues, that whilst re-performance 
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destabilises performance’s ontology it also provides it with a possible future, 
and that in the current world finding a future and a way to survive feels more 
important than ever. 
 The thesis, which is positioned within the context of performance studies, 
explores re-performance as a means of bringing performance back to life in the 
present, and, therefore, enabling it to survive. It questions the implications that 
this has for Peggy Phelan's highly influential depiction of ‘performance as a 
rehearsal for death’ 1997: 3), explaining that ‘billed as rehearsal, performance 
and theatre have a special relation to art as memorial’ (1997: 3). Phelan’s use 
of the term memorial is interesting because a memorial is something which 
preserves, which remembers. It stands in for the lost object, reminding us that it 
existed. Memorial and remembering are part of the process of mourning, and 
when, re-performance is viewed as a memorial, I contend that it helps us to 
prepare for our own death and the deaths of those we love. I argue that this is 
relevant in the current global climate of war and terrorism, where the threat of 
death is omnipresent. In her 2004 book Precarious Life: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence, which was written in the context of post 9/11 America 
Judith Butler discusses this threat and describes the current political climate as 
one that is a ‘cycle of revenge’ (2004:10). Butler goes on to discuss the 
possibility that ‘non-violent, cooperative, egalitarian international remain the 
guiding ideal’ (2004: 17). Butler’s comments suggest that we currently live in a 
world where the ‘guiding ideal’ (2004: 17),  is in danger of being over thrown in 
favour of a system in which ‘violence only brings on more loss, and… only 
leads, again and again, to the dry grief of an endless political rage’ (2004: XIX). 
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 This research conducts an in-depth analysis into Peggy Phelan's claim 
that 'theatre and performance have especially potent lessons for those of us 
interested in reassessing our relations to mourning, grief and loss’ (1997: 3). 
The research asserts that re-performance changes what theatre and 
performance have to teach us about these concepts, by contending that 
because re-performance prevents performance from disappearing entirely. 
Moreover, this research investigates the possibility that re-performance 
changes those ‘especially potent lessons’ that performance can teach us 
(Phelan 1997: 3). This research investigates the possibility that re-performance 
changes the lessons that theatre and performance have to teach us about 
death by enabling us to witness the processes of mourning, grief and loss 
because they are mirrored in acts of re-performance. This is one of the key 
concepts that the thesis examines, and which this introduction outlines. The 
introduction also presents the key texts with which the research engages, 
particularly the performance studies texts, which include Peggy Phelan’s 1997 
Mourning Sex: Performing Public Memories, Diana Taylor’s 2003 The Archive 
and The Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas and Rebecca 
Schneider’s 2012 Performing Remains: Art and War in times of Theatrical 
Reenactment. In addition, this introduction explores the concepts of the 
multiplicity of death, dying as a process and re-performance as a means of 
bringing performance back to life.  
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Research Methodologies 
This research project is based upon the investigation and analysis of 
performances by a range of artists who have been selected as case studies for 
the thesis and builds upon the exploration of ritual, repetition and re-
performance that I conducted for my MA dissertation. In my dissertation I 
examined instances of repetition within performance art and, whilst this 
research was predominantly focused on repetition in relation to ritual, the 
dissertation explored the desire to repeat actions, behaviours and 
performances. This led to an interest in re-performance, specifically the desire 
to re-perform and considerations of why re-performance has become such a 
prominent area of performance art practices over the last 20 years. The MA 
dissertation also explored the work of artist Marina Abramović, including her re-
performance projects Seven Easy Pieces (2005) and The Artist is Present 
(2010). My research into Abramović’s re-performance of her 1975 piece Lips of 
Thomas as part of Seven Easy Pieces focused on notions of scaring and the 
ways in which scars can be seen as relics or leftovers of many live art pieces. In 
Abramović’s case I was specifically interested in the notion that the act of re-
performance could be considered an act of re-opening an old wound, as in her 
re-performance of Lips of Thomas Abramović was cutting open the scar tissue 
from the initial performance. From this I developed a fascinsation with the 
remains of performance, which has been developed through the current 
research project. It is from my engagement with these acts of re-performance 
and the writings about these and other instances of performances that my 
interest in re-performance began and the idea for this research project 
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developed. This interest was particularly sparked by my reading of Phelan’s 
Mourning Sex which caused me to consider the relationship between re-
performance, mourning, loss and death. The consideration of this relationship 
has become central to the research project. 
 Thus, throughout the research project this thesis has drawn upon 
performance studies texts such as those by Phelan, but also Schneider and 
Taylor, which have already been mentioned, placing it firmly within the tradition 
of Performance Studies. In addition to this, the research draws upon a range of 
philosophical texts including Derrida’s Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, 
the Work of Mourning and the New International (1994), Freud’s ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’ (1917) and ‘The “Uncanny” (1919), Julia Kristeva’s Black Sun: 
Depression and Melancholia (1987) and Powers of Horror: An Essay on 
Abjection (1980), as well as Judith Butler’s Precarious Life: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence (2004). It also utilises Simon Critchley’s The Book of 
Dead Philosophers (2008) and Deleuze’s writings on time, such as Cinema 1: 
The Movement Image (1983) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1985). By 
situating the aforementioned philosophical treatises in dialogue with the 
performance studies theories, this research sheds light onto an area of 
performance studies that is yet to be discussed, that of the relationship between 
re-performance and death.  Although works, such as Phelan’s Mourning Sex, 
examine the relationship between performance and death, this research 
focuses more specifically on the ways in which acts of re-performance disrupt or 
destabilise this relationship. The emphasis on re-performance, combined with 
its focus on non-linear notions of time and the cyclical nature of both life and 
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death and performance, means that re-performance provides the thesis with a 
unique lens through which to examine existing concepts within performance 
studies. 
 The philosophical writings of Herbert Blau, specifically his 1987 essay 
The Eye of Prey, were also considered as part of this research project due to 
their emphasis on the relationship between performance and haunting, which is 
central to this thesis. In The Eye of Prey Blau asserts that ‘if there is an Eternal 
Return, the performance always returns’ (1987: 173) and ‘that’s why we find 
ourselves, at the uttermost consummation of performance, in the uncanny 
position of spectators. It is uncanny because, in some inexplicable way…, we 
are seeing what we saw before.’ (1987: 173;  emphasis in original) were 
examined as part of this research project due to their emphasis on the 
relationship between performance and haunting, which is central to this 
research project. However, Blau, like Marvin Carlson, who in his 2001 text The 
Haunted Stage: Theatre as Memory Machine argues that ‘one of the universals 
of performance, both East and West, is its ghostliness, its sense of return,’ (1), 
Blau focuses on examples from theatre. Thus, their writing about haunting 
differs from this research project’s orientation. Whilst their writing is rooted in 
the haunting created by the repetition of the word and the power of language 
this thesis is specifically concerned with the notions of haunting that are present 
within the body, created by bodily and often visceral actions. As such this thesis 
takes its examples and influence from performance art rather than theatre, and 
concentrates on a dialogue with those performance studies sources 
comparatively focused on performance.  
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The performance art case studies chosen for the research have been 
investigated through existing critical writings on the artists and specific 
performances, as well as the archival footage of their works, supported by 
research conducted at The Live Art Development Agency (LADA). The 
exception to this is Martin O’Brien’s 2015 performance, Anatomy of a Bite, 
which was witnessed live. The artists Martin O’Brien and Dani Ploeger were 
also interviewed as part of the research project, and the insights gained from 
these interviews are used when discussing their practice. Ploeger and O’Brien 
were chosen for interview because they are both British-based and the 
youngest of the living artists, making them more easily accessible for interview. 
Thus, they provide an insight into notions of re-performance and bodily 
transmission as part of a younger generation of artists who engage with the 
works of previous generations. 
 
Case Studies 
The case studies chosen for this research were carefully selected because all of 
the performances which are analysed within the project can either be 
considered re-performances or engage with issues that this thesis asserts are 
pertinent to re-performance. This includes artists who explore issues related to 
illness, dying, death, loss and mourning within their practice. It develops on 
performance art’s frequent engagement with death 3 , from performative 
                                                 
3 As displayed in performances including Gina Pane’s Death Control (1974), 
which includes ‘a close-up of Pane’s face with live maggots crawling across its 
surface’ (Black 2002: 2). The familiar idea of the rotting corpse being eaten alive 
by maggots is a striking representation of death in Pane’s performance. There 
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memorials to works which foreground illness and bodily fragility. As well as 
those which engage in re-birth and the multiplicities of life and death, all of the 
case studies are concerned with the issues that I outlined in my opening 
paragraphs as being pertinent to both this thesis and the current political 
climate. 
 The research employs the term initial performance when discussing the 
earliest or earlier manifestations of performances on which re-performances are 
based and using this definition the thesis questions whether re-performance 
can be viewed as a way of documenting performance and enabling it to 
continue “living” in the present, by making visible the echoes and traces of the 
initial performance. In light of this, the thesis argues that performance does not 
always disappear entirely but that it can become a more permanent entity and 
that it can be made to remain through re-performance. This research uses the 
term re-performance rather than re-enactment, choosing it because re-
enactment can be too narrow and reductive a term to be usefully employed in 
relation to the broad range of works that are examined in this research. The 
term re-enactment, for myself and Schneider, is suggestive of a deliberate 
attempt to re-create a past performance as accurately as possible. This is 
highlighted by Schneider when she states that ‘if they [re-enactors] repeat an 
event just so, getting the details as close as possible to fidelity, they will have 
touched time and time will have recurred’ (2011:10; emphasis in original). 
                                                                                                                                               
are also more recent examples of performance art’s engagement with death, 
such as artist Sebastian Horsely’s Crucifixion in 2002. Horsely ‘paid £2,000 to 
be crucified in the Philippines’ as part of the islands’ Easter ceremonies (Milner 
2002:1).  
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However, I argue that the term re-performance also encompasses 
performances that are not direct re-enactments, but which still resemble the 
initial performance in notable ways. The term re-performance incorporates 
performances which do not necessarily repeat the performative actions of the 
initial performance but which examine the same issues or concepts. As well as 
performances, such as those by Anne Bean and Lynn Hershman Leeson, in 
which artists seek to re-perform themselves. It also includes examples of 
intratextuality, where performances within the body of an artist’s work can be 
seen as re-performances of one another. An example of work which could be 
considered a re-performance, rather than a re-enactment, is Martin O’Brien’s 
2015 performance Anatomy of a Bite, which closely resembled Sheree Rose 
and Bob Flanagan’s 1994 performance Autopsy but did not attempt to replicate 
or re-create the performance exactly. Yet, despite this deliberate shift in 
terminology, this research significantly develops some of the key ideas and 
questions raised in Schneider’s text by linking them to Phelan’s discussion of 
performance’s ephemeral state. It develops Phelan’s theorization that 
‘Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate 
in the circulation of representations of representations’ (1993: 146), whilst 
displaying that it can, as Schneider asserts, be re-enacted. 
 As highlighted, the work of Martin O’Brien (1988-) was selected as a 
case study for this research because some of his performance work also serves 
as re-performances of Bob Flanagan’s (1952-1996) earlier work. Flanagan was 
a performance artist who also suffered from cystic fibrosis and died from the 
illness in 1996, aged 44. Flanagan created performances with his partner, 
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Sheree Rose (1941-), which explored his life with cystic fibrosis. Flanagan and 
O’Brien’s practice shares similar concerns with living with cystic fibrosis. 
O’Brien’s practice examines his life with cystic fibrosis through his deployment 
of ritualistic acts and durational performances, which use mucus to highlight his 
illness and make his body’s fragility visible. However, this isn’t the only 
similarity. Both artists have also created work with Rose and their collaborations 
are examined throughout the thesis. The particular relationship between the 
three artists is unique and is analysed for what it can teach us about re-
performance, repetition, loss and death. Additionally, O’Brien and Rose’s work 
also considers their relationship with death. Despite the age gap – he is in his 
early thirties and she is in her seventies – O’Brien’s life expectancy is 
dramatically shorter than Rose’s and, as such, they both examine issues of 
ageing and bodily fragility, which the research also considers. One of the critical 
concerns explored in reference to Martin O’Brien’s practice is his body’s fragility 
in relation to his illness and his use of bodily fluids in his performances. These 
concerns are also analysed in the work of artist Ron Athey (1961). Athey, who 
is 56 years old and HIV positive, creates performances which involve 
bloodletting. This thesis compares that bloodletting to O’Brien’s use of mucus, 
as both fluids provide the signs and symbols of the artists’ illnesses and frailties.  
 The work of Hannah Wilke (1940-1993), and specifically the video 
installation Intra-Venus Tapes (2007) is also investigated in relation to making 
illness visible and as an example of how re-performance can allow us to witness 
the past, as in the installation we witness Wilke’s death in the certain knowledge 
that it is a past event, that we are not witnessing it in real time. Here the 
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research examines Intra-Venus Tapes in relation to what the thesis argues is 
the human desire to leave something of ourselves behind after our deaths, to 
allow part of us to remain. This desire is also explored in relation to artist Jo 
Spence (1934 - 1992) and her photographic works; Narratives of Disease 
(1989) and The Final Project (1992). In a similar manner to Wilke’s Intra-Venus 
Tapes Spence created The Final Project whilst she was battling with leukemia, 
and the project explores her illness and eventual death in 1992, aged 58. The 
Final Project can be seen as a re-performance of her earlier work Narratives of 
Disease because Narratives of Disease documented Spence’s battle with 
breast cancer, whilst The Final Project applied the same focus on making what 
was then her terminal illness visible.  
 This thesis is concerned with our desire to create projects, such as Intra-
Venus Tapes and The Final Project. This desire, which the thesis asserts is the 
desire to leave something of oneself behind after death, is also analysed in 
relation to the work of artists Carolee Schneeman, Jill Hocking, Andrew 
Henderson, Briar Bates and Tom Joslin. Schneeman’s exhibition Mortal Coils 
(1994-1995) was her way of memorialising the lives of friends whom she had 
lost. Whilst it was not in and of itself a re-performance because it is analysed in 
relation to ways of memorialising those we have lost, it is linked to the key 
concerns of re-performance; loss, mourning, death and memorial. These key 
concerns are also what enable the thesis to position Mortal Coils alongside 
works such as those produced by Hocking, Henderson, Bates and Joslin. 
Hocking, who died from cystic fibrosis, in 2004 at the age of 24, created a 
cabbage leaf blanket, which she lay under as part of an installation piece. The 
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rotting cabbage leaves symbolised her illness and bodily fragility but also 
enabled Hocking to take control over the way in which her life, illness and body 
were presented. This is similar to Andrew Henderson’s 2016 performance 
Taking it to the Grave. Henderson, who suffered from lymphoma and died 
shortly after the performance at the age of 28, created the piece as a way of 
acknowledging his illness and impending death. Comparisons are drawn 
between Henderson’s performance and Tom Joslin’s video diary Silverlake Life: 
The View from Here which was produced in 1993. Joslin, who died of AIDS in 
1991 created the film as a form of memorial, a record of his life and subsequent 
death. I assert that in these case studies, performance and film provided the 
artists with the means to take charge of their lives, bodies and memories. These 
performances removed the medical lenses through which they had been viewed 
during their illnesses and enabled them to gain ownership over how they would 
be perceived and remembered. It also meant that they left something of 
themselves behind, so that they would not disappear once they died. 
 This notion of taking control over the way in which you are mourned and 
remembered is also analysed in relation to the work of artist Briar Bates and her 
performance, Ankle Deep: A Water Ballet (Kiely 2017: 1). Ankle Deep was 
Bates’ way ‘to commemorate her death [by] — instructing her friends to perform 
a water ballet in the wading pool at Volunteer Park’ (2017: 1). Ankle Deep was 
performed by Bates’ friends following her death and although she wasn’t 
present at the performance she was fully involved in its creation. Bates’ friends 
performed the piece ‘“because Briar told us to,” Morgan said’ and Bates was 
involved in choreographing and rehearsing the performance (2017: 1). The 
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performance differs from Hocking’s, Henderson’s and Joslin’s because it was 
performed after her death and therefore, she did not participate in its 
performance. However, I contend that it served similar purposes, allowing 
Bates’ to gain ownership over the way that she was remembered; control that 
she was not able to have over her body, her life or her death. 
 These concepts of control and authorship are contrasted with what I 
argue is Wilke’s lack of authorship in Intra-Venus Tapes. Wilke began the 
project of Intra-Venus Tapes without knowing that she wouldn’t see it through to 
its conclusion. Bates on the other hand, was aware that her project would be 
fulfilled after her death. This difference is crucial in terms of authorship because 
whilst Bates was able to plan the project in such a way that she could retain 
authorship of it Wilke did not have the same opportunity, meaning that she was 
unable to retain authorship of Intra-Venus Tapes following her death. Intra-
Venus Tapes was begun by Wilke when she was diagnosed with lymphoma 
and completed by her partner Donald Goddard after her death in 1993, at the 
age of 52. Goddard’s completion of the project can be considered a re-
performance as Goddard inevitably re-shaped the project when he took it over 
in order to complete it. This raises questions about the authorship of the 
performance, whether it was retained by Wilke, or passed on to Goddard after 
her death. My positioning of the work as a re-performance suggests that 
Goddard took over authorship of the project, but that Wilke retained a presence, 
as a specter haunting both the work and Goddard as he continued creating the 
work. The work of Athey’s is also investigated in relation to re-performance, 
specifically his collaborative re-performance of Self-Obliteration #1   Ecstatic 
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(2011) with Julie Tolentino (1964). The performance is analysed in terms of the 
relationship between Athey’s initial performance and his and Tolentino’s re-
performance, as well as their collaborative relationship and the implications that 
re-performance has for notions of authorship as well as loss and mourning. 
 The idea of non-linear time runs throughout the thesis and is applied to 
all case studies and performers, as it is used to examine the ways in which re-
performances are haunted by initial or earlier versions of the performance and 
suggest the possibility of future re-performances. The thesis asserts that 
through both photography and re-performance echoes and traces can be made 
to remain and the past can be brought to life in the present. In the case of Wilke 
and Spence’s work, which has already been discussed, the thesis contends that 
their work destabilises linear notions of time because it makes their lives visible 
after their deaths. The research argues that re-performance disrupts the 
linearity of time by enabling a performance, like a specter, to exist 
simultaneously in the past, present and future. This argument has been 
developed from Derrida’s concept of the specter and specifically his questioning 
of time in relation to the specter. Derrida asks ‘what is the time and what is the 
history of a specter? Is there a present of the specter? Are its comings and 
goings ordered according to the linear succession of a before and an after’ 
(1993: 48)? These questions inform the ways in which this research explores 
non-linear notions of time in relation to re-performance. 
 This argument is made however, with the knowledge that a re-
performance is never the same as the initial performance. This concept is 
explored specifically through the work of artist Dani Ploeger. His performances, 
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Electrode (2011) and Ascending (2013), are investigated as examples of re-
performances, which inevitably fail in their attempts to re-create the initial 
performance fully or exactly. Ploeger’s work was also selected as a case study 
for this thesis because of the intratextual relationship between the two 
performances, which, this thesis contends, can be considered re-performances 
of one another. 
 The case studies of artists, Aliza Shvartz, Lynne Hershman Leeson and 
Anne Bean are slightly different from the others included in this thesis. 
However, they have been used to explore notions of multiplicity, uncanniness 
and re-birth which work with the thesis’ focus on examining the relationship 
between performance, re-performance and death. Aliza Shvartz caused 
controversy in 2008 with her untitled performance, in which she inseminated 
herself with donor sperm before taking an abortifacient and collecting the 
resulting blood for use in an exhibition. Despite the fact that Shvartz’s work is 
not a re-performance in the same way as the other case studies it is still linked 
to notion of repetition and multiplicity because of Shvartz’s repeated acts of 
insemination and possible abortion, as well as the fact that she potentially 
multiplied herself, if she conceived. It is these notions of multiplicity and re-birth 
which link Shvartz’ work to that of Hershman-Leeson and Bean. From 1974 - 
1978 Hershman Leeson performed the character of Roberta Breitmore and in 
2012 Bean moved to a town where no-one knew her where she lived as the 
character Chana Dubinski. In both cases the people who interacted with 
Breitmore and Dubinski were unaware that they were participating in a 
performance and treated them as if they were actual people. In each case 
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Breitmore and Dubinski were also created using elements of Hershman Leeson 
and Bean’s personalities and histories so that rather than being fictitious 
characters Breitmore and Dubinski were multiplications of the artists who 
created them. Due to the fact that Breitmore and Dubinski were created by 
Hershman Leeson and Bean respectively, this thesis analyses their relationship 
to life and death and the ways in which the Hershman Leeson and Bean gave 
life to Breitmore and Dubinski whilst simultaneously multiplying their own lives. 
 
Themes and Theories 
Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will outline the key themes that are 
examined in this research. This thematic organisation enables me to place the 
theories and case studies in dialogue with one another and highlight how this 
provides interesting and original insights into performance’s (and re-
performance’s) relationship  with death. It also reflects the thematic focus of the 
chapters themselves. The chapters have been arranged thematically so that the 
structure of the thesis itself reflects the processes of mourning and re-
performance which it analyses. The first chapter of the thesis introduces the key 
themes and theories but the remainder of the thesis examines each thematic 
focus in turn, beginning in chapter two with notions of death and finitude. Whilst 
chapter three explores the remains of both performances and lives and chapter 
four focuses specifically on the concepts of loss and mourning. The final two 
chapters investigate notions of legacy and memorial, considering the 
possibilities for the future and survival.  
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Echoes and Traces 
In Mourning Sex Phelan uses the discourse of psychoanalysis to investigate the 
work of mourning and loss. She discusses the nature of loss and our desire to 
hang on to that which we have lost. Phelan analyses art, performance and film 
and presents us with an image of mourning as a desperate struggle to keep the 
object of mourning alive. The crux of the issue, for Phelan, is the fact that ‘not 
even the dead will hold still: they do not leave us all at once, which would be 
horribly violent but clear’ (1997: 41). In death, as in performance, there are 
always echoes and traces left behind. I contend that by creating something 
which disappears, but leaves echoes and traces that we endeavour to hold 
onto, in our quest to try and re-capture the essence of the thing that has 
disappeared, re-performance prepares us for death. Phelan claims that 
performance prepares us for death because it disappears. Yet, if re-
performance prevents performance from disappearing, then it could be the case 
that performance can no longer prepare us for death. However, aided by 
Rebecca Schneider’s theorisation of re-enactment, this research argues that far 
from weakening Phelan's claim, the existence of re-performance strengthens 
the relationship between performance and death.  
In her 2011 text, Performing Remains, Schneider explores both civil war 
and theatrical reenactments stating that in reenactment there is ‘a syncopated 
relationship to the event that (some) participants hope will touch the actual past, 
at least in a partial or incomplete or fragmented manner’ (2011: 9; emphasis in 
original). Schneider discusses ‘temporal leaks’, which she describes as the 
ability to touch or, in some way, step into a time in which we do not belong 
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(2011: 10).  Schneider also talks about ‘following footsteps and leaving 
footsteps to follow in directions not always, or only, forward’ in relation to civil 
war re-enactments, stating that ‘the fighting [which] took place both followed 
precedent wars and left remains’ (2011: 11; emphasis in original). This ability to 
touch the past, to create something which neither fits entirely into the past or 
present, is the creation of a temporal leak. This notion is also explored by 
Derrida in relation to the specter. Derrida states that ‘at bottom, the specter is 
the future, it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come, 
or come back;’ (1993: 39). The specter then, like re-performance, confounds 
notions of linear time by allowing performance to come, or come back. Re-
performance, according to Schneider’s concept of simultaneously following and 
leaving footsteps to follow and Derrida’s notion of specters of the future, is a 
way of allowing performance to continue. It is a way of documenting 
performance without losing the ephemerality, which Phelan in her 1993 book 
Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, claims is the essence of performance.  
 Schneider recognises that re-performances are never the same as the 
initial performance, when she states that ‘the “original” recurs, occurring always 
and only in and through difference’ (2011: 131). In this way, Phelan and 
Schneider’s viewpoints, far from being oppositional, do in fact work together. 
Re-performance allows performance to be saved and documented whilst 
remaining performance, but never the same performance. Re-performances are 
created using the echoes, traces and leftovers of the initial performance, but 
they differ from the initial performance. Therefore, the initial performance still 
disappears. It just does so slowly, until all that is left of the initial performance 
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are the memories conjured when we witness the re-performance. In a similar 
way, when someone dies, they leave behind echoes and traces which we often 
keep and treasure because they conjure memories of the lost other. These 
memories comfort us, or as Phelan claims in her story of one of the first 
paintings, ‘console [us], make [us] feel less lonely’ (1997: 120-121). 
 
Bodily Transmission: The Bodily Archive 
Memories, however, will inevitably fade and evidence of precedent acts 
or events need to be stored in some form of archive in order to survive. In this 
research I explore the notion of bodily transmission as a means of storing 
performance, keeping a performance “alive” and preventing it from 
disappearing. A key question that this research addresses is whether re-
performance, when seen as a form of bodily transmission from one body or 
performer to another, can be understood as a way of memorialising 
performance, creating what I describe as a bodily archive of performance. I am 
not the first person to ever use the term bodily archive. Indeed Andre Lepecki 
used the term in his 2010 essay ‘The Body as Archive: Will to Re-Enact and the 
Afterlives of Dances’. However, Lepecki predominantly uses the term in relation 
to dance whereas this thesis examines acts of performance art. Lepecki does 
discuss Julie Tolentino’s project The Sky Remains The Same, which is also one 
of the case study performances in this thesis, but I assert that my use of the 
term still differs from his in crucial ways. Lepecki’s concept refers specifically to 
acts of re-performance, which he terms re-enactment, whereas this project also 
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employs the term bodily archive in relation to initial performances in which the 
artist’s body becomes marked by the performance. Thus, the term is used in 
relation to performances by artists such as Ron Athey and Marina Abramovic, 
whose bodies become an archive of their performance history as they are 
wounded, bleeding and scarred through their performances. In Diana Taylor’s 
2003 book The Archive and The Repertoire she uses the term repertoire to 
discuss embodied transmission and documentation versus the traditional 
language-based archive (this is discussed in more detail below). Taylor’s writing 
will be drawn upon as the thesis explores the idea of bodily archiving and 
remembering. Here the work created by Ron Athey and Julie Tolentino, and, 
specifically, the 2011 project The Sky Remains the Same, is analysed in order 
to examine this concept of bodily transmission and the ways in which it can 
allow the performance to outlive the initial artist. Their work sees Tolentino 
witness Athey's performance before presenting her re-performance, and I 
assert that notions of bodily transmission are present due to the nature of the 
performance. Additionally, I argue that this idea of passing on links to the 
questions raised earlier in relation to re-performance as a means of keeping 
performance “alive”. By passing on a performance from one body to another, 
the future of the performance becomes more secure, in the sense that the body 
of the initial performer is no longer required to ensure its survival. Thus, the 
performance can have a life in any number of bodies and is no longer reliant on 
the body of the initial performer. This is, as I contend in chapter one, significant 
in the current cultural and political climate where death appears to surround us 
as we face the very real threats of war and terror every day. I postulate the idea 
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that the desire to retain a performance is similar to the desire that we have to 
hold onto the leftovers and memories of the loved ones that we have lost. 
Here, Diana Taylor’s concept of the repertoire will be used to explore 
notions of bodily transmission. Taylor uses the term repertoire to describe an 
act of collective and cultural remembering (2003). We find performance as an 
outlet for public grief as well as a way of remembering those who have 
disappeared and become lost to us in one way or another. Taylor describes 
acts of collective remembering, coming together to remember, to mourn and to 
memorialise those who ‘disappeared’4 (2003: 161). This thesis will argue that 
bodily transmission and the passing on of a performance from one artist to 
another, whilst not an act of mourning, is an act of witnessing and remembering. 
It is a way of archiving and retaining a performance and perhaps, an 
acknowledgement of the frailty of the human body. Performances need to be 
passed on from one body to another in order to endure because all bodies are 
fragile. 
This concept of bodies as ephemeral and the need for performances to 
be passed from one body to another in order to survive raises questions of 
survival, death and finitude. The term finitude is used throughout the thesis to 
refer to the fact that everyone and everything has a life span, that no-one is 
immortal, and nothing lasts forever. This thesis’ understanding of finitude 
focuses on the term in relation to earthly mortality rather than any religious 
                                                 
4  In The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the 
Americas Taylor talks specifically about events in Chile but her concept of 
collective mourning or remembering can be usefully applied to a range of other 
contexts, such as those explored in this research. 
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connotations of the term. Thus, finitude is used in relation to notions of bodily 
fragility, loss, death and mourning. The notions of finitude and bodily fragility are 
particularly pertinent when considering the work of Athey and Tolentino. Due to 
the fact that Athey is ‘HIV positive’ his illness brings his survival into question 
(Palmer 1998: 1). These questions are explored through the nature of the 
performance and, in particular, the use of bloodletting. Athey and Tolentino’s 
bodies can be described as precarious because they are endangered due both 
to Athey’s illness and Tolentino’s proximity to his seemingly “dangerous” body. 
The use of blood in the performance is crucial to the notion of precariousness 
as the close proximity of the artists’ bodies means that there is potential for the 
blood to cross the boundaries between the two bodies. This concept of 
precariousness will be employed in order to denote and explore notions of 
bodies on the edge, bodies operating on boundaries, whose nature or state of 
being is somehow at risk or under threat. Athey and Tolentino appear to be 
under threat of death. Additionally, their bodies operate on boundaries. They do 
not fit easily into the categories of sick or healthy but operate in a liminal space, 
a space described by Victor Turner as ‘betwixt and between’ (1969: 65). Athey 
and Tolentino are, I assert, bodies which exist in the space between life and 
death. They are very clearly and visibly alive but at the same time their use of 
blood and wounding is a visceral reminder of the fragility of their, and indeed 
our own, bodies. 
Moreover, Athey and Tolentino operate on boundaries because theirs 
are bodies that refuse to be easily defined or categorised. They cannot be 
delineated according to cultural perceptions of masculinity or femininity. 
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Furthermore, at times during the performance the boundaries between their 
bodies are not always visible as they merge into a mass of blood and flesh. The 
nature of the performances, in which blood drips, leaks and oozes out of the 
performers’ bodies, serves to further this blurring of bodily boundaries, meaning 
that there are moments in which the bodies that are witnessed can’t easily be 
identified as belonging to Athey or Tolentino. Therefore, it can be said to be 
crossing and transgressing boundaries. It is for this reason that The Sky 
Remains the Same also provides a basis for examining gender roles in 
performance and re-performance. The fact that Tolentino, as a female artist, re-
creates the work of a male artist allows the research to examine the way in 
which the physical body of a performer affects the perception of a performance. 
It enables the thesis to question whether Tolentino’s status as a woman 
disrupts notions of body-to-body transmission that occur in her re-performance. 
It also provides the opportunity for the research to question whether Tolentino’s 
re-performance, especially the nature of the re-enactment which positioned her 
body next to Athey’s, feminises his body as an erotic object, or masculinises 
hers as capable as being as tough as his. Seeing the same actions performed 
by a male body and then a female body disrupts notions of gender difference 
because the actions are the same, but the bodies performing those actions 
differ. This blurs the lines between the bodies of the two performers. In a sense 
the two bodies are intertwined. They share a physical space and a set of 
performative actions. As such, it is not always easy to define where Athey’s 
body, or indeed his performance, ends and Tolentino’s begins. However, once 
again notions of gender disrupt this blurring of bodies, performances and 
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boundaries because the gender difference between the performers prevents 
their actions from being read in the same way and, therefore, interrupts the 
notion of bodily transmission. 
 
Haunting and Specters 
The concept of bodily transmission or passing on is also explored through the 
work of artists, Sheree Rose, Martin O'Brien and Bob Flanagan. The work 
created by both Rose and Flanagan and Rose and O’Brien is similar in form as 
it explores sadomasochistic ideas, with Rose presented in the role of dominant 
sadist and, first Flanagan, then later O'Brien, fulfilling the role of subservient 
masochist. Here it is not Flanagan’s or O'Brien's presence which conjures 
notions of passing on but Rose’s. It is her body and the role that she plays in 
the performances which invokes the similarities between the performances and, 
therefore, the notions of bodily transmission. Rose's work with O'Brien appears 
to be haunted by her earlier work with Flanagan because she acts as the body 
through which the transmission from Flanagan to O'Brien takes place. Thus, it is 
her presence which causes the work to appear haunted by Flanagan's ghost. 
Flanagan may not be physically present in the work created by Rose and 
O'Brien, but that does not stop him being present as a specter who haunts the 
performance. We can see Flanagan in O'Brien's body, which is beaten, whipped 
and bruised by Rose in the same way that Flanagan’s was in the past.  
Notions of gender are also examined here as Rose is positioned as the 
mother figure through which Flanagan’s work is passed onto O’Brien, the 
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feminine vessel which breathes life into Flanagan’s performances. This concept 
of Rose as a feminine mother figure is however, disrupted by the knowledge 
that Rose is an active participant in the performances. In her role as sadist to 
their masochist, she whips and beats Flanagan and O’Brien and, therefore, has 
agency in the performances.  
 The analysis of Rose and O’Brien’s work is informed by Jacques 
Derrida’s text Specters of Marx, in which Derrida employs the term specter, 
stating that ‘it is flesh and phenomenality that give to the spirit its spectral 
apparition, but which disappear right away in the apparition, in the very coming 
of the revenant or the return of the specter’ (1994:6; emphasis in original). The 
specter then, according to Derrida, appears as something more tangible than 
the ghost or the spirit. When he speaks of the specter, Derrida speaks of flesh 
and visors and helmets, solid objects, things which one can touch and feel. 
However, Derrida does not lose the elusiveness normally associated with 
ghosts and spirits by choosing the term specter. On the contrary, he 
emphasises the somewhat illusory nature of the specter in his discussion of 
what he terms ‘the visor effect’, where he presents the specter as someone or 
something which is always there, always watching us even when ‘we do not see 
who looks at us’ (1994: 7; emphasis in original).    
Derrida refers to the specter of Marxism, which he claims haunts Europe, 
suggesting that the specter of communism is one which terrifies the powers of 
Europe because it is a ‘specter of communism then to come’ (1994: 37; 
emphasis in original).  Specters, according to Derrida, are terrifying not only 
because they act like spies, watching us from behind their helmets or visors but 
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because they speak of something which is not necessarily or not only past. 
Derrida uses Hamlet’s words ‘time is out of joint’ in relation to the specter, 
suggesting that the specter can speak of the past and the future simultaneously 
(1994: 10). Thus, the specter does not seem to remain in its own time but is 
able to travel between times. This research argues that it is in this way that 
Flanagan's specter returns to haunt Rose and O'Brien's performances.  
  The idea of the specter is entwined with Derrida's notion of hauntology, 
in the sense that both speak of the future and present as well as the past. As 
Derrida has stated, hauntology and the specter speak to ‘repetition and first 
time, but also repetition and last time since the singularity of any first time 
makes of it also a last time’ (1994: 10; emphasis in original). Derrida speaks of 
the singularity of the first time whilst simultaneously describing repetition and 
the last time. This suggests that time is not only linear, but it can become ‘out of 
joint’ through time travelling specters who haunt the present and future from 
their position in the past (1994: 18). These specters refuse to stay in their own 
time, relentlessly pushing forward into a time where they should not belong. 
Flanagan does not belong in O'Brien and Rose's performances; he haunts them 
like Derrida's specter, like the ghost of Hamlet’s father, refusing to stay in the 
past. 
 
The Process of Dying 
The notion of time being ‘out of joint’ is also at issue in the work of Hannah 
Wilke, Jo Spence and Tom Joslin (1994: 18). Wilke, Spence and Joslin’s work 
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explores their illnesses and subsequent deaths but, this thesis argues, that they 
do so in such a way as to present dying as non-linear process. In the work that 
they create using film and/or photography spectators do not witness the linear 
progression of an illness, from health until death. Instead spectators are 
presented with the concept of dying as something that belongs neither in the 
past, present or future but which speaks to all three simultaneously. Dying is 
presented, in a similar way to re-performance, as a process. As such, this work 
provides insights into performance’s relationship with death and, in particular, 
into questions about performance’s ability to prepare us for death. Wilke’s Intra-
Venus Series (1993) and the subsequent Intra-Venus Tapes (2007), as well as 
Spence’s The Final Project (1992) and Tom Joslin’s Silverlake Life: The View 
from Here (1993), allow the research to explore the relationship between 
witnessing performance and witnessing death. In Intra-Venus Tapes, an 
exhibition produced fourteen years after her death; spectators can witness 
Wilke’s physical deterioration during her battle with Lymphoma. In the tapes, 
Wilke appears like a specter, her presence haunts the exhibition in which she 
appears very much present and alive. The fact that we are able to witness this 
so long after her death raises questions about performance’s ability to ‘respond 
to the psychic need to rehearse for loss, and especially for death’ (Phelan 1997: 
3). How can performance, if it disappears as it is being performed, respond to 
this need when long after Wilke’s death we can still see her, very much alive 
and present? This issue is explored by Phelan in her analysis of the film, 
Sliverlake Life: The View from Here, created by Tom Joslin, and the thesis 
examines Phelan’s analysis in relation to both Silverlake Life and Intra-Venus 
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Tapes. Phelan discusses the temporal boundaries crossed by watching the 
dead, alive, if not always healthy, on film. She explores Joslin’s desire to make 
the film and argues that in film Joslin remains, even after his death, when she 
states that ‘cinema is one place where the still-moving body leaves a trace’ 
(2013: 156). This thesis draws upon Phelan's analysis of Joslin's film to inform 
my own investigation of his, Wilke’s and Spence's work, as the thesis questions 
what it means to witness another’s death after the event and the implications 
that this has for performance’s claims to ephemerality and its ability to respond 
to ‘a psychic need to rehearse for loss, and especially for death’ (2013: 3).  
As outlined earlier in this introduction, some of the artists that make up 
the case studies suffer(ed) from chronic or incurable illness. They have been 
chosen because their illnesses are explored through the work that they create 
and, as such, their work presents us with images of sick and/or dying bodies. It 
is the presentation of these bodies in performance that makes them of particular 
interest to this research. The status of these bodies as sick or dying places 
them on the borders of life and death, and, therefore, presents dying as a 
process rather than a state; a process through which the health of a body 
deteriorates slowly until it arrives at death. Throughout the research, a 
distinction is drawn between death and dying. The term death is used to 
describe the state of a body or person which is fixed. Contrastingly, dying is 
used to describe the process through which a person or body must pass in 
order to go from being alive to being dead. It is the concept of dying as a 
process that this research is interested in, as it provides a conceptual 
framework for exploring performance’s relationship with death. Furthermore, it 
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raises questions about the ephemerality of performance. Bodies on the 
boundary of life and death are ephemeral; they will cease to exist once the 
process of dying is over, similar to the way in which performance arguably 
ceases to exist once it has ended. However, these bodies leave echoes and 
traces behind, much like the echoes and traces that performances leave behind 
as documentation. 
 
Afterlives, Survival and Re-performance 
These echoes and traces can be seen as the afterlife of performance, the 
things left behind which enable the performance to be re-performed and re-
created. This thesis asserts that acts of re-performance are also acts of 
survival. They enable performances to survive, albeit in a transformed state, 
and I contend that this process of transformation and survival is crucial to 
performance’s and re-performance’s relationship with death. In his exploration 
of philosophical notions of death in, The Book of Dead Philosophers, Simon 
Critchley quotes the philosopher Zhuangzi as saying that ‘death and life are 
never-ceasing transformations’ (2008: 56), and this research draws parallells 
between the transformations involved in re-performance and those involved in 
dying and death. I argue that the transformations within re-performance enable 
performances to disappear slowly, fading away with each transformation, rather 
than instantaneously, and that this mirrors the process of mourning. Thus, this 
enables re-performance to prepare us for death and helps us to survive the 
deaths of those we love. As Critchley states, ‘it is the deaths of those that we 
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are bound to in love that undo us’ (2008: 9). And I assert that in order to survive 
those deaths we have to find a way to make meaning from the loss in the same 
way that re-performances make meaning from the echoes and traces of 
performances.  
The question of how to survive the loss of others is further explored in 
relation to Judith Butler’s 2004 text Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning 
and Violence, in which she discusses the ‘the transformative effect of loss’ and 
asks ‘Who “am” I without you? (2004: 21,22). What Butler makes clear is that 
when we experience the loss of a loved one it changes us and this links to 
Phelan’s assertion that ‘Narcissism emerges not out of an excess of self-love, 
as is commonly assumed, but rather as a “militant” acknowledgement of loss’ 
(1997: 130). Phelan proposes the idea that narcissism is a means of self-
preservation, of surviving the loss of the other. However, Phelan’s use of the 
term militant is suggestive of the fact that this kind of grief can generate agency 
and it is this notion that the thesis explores in relation to monuments and 
memorials. This thesis analyses performances such as Silverlake Life, Taking it 
to the Grave and Ankle Deep, contrasting them with other memorial forms such 
as The Aids Quilt and The Vietnam Veterans Memorial in order to explore the 
ways in which memorials can be performative and the interrelation between 
monuments and less traditional forms of memorial. The research argues that 
temporal memorials can work alongside monuments, in much the same way as 
performance documentation and bodily archives can work together, in order to 
provide a fuller insight into past performances as well as the lives of the dead. 
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Thus, this enables performance to play a significant role in preparing us for loss 
and death. 
 Having outlined the key concepts and questions raised by this research 
and introduced some of the key theorists, texts and terms, which will be drawn 
upon throughout the research, I will now briefly introduce the content of each 
chapter. 
 
Chapter One – Re-performance, Death, Mourning and Survival: A Theoretical 
Discourse 
The first chapter of the thesis draws together the main theories which underpin 
and influence the research, outlining the links between the theories and the 
ways in which they are brought together in order to develop this thesis’ 
understanding of the relationship between performance, re-performance and 
death. The artists whose work makes up the case studies for this thesis are also 
introduced as the chapter explains the ways in which the theories will be 
applied to the artists’ work and the reasons why these particular artists and 
performances have been selected for analysis. The first chapter builds upon this 
introduction by highlighting the main ideas that are developed throughout the 
rest of the thesis, providing a more detailed outline of these theories and 
concepts and the specific ways in which the research employs them. Therefore, 
this sets these concepts up for more detailed analysis later on in the thesis. 
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Chapter Two – Desire and Fear: Death and Finitude 
The second chapter of the thesis focuses on examining the re-performance 
works of Ron Athey with Julie Tolentino and Sheree Rose with Martin O’Brien 
and Bob Flanagan. The re-performances analysed in this chapter are done so 
in terms of what they can teach us about the fragile nature of bodies and the 
concept of finitude. They are also positioned in dialogue with Julia Kristeva’s 
concept of abjection and Freud’s theory of melancholia. Through this dialogue, 
which the chapter also links to the Derridian notions of haunting and specters, 
the research argues that specters can be viewed in re-performances and 
examines the ways in which they are made visible. It draws upon Julia 
Kristeva’s notion of abjection and analyses the combination of fear and desire 
that we experience when witnessing performances in which bodily boundaries 
become blurred and there is a risk of contamination. If a re-performance is 
haunted by the specter of an earlier version of the performance and the 
performance, as I argue, can be seen as a means of passing on from one body 
to another, the two bodies cease to be separate entities. They become 
intertwined and the boundaries between them become blurred. Thus, this 
suggests that the bodies of the performers are at risk of losing ‘the integrity of 
one’s “own and clean self” (Kristeva,1982: 53). The blurring of the bodies’ 
boundaries risks collapsing the boundary between the two bodies, placing them 
in an abject space in which self and other can no longer be easily separated.  
 In addition to its focus on re-performance this chapter will analyse works 
by artists Martin O’Brien and Ron Athey, which investigate abjection through 
their use of bodily fluids, in O’Brien’s case, mucus and in Athey’s, blood. The 
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chapter will analyse the ways in which the use of these fluids explores the 
notion of abjection and links this to ideas about corpses and dying which 
Kristeva examines, describing the corpse as, ‘the most sickening of wastes, […] 
a border that has encroached upon everything’ (1982: 3). The chapter will form 
a link between these concepts (re-performance, abjection, illness and bodily 
fluids) by arguing that in illness and dying, as in re-performance, the body’s 
integrity cannot be guaranteed. Kristeva states that ‘the corpse, seen without 
God and outside of Science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life’ 
(1982: 4). When viewed in this way, illness and dying appear to encroach upon 
the body, infecting the body, taking over the body, until the point of death: 
‘Death happens when the illness within the body surmounts the health within 
the body’ (Phelan 2013: 159). At the point of death, the body ceases to be a 
body and becomes a corpse, the ultimate object of abjection. 
 Drawing links between Phelan and Kristeva's arguments this chapter 
contends that in re-performance and in performances which use bodily fluids, as 
in death, the boundaries of the body become blurred, insecure and misaligned, 
allowing for slippages, failures and transgressions. This includes the slippage 
between the bodies of the initial artist and the re-performer and the 
transgression of publicly displaying bodily fluids, which are usually confined 
within the body, and the failure of the body to be able to rid itself of illness. It 
ultimately displays the failure to prevent death from trespassing upon and taking 
over the body. The chapter also asserts that this use of bodily fluids, together 
with the desire to re-perform pieces in order to intercept their disappearance, 
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serve as pertinent reminders of the fact that our bodies are fragile and our lives 
finite. 
Chapter Three – Echoes, Traces and Remains 
In the third chapter of the thesis I build upon the second by accepting that re-
performances differ from both the initial performance and each other in several 
ways but arguing that in spite of their differences re-performances always 
contain remnants of the initial performance. Here, the research draws upon the 
Derridian notion of the Specter in order to argue that re-performances are 
always haunted by the initial performance because the remnants of the initial 
performance form the basis of the re-performance and are therefore visible in 
the re-performance. Using the case studies of Martin O’Brien’s 2011 
performance Mucus Factory and his 2015 piece, Anatomy of a Bite, as well as 
Julie Tolentino and Ron Athey’s 2011 performance, Self-obliteration #1 
Ecstatic, and Dani Ploeger’s performance Electrode (2011), this chapter asserts 
that re-performances powerfully evoke memories of the initial performance. In 
so doing, they present possibilities for the return of the initial performance by 
providing us with new insights into and ways of understanding the initial 
performance. 
 In addition to its focus on re-performance this chapter also explores 
Richard Schechner’s concept of aftermath, analysing the ways in which bodily 
remains, such as blood and mucus, can be seen as the aftermath of a 
performance. I question whether these objects can be used in conjunction with 
other archival materials in order to document performance. This chapter also 
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explores the concept of intertextually / intratextuality as the chapter examines 
the ways in which certain actions or gestures are re-iterative and appear 
throughout the body of an artist’s work, as a way of documenting their earlier 
work. By placing these concepts in dialogue with one another this chapter is 
able to argue that documentation and live performance, just like traditional 
archives and bodily archives, are not merely two sides of a binary opposition, 
but can in fact work together in order to enhance both our understanding of 
previous performances and performance’s relationship with death. 
Chapter Four– Loss and Mourning  
The fourth chapter of the thesis analyses performance’s relationship with death 
in more detail, building upon the discussion of the way in which performance 
prepares us for death and loss in chapter two.  This chapter focuses on 
examining the relationship between performance and mourning. Through an 
exploration of mourning and melancholia, drawn from Freud and Kristeva, this 
chapter argues that performance, and re-performance in particular, prepare us 
for death by enabling us to understand dying as an ongoing process.  Amongst 
the case studies addressed in this chapter, are Martin O’Brien and Sheree 
Rose’s work Dust to Dust (2015), Jo Spence’s exhibitions, Narratives of 
Disease (1989) and The Final Project (1992), as well as Hannah Wilkes video 
exhibition Inra-Venus Tapes (1990-1993). The case studies in this chapter are 
used to explore re-performance’s relationship with death and are examined 
through a dialogue between Barthes’ writing on photography and death in 
Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography and Rebecca Schneider’s analysis 
of re-performance (which she terms reenactment) in Performing Remains. By 
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bringing these texts together and placing them in dialogue with one another, 
this chapter argues that discussions of the relationship between photography 
and death can be pertinently applied to the relationship between death, 
performance and re-performance. It contends that doing so can further our 
understanding of the possible ways in which performance and re-performance 
prepare us for death and loss. 
Chapter Five – Re-performance, Legacy and the Future 
The fifth chapter of this thesis draws conclusions from the ideas and concepts 
explored in the earlier chapters, pulling together ideas of re-performance and 
the impact that it has on performance’s relationship with death. This chapter 
focuses on the notion of legacy, expanding upon the earlier discussion of bodily 
archives this chapter introduces the notion of re-performance, creating a legacy 
of performances, developing on what Diana Taylor termed a ‘repertoire’ (2003). 
This chapter explores the notion of legacy in more detail, questioning our desire 
or need for a legacy. Drawing upon Simon Critchley’s recent work The Book of 
Dead Philosophers (2008), this chapter explores Critchley’s concept of a 
philosophical death and discusses it in relation to Freud’s notion of life and 
death drives. This chapter questions our desire to leave something behind and 
our seeming inability to accept that death is the one thing from which we never 
return.  
 In examining this desire, the chapter will also draw upon examples of 
performances of illness and dying, such as Marina Abramović’s 2005 
performance, Seven Easy Pieces, her 2010 performance, The Artist is Present, 
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Martin Nachbar’s 2000 performance project, Affects/Rework and Jill Hocking’s 
Cabbage Leaf Blanket performance (2002). The chapter will argue that 
performances such as these are linked with the concept of legacy, both of an 
artist seeking to gain control over their legacy and of legacies as being passed 
on through re-performance. the notion of legacy is also linked to the idea of 
survival and the desire to create and leave a legacy behind in order to ensure 
that you will be remembered. 
 
Chapter Six - Mourning and Memorial: 
The final chapter of the thesis builds on the previous chapter’s focus on legacy 
by moving towards an exploration of memorial. It analyses various kinds of 
memorial, from traditional memorials, such as The Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
to performance as memorial in pieces such as Briar Bates’ Ankle Deep. 
Drawing upon Metchild Windrich’s 2014 text, Performative Monuments: The 
Rematerialisation of Public Art, and Thomas Laqueur’s 2015 book, The Work of 
the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains, the chapter questions the 
motives behind creating memorials, arguing that performance as memorial can 
work alongside traditional forms of memorial to further enhance the relationship 
between performance and death by helping us to find more personal ways to 
memorialise those that we have lost. Supported by Peggy Phelan’s discussion 
of mourning, and specifically, her analysis of Tom Joslin’s Silverlake Life: The 
View from Here, this chapter questions what it is to witness and to survive the 
death of the other and the role that memorials play within the process of 
mourning. In addition, the chapter also examines the relationship between 
   49 
ephemeral memorials and re-performance, arguing that both acts reflect the 
ways in which the dead, just like performance, do not disappear but are 
transformed and continue to exist in these transformations. 
 The focus on memorial and comparisons between the traditional forms of 
memorial and performance as memorial leads the chapter to question the 
reliability of memorials and monuments, asking what might happen if we 
created false documentation and/or fake memorials. This question is asked in 
relation to Valie Export’s 1969 performance Action Pants: Genital Panic and a 
series of photographs which she created to commemorate the performance, but 
which have in many ways come to serve as documentation of the performance. 
Here, the chapter argues that much like ephemeral memorial performances, 
less traditional documentation can offer a valuable insight into a life or 
performance. 
 Notions of fakery are also examined in relation to performances in which 
artists have created “life”, such as Anne Bean and Lynne Hershman Lesson’s 
creations of alter egos or second lives. The chapter argues that the existence of 
these alter egos and the documentary proof of their lives can be considered 
fake because they were not actual people. However, it also questions the ways 
in which their existence was tied to the artists who created them, contending 
that they were part of the artist. In this sense, the chapter explores notions of 
multiplicity, asserting that the “lives” created by the artists served as 
multiplications of the artists themselves, allowing them to live more than one 
life. The chapter analyses these notions of multiplicity and false documentation 
in relation to loss, death, memorial and re-performance exploring the 
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relationships between traditional memorial forms and archival documentation 
and the fake documents, false lives and ephemeral memorial performances that 
appear in the case studies. It asserts that the two apparently opposing sides are 
interrelated and that it is this interrelation which allows for a relationship 
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Chapter One - Re-performance, Death, Mourning and Survival: A Theoretical 
Discourse 
 
As outlined in my introduction this thesis argues that the current global climate 
is one of war, death, terror and rupture. In her 2004 text Precarious Life: The 
Powers of Mourning and Violence, Judith Butler described how on September 
11th 2001 ‘US boundaries were breached, an unbearable vulnerability was 
exposed, [and]… a terrible toll on human life was taken’ (2004: XI). Since then 
there have been more attacks, more boundaries have been breached, more 
lives have been lost. The London Bombings on July 7th 2005, the terror attacks 
in Paris which took place on November 13th 2015 and the bombings which took 
place in Brussels on 22nd March 2016, to name but a few. Not forgetting the 
loss of life in the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria. Violence and death 
surround us, they envelope us. It feels as though everywhere we look we see 
destruction, horror, annihilation, and death is the end, the one thing from which 
we can never hope to escape. The relationship between re-performance and 
death, I argue, is central to our understanding of the concepts of death, loss 
and mourning. Phelan has asserted that ‘performance and theatre are 
instances of enactments predicated on their own disappearance’ (1997: 2), and 
I claim that it is the correlation between performance and disappearance which 
allows performance and re-performance to have an integral relation to the 
concepts of loss and death. Mourning is crucial to this relationship because the 
relationship between re-performance and death is particularly pertinent when 
considered in relation to the loss of loved ones. The lost other, like the lost 
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performance, does not disappear entirely and instantaneously. Phelan has 
argued that ‘the affective outline of what we’ve lost might bring us closer to the 
bodies we want still to touch’ (1997: 3). The lost other lingers, or their echoes, 
traces and leftovers do, in the form of an affective outline. I utilise the term 
affective outline to describe a range of objects, such as photographs and 
videos, that are left behind after a performance and/or a death. However, I also 
employ the term to denote less traditionally archivable materials such as the 
blood and mucus used in Ron Athey and Martin O’Brien’s performances and 
the clothing and jewellery of lost loved ones. It is my assertion that in order to 
survive the loss of the other, the deaths of those we love, we must find a way to 
create something new and meaningful from those leftovers. Re-performance 
serves as a metaphor for this process, as it is in re-performance that the 
leftovers and remains of the initial performance are transformed into something 
both new and meaningful.  
 However, that new performance is haunted by the specter of the initial 
performance. In the current climate, where the threat of death appears to be 
very real, re-performance serves as an important metaphor for us in 
understanding our own relationship with death, loss and mourning. In 
witnessing re-performances, we can understand how something meaningful can 
be made out of the leftovers of death and loss, and in a Europe haunted by the 
specters of war, terrorism and the rupture caused by Great Britain’s recent split 
from the European Union. It is now more important than ever that we learn to 
find a way to create something new and meaningful from the death, destruction 
and terror that we face. As Simon Critchely notes ‘in learning how to die we 
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might also be taught how to live’ (2008: 6). If we can find a way to create 
something new and meaningful from death, then perhaps we can find a way to 
understand that, whilst death may be the end of a life, it does not have to mean 
complete annihilation. And if we can do this, perhaps as Critchley claims, we 
can learn to live free from the ‘terror… of the inevitability of our demise’ (2008: 
1). 
 The concern with survival and finding ways to create something 
meaningful from death and possible annihilation are, I contend, critical in the 
current cultural and political climate and will be introduced thematically. This 
thematic introduction will serve to illustrate the ways in which the work draws 
the theories together, reading them in relation to one another, in order to offer 
new insights into the concepts that they explore. Each of the themes will be 
presented in relation to the artists whose work they will be used to examine 
throughout the thesis. This will therefore serve as a way of outlining how the 
theories will be applied to the case studies chosen for this research (as outlined 
in the introduction) providing an insight into how applying these theories to acts 
of re-performance, allows for new critical readings of them. 
 
Re-performance and Temporality: The Return of the Specter 
One of the key concerns of this thesis is the notion that both lives and 
performances create and leave leftovers and throughout the writing I assert that 
these leftovers are integral to re-performance’s relationship with death. 
 This notion of leftovers is linked to Derrida’s concept of ‘Hauntology’, as 
outlined in Specters of Marx: The state of the Debt, The work of Mourning and 
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the New International. Derrida describes ‘Hauntology’ as the ‘logic of haunting’ 
(1994: 10). Derrida asks, ‘what does it mean to follow a ghost? And what if this 
came down to being followed by it, always, persecuted perhaps by the very 
chase we are leading? Here again what seems to be out front, the future, 
comes back in advance: from the past, from the back’ (1994: 10). Thus, Derrida 
suggests that haunting is not a one-way road but a circuitous route where we 
are followed by the very thing for which we are searching. In this context of 
hauntology where, the past is not only behind but also in front of us and where 
time is not linear but rather an endless loop which folds back into itself again 
and again, each time becomes ‘a first time’ and also ‘a last time’ (1994: 10).  In 
Derrida’s view, hauntology means that first time and last time and past and 
future are not dichotomous opposites, but exist in a constant state of flux, where 
the last time does not always follow the first time and the future does not always 
follow the past.   
 This sentiment is echoed by Rebecca Schneider who puts forward the 
notion of reenactment as a way of keeping performance alive, of bringing it 
back to being in the present. She states that ‘entering, or re-enacting, an event 
or a set of acts (acts of art or acts of war) from a critical direction, a different 
temporal angle, may be … an act of survival, of keeping alive as passing on’ 
(2011: 7; emphasis in original). The suggestion here is that re-performances 
retain something of the initial performance, they are haunted by the specter of 
them, and in this way bring the initial performances back to life in the present. 
This concept is one which underpins the theoretical discussions throughout this 
thesis, from discussions of the ways in which re-performance blurs the 
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boundaries of time to the argument that performance does not always, or at 
least not entirely or instantly disappear once it is over. By placing these ideas 
alongside arguments such as those made by Peggy Phelan in Mourning Sex 
and Diana Taylor in The Archive and The Repertoire, this research interrogates 
the ways in which re-performance and bodily archives work together to enable 
something of performance to remain, to be left behind.  
 Derrida also discusses hauntology in relation to Karl Marx and the 
communist manifesto and, in doing so, presents us with a picture of the world, 
or, at least Europe, which is crawling with ghosts and in which everyone seems 
to be haunted by someone or something.  In his reading of the communist 
manifesto, Derrida claims that Europe is haunted by the specter of communism, 
stating that ‘haunting would mark the very existence of Europe’ (1994: 3). 
Derrida goes on to say that ‘the specter is the future, it is always to come, it 
presents itself only as that which could come or come back’, thus suggesting 
that what makes the specter so terrifying is the fact that it cannot be contained 
by the past or by singularity because it is defined by its ability to come back 
(1994: 48). In the current cultural and political climate, it is no longer the specter 
of communism which haunts Europe but the specter of death, and specifically 
those deaths related to terrorism and subsequent wars. Butler has described 
post 9/11 America as being engaged in ‘cycles of violence’ (2004: XII), and this 
is not just the case in the US. The violence that has taken place globally, either 
of acts of terrorism, or acts of war, has seen a dehumanisation of death. Drone 
strikes take away the human element in the act of killing whilst, as Butler 
suggests, ‘the humans who are imprisoned in Guantanamo do not count as 
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human; they are not subjects protected by international law’ (2004: XVI). In this 
climate, death appears justified, necessary in order to prevent the borders 
(which both Butler and I have described as being breached through acts of 
terrorism) from being breached again. The fear of death, the threat of violence 
that may be inflicted upon a nation, has led to acts of war and violence being 
inflicted upon other nations. It is this fear and the acts of violence to which it 
leads that, I contend, are the current specter haunting Europe and the US. 
 Throughout this thesis, Derrida’s notion of the term hauntology will be 
employed to explore the ways in which re-performances are haunted by the 
specters of earlier versions of the performance. I will utilise Derrida’s term 
‘specter’, which he prefers to the term’s ‘ghost’ or ‘spirit’. He differentiates 
between the terms by stating that ‘it is flesh and phenomenality that give to the 
spirit its spectral apparition, but which disappear right away in the apparition, in 
the very coming of the revenant or the return of the specter’ (1994: 6; emphasis 
in original). The specter then, according to Derrida, seems to be something 
more palpable than the ghost or the spirit. However, the corporeality of the 
specter is fleeting and ephemeral, disappearing almost at the very moment it 
appears. The specter, I contend, can momentarily appear visible and present, 
but almost instantaneously it disappears back into the realm of the apparition, 
leaving us questioning whether it was ever there at all. This is one of the 
reasons that I employ the term as I argue that through re-performances earlier 
versions of the performances can be made visible again. It is the visibility of the 
specter that draws me towards the term, as specters are both visible and 
somatic, but also virtual and transitory. This notion of the specter as 
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simultaneously visible and invisible is highlighted by Derrida’s assertion that ’we 
do not see who looks at us’ (1994: 7). This statement again emphasises the 
idea of the specter as something of which to be afraid, presenting it as almost 
predatory, sneaking around unseen, but seeing all. Using Hamlet and the ghost 
of Hamlet’s father as a point of reference, Derrida claims that ‘even though in 
his ghost the King looks like himself, that does not prevent him from looking 
without being seen’ (1994: 7). The specter, this ‘carnal form of the spirit’ (1994: 
6) seems to take on a rather sinister presence, something that watches us but 
does not always reveal its watching, choosing instead to hide behind its visor 
and only revel itself to us when it wishes. Thus, Derrida suggests that the 
specter is always present but not always visible. Hamlet sees the ghost of his 
father whereas Gertrude and Claudius do not. Thus, this suggests that the 
specter is an active agent who decides when they are seen and by whom, 
rather than a passive bystander who is brought into being through the act of re-
performance. It is also interesting to note that Derrida’s primary example of the 
specter comes from performance. This performance which is rather different 
from the ones that concern this thesis, but a performance nonetheless, hence 
highlighting the links between performance, death and haunting. 
 According to Derrida then, specters are terrifying, not only because they 
act like spies, watching us from behind their helmets or visors, but because they 
speak of something which is not necessarily or not only past. Derrida uses 
Hamlet’s words ‘time is out of joint’ in relation to the specter, suggesting that the 
specter can speak of the past and the future simultaneously (Derrida 1994: 20). 
It does not remain in its own time but appears to be able to travel between 
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times. Again, using Hamlet as a reference, Derrida states that ‘Hamlet already 
began with the expected return of the dead King. After the end of history, the 
spirit comes by coming back’ (1994: 10 emphasis in original). Hamlet’s King 
belongs to the past, he lived and died in the past, but Derrida suggests the 
specter of the King is here in the present. The past then, through the specter, 
can exist in the present. The specter also seems to hold the possibility of its 
return. Hamlet’s father does not visit him just once. The specter returns many 
times, hinting at the notion that the specter is capable of existing not only in the 
past and the present, but also in the future. This is another reason that I use the 
term specter throughout the thesis. It serves to illustrate the ways in which re-
performances operate on the boundaries of time, in liminal places where past, 
present and future can all be glimpsed concurrently. The specter lends itself to, 
and is, in a way, entwined with, the notion of hauntology, in the sense that both 
speak of the future and present as well as the past. As Hamlet and Derrida 
have stated, ‘time is out of joint’ and, as such, hauntology and the specter 
speak to ‘repetition and first time, but also repetition and last time, since the 
singularity of any first time makes of it also a last time’ (1994: 10; emphasis in 
original). Derrida discusses the singularity of not only the first time but also the 
last time, thus arguing that each repetition is singular. Its status as a repetition 
does not make it any less unique. Each repetition is both a first time and a last 
time. This suggests that time is not only not linear, but that it can become ‘out of 
joint’ through the time travelling specters who haunt the present and future from 
their position in the past (Shakespeare Act 1, Scene 5 and Derrida 1994: 20). 
They do not remain in their own time, but rather they appear again and again in 
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times to which they don’t seem to belong. This is also the case with re-
performances. As Rebecca Schneider has asserted in re-performance, ‘past, 
present and future occur and recur out of sequence’ (2011: 35; emphasis in 
original). Through re-performance, performances, like specters, can remain, can 
survive and can exist in both the present and future, rather than being confined 
to the past. These concepts of haunting, specters and repetition are explored in 
a variety of ways throughout the thesis but are particularly significant to the 
research into the performances created by Sheree Rose and Martin O’Brien. 
These performances are re-performances of Rose’s earlier works with Bob 
Flanagan and are, therefore, haunted by Flanagan’s specter, which is made 
visible in and through O’Brien’s body. 
 
Time is Out of Joint 
Rebecca Schneider explores notions of nonlinear time in her 2011 book 
Performing Remains, in which she examines both civil war and theatrical 
reenactments, and the way in which they cause what Schneider terms ‘temporal 
leaks’ (2011: 10). Schneider’s decision to explore civil war reenactments 
alongside re-performances is interesting when considered in connection with 
this research’s interest in the relationship between re-performance and death. 
Civil War reenactors are taking the places of the dead, even those who were 
not killed in battle are no longer living. As such, the act of reenacting a Civil War 
battle can be considered an act of bringing both the past and the dead back to 
life in the present. This idea is underscored by Schneider’s statement that in 
Civil War Reenactments ‘it can occasionally feel “as if” the halfway dead came 
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halfway to meet the halfway living, halfway’ (2011: 14). Here Schneider speaks 
to the sub summation of self and other, past and present and living and dead, 
suggesting that through re-performance we can create liminal moments in 
which there is no clear boundary between any of these states.  
 Schneider also talks about ‘following footsteps and leaving footsteps to 
follow in directions not always, or only, forward’ (2011: 11; emphasis in original). 
This suggests that reenactment is a way of allowing performance to come back, 
to exist not just in the past, present or future but be repeated. The crucial part of 
Schneider’s comment is ‘not always, or only, forward’ which suggests that she 
is not talking about moving in a linear direction but in a circuitous nature in 
which past, present and future appear as if in a loop (2011: 11; emphasis in 
original).  
 Reenactment or re-performance is a way of documenting performance 
without losing the performative aspect to which Phelan refers in Unmarked: The 
Politics of Performance when she argues that ‘performance’s only life is in the 
present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented or otherwise 
participate in the circulation of representation of representations: once it does 
so it becomes something other than performance’ (1993: 146; emphasis in 
original). It appears to me that Schneider postulates reenactment as a means of 
allowing performance to continue to live in the present. With the eternal 
possibility of re-performance, performance could feasibly have no beginning or 
ending. Like Derrida’s time travelling specters, re-performance holds the 
promise of return. On the surface this seems to oppose Phelan’s view, in which 
any attempt to save or document performance destroys its ephemerality, but 
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Schneider recognises that reenactments are never the same as the first time. 
Each re-performance is somehow marked as different, and, in this way, Phelan 
and Schneider’s viewpoints far from being oppositional do in fact work together. 
Through my analysis of re-performances created by Ron Athey, Julie Tolentino 
and Dani Ploeger I argue that reenactment, or what I refer to as re-
performance, allows performance to be saved and documented whilst 
remaining a performance, but never the same performance. By examining the 
similarities and differences between, for example, Ron Athey’s initial 
performance of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic in 2009 with Julie Tolentino’s re-
performance of it in 2011, as part of her project The Sky Remains the Same, I 
assert that whilst each repetition may be unique it is still haunted by the 
specters of previous versions of the performance. 
 
Death, Absence and Leftovers: Dead, Not Dead and Not, Not Dead 
As highlighted above the idea of leftovers is crucial to this thesis and the 
relationship between re-performance and death and underpins the exploration 
of death and absence which is central to the research. In the absence of his 
mother, which followed her death, Roland Barthes searched through 
photographs of her. He was trying to find that one picture which for him 
captured the essence of his mother. He eventually found it ‘in the Winter 
Garden Photograph’ (1981: 72). This photograph, Barthes claims, did not re-
produce or contain his mother, as he says that ‘what I have lost is … a quality (a 
soul) : not the indispensable, but the irreplaceable’ (1981: 75). It does, however, 
contain something of her essence and this causes Barthes to want to hold onto 
   62 
it, to keep it as a reminder of that which he has lost. Barthes is, of course, 
writing about photography, but this thesis explores the ways in which his ideas 
can also be fruitfully related to performance and particularly re-performance. By 
placing Barthes’ writings on photography in conjunction with Rebecca 
Schneider’s exploration of re-performance in her text, Performing Remains, the 
research analyses the relationship that both performative photography and 
performance art re-performances have with death, absence and loss, asserting 
that both art forms provide ways for the dead to remain. They enable the dead 
to appear alive in the present. Therefore, allowing spectators to witness the 
Derridian specters which haunt the performances and exhibitions that this 
research examines. This witnessing, much like any act of spectatorship is ‘an 
individual experience’ and not all spectators will experience the specter in the 
same way, or indeed at all (Freshwater 2009: 24). A spectator’s response to a 
re-performance will be determined by their own previous experiences of 
spectatorship. As Freshwater explains in Theatre and Audience ‘our responses 
to performance are generated by individual preoccupations and experiences,’ 
(2009: 23). This is particularly pertinent to spectators’ responses to re-
performances. Their knowledge and/or experience of the initial performance will 
impact upon their reading of the re-performance and in the case of audience 
members who were present at both performances the experience of a re-
performance may invoke their own, personal memories of the initial 
performance. They may be haunted by the specter of their own previous 
experience. 
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 I explore the relationship between re-performance, death, absence and 
loss, arguing that re-performances exist in a liminal state (liminality is something 
which I mentioned earlier in the chapter). Like the specters discussed earlier, 
re-performances do not exist solely in the past, present or future and the dead 
do not entirely disappear. As I have already argued, they refuse to remain in 
their “own time”, disrupting linear notions of time by forcing those witnessing 
them to acknowledge that what they are witnessing is both the past happening 
in the present and the possibility of it reoccurring again in a future re-
performance. 
 This concept of liminality is explored using Richard Schechner’s concept 
of Me, Not Me and Not Not Me, which Schechner describes as the self-
incorporating the other in performance. The Me (performer) takes on behaviours 
of the Not Me (the character), combining the two to create the Not, Not Me. and 
I argue that within re-performance, as with performative photography, what we 
witness is the subject being neither Dead nor Not Dead but Not Not Dead. 
Although there is a distinction between re-performance as a live act involving a 
body in a space, observed by spectators and performative photography, in 
which the act of posing for the photograph is the performance and this 
performance takes places only for and in front of a photographer, the element of 
Not Not Dead is visible in both cases. Schechner highlights the sense of 
merging the self with the other in Me, Not Me and Not Not Me when he states 
that ‘elements that are “not me” become “me” without losing their “not me-ness” 
(1985: 111). I contend that this is also the case in both photography and re-
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performance as both allow the dead to appear alive, thus the Dead and Not 
Dead converge, creating the liminal realm of Not Not Dead. 
 Through both performative photography we are able to transgress the 
boundaries of time and witness someone’s death many years after the event. 
Thus, this enables us to see them as simultaneously dead and not dead, 
present and absent, in the past and the present. This argument is used to 
analyse the performative photography of Hannah Wilke and Jo Spence (which, 
as I explained in the introduction, this thesis argues also function as re-
performances), arguing that the photographs they created of themselves dying 
enable us to witness their deaths over and over again, several years after the 
event actually occurred. Our ability to witness these deaths multiple times 
disrupts linear notions of both time and death. We can re-wind, re-play and re-
visit these deaths over and over again, supporting Phelan’s statement that ‘the 
body itself does not stop moving; cinema is one place where the still-moving 
body leaves a trace’ (1997: 156). Although Phelan’s argument is made in 
relation to cinema, which is something I address later on the chapter I contend 
that it is also applicable to the photographic works of Wilke and Spence. Whilst 
this ability to re-visit the death of the other may initially be seen as a traumatic 
experience and when it is considered in relation to Barthes’ exploration of the 
relationship between photography and death, rather than being traumatic, this 
act of witnessing and re-witnessing death can be seen as one of survival. Each 
time we witness the death we survive it again. The ability to survive the deaths 
of those we love is crucial in the current climate of war and terrorism where 
those deaths can be both violent and unpredictable. As Judith Butler argues in 
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Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence ‘when we lose some of 
these ties [to others whom we love] by which we are constituted, we do not 
know who we are or what to do’ (2004: 22). Surviving the loss of a loved one 
then, is about rediscovering who we are in light of that loss. In order to 
rediscover ourselves we must understand what it is that we have lost, both in 
the other and in ourselves, and that in this process of mourning and discovery 
the ability to re-witness the loss, re-visit the site of trauma, can aid us in 
understanding how to survive it. 
 Notions of survival are also explored by Diana Taylor in her text The 
Archive and The Repertoire in which she discusses the ability for something to 
be passed on, kept alive and remembered somatically. Taylor terms this ‘the 
repertoire’, an embodied form of remembering and states that ‘embodied and 
performed acts generate, record, and transmit knowledge’ (2003:21). In the 
repertoire actions, knowledge and memories are passed from one body to 
another through a process of bodily transmission. Taylor asserts that ‘the live 
performance can never be captured or transmitted through the archive’ (2003: 
20). This assertion makes it clear that live performance needs to be embodied, 
something which Taylor further emphasises when she states that ‘embodied 
memory, because it is live, exceeds the archive’s ability to capture it’ (2003: 20). 
Taylor’s argument is that the transmission of knowledge, which the repertoire 
allows for, is something which cannot be achieved without the live body. Taylor 
also explores the relationship between ‘the Archive’ and ‘The Repertoire,’ 
which, she asserts, is one of interdependence, claiming that ‘the repertoire ... 
expands the traditional archive’ (2003: 26). This claim is one that I investigate 
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throughout the thesis as I examine the various ways in which the archive and 
the repertoire work together in acts of re-performance. This is explored through 
my analysis of Martin O’Brien’s performance work and specifically his 2015 
performance Anatomy of a Bite. 
 Taylor examines the ways in which performance can become an outlet 
for public grief, as well as a means of remembering those who have 
disappeared and become lost to us in one way or another. In recent years there 
have been many public demonstrations of grief, from the One Love concert in 
Manchester in June 20175 to the graffiti messages in Brussels6 following the 
terror attack there in March 2016. It is clear that as a society we need to find 
some way of making sense of and memorialising events and Taylor asserts that 
the repertoire can be seen as a means of doing this. 
  This is clear in the chapter entitled, ‘Lost in the field of vision 
witnessing September 11’, in which Taylor recalls her need to photograph the 
horrific events that took place around her. She states that ‘aware that a 
historical event was overtaking my capacity to understand it, I too wanted to 
contain the moment and freeze it for later’ (2003: 241). For Taylor, the only way 
to ‘contain the moment’ was to photograph it, to create a document of it which 
she could use later on to help her understand what she had witnessed (2003: 
241).  Creating art has always been a way of understanding and exploring 
events and for Taylor the photographs she took on September 11th would serve 
                                                 
5 The One Love concert was held in June 2017 to honour the victims of the 
terror attack on the  Manchester Arena in May 2017. 
6 Following suicide bombings in Brussels in March 2016 citizens of Brussels 
wrote messages using chalk on the public square outside the Brussels stock 
exchange in response to the attacks. 
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to memorialise the incident. These photographs, however, belong to an archive, 
perhaps not one to which another individual could go and look, but Taylor’s own 
archive, her personal collection of photographs. They are documents and as 
such can be stored and contained in a traditional archive. Nevertheless, Taylor 
asserts that there are other ways in which things can be remembered, ways 
which can be just as valid and important as archival documentation. 
 Taylor’s emphasis on the body and her positioning it as central to the 
concept of the repertoire is something on which this thesis develops further by 
introducing the new concept of a bodily archive. The research employs the term 
bodily archive in a similar way to that in which Taylor utilises the term repertoire. 
It uses it to describe a corporeal, somatic way of knowing or of transmitting 
knowledge, from one body to another and of retaining this knowledge within a 
single body in the cases of re-performances by the initial artist. The research 
project has chosen the term bodily archive rather than repertoire because it 
foregrounds the role the live, physical bodies of performers play in the retaining 
and transmitting of knowledge that occurs within the bodily archive. This, 
however, does not mean that bodily archives are in opposition to traditional 
archives but, as Taylor suggested, the two ‘exist in a constant state of 
interaction’ (2003: 21). This ‘constant state of interaction’ (2003: 21), is one that 
I explore throughout the thesis by examining the ways in which more traditional 
archival materials are used to help create re-performances. I also explore it 
through a consideration of the ways in which re-performance captures the live, 
ephemeral nature of performance, which other archival materials are unable to 
retain and the ways in which re-performances leave their own echoes and 
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traces, which may or may not be considered archivable. Again, these notions 
are examined specifically in relation to Martin O’Brien’s 2015 performance 
Anatomy of a Bite. 
 The concept of echoes and traces is investigated in relation to the work 
of artists Ron Athey and Martin O’Brien, and in particular their production and 
use of bodily fluids within their work. These fluids provide the performance with 
remnants, or to quote Richard Schechner, an ‘aftermath’ 2013: 246), but are not 
objects which can be considered traditionally archivable. Like Schneider, Taylor 
explores ways in which performance can be ‘saved, recorded, documented’ 
without becoming ‘something other than performance’ (1993: 146). And like 
Schneider, Taylor turns to bodily transmission in order to achieve this. 
 
Witnessing Loss: The Desire to Hold On 
Whilst Phelan’s arguments in Unmarked: The Politics of Performance may not 
obviously fit with Taylor and Schneider’s discussions of reenactment and the 
repertoire, on closer analysis both concepts highlight the inability of the archive 
to capture or document performance, which was also Phelan’s point in 
Unmarked. This relationship between performance, loss and death is explored 
further by Phelan in her 1997 book, Mourning Sex. Here, Phelan uses the 
discourse of psychoanalysis to explore the work of mourning and loss. In a 
series of chapters, some of which are written performatively, Phelan discusses 
the nature of loss and our desire to hang on to that which we have lost. Within 
the text Phelan explores art, performance and film and presents us with an 
image of mourning as a desperate struggle to hold onto the object of mourning. 
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In a chapter entitled, ‘Infected eyes: Dying Man With A Movie Camera, 
Silverlake Life: The View from Here’, Phelan examines the film created by Tom 
Joslin, a filmmaker who ‘died of AIDS on July 1, 1991’, and discusses the 
temporal boundaries crossed by watching the dead, alive, if not always healthy, 
on film (1997: 154). She explores Joslin’s desire to make the film, stating that 
‘all of his desperation… is reserved for making Silverlake Life’ (1997: 156). The 
consequence of this is that Joslin’s main concern is avoiding annihilation, 
ensuring that even though his body will die, something of him will remain. It is 
evident in Phelan’s discussion that in film Joslin remains even after his death. 
As discussed earlier in relation to haunting, specters and Barthes’ analysis of 
photography Phelan’s assertion is that ‘cinema is one place where the still-
moving body leaves a trace’ and that ‘time stops without a living, moving body, 
but that the body itself does not stop moving’ (1997: 156).The crux of the issue 
for Phelan is the fact that ‘not even the dead will hold still: they do not leave us 
all at once, which would be horribly violent but clear’ (1997: 41). The fact is that 
in death, as in performance, there are always echoes and traces left behind. 
For me, it is these echoes and traces which mean that ‘theatre and performance 
respond to the psychic need to rehearse for loss, and especially for death’ 
(1997: 3). They do so by creating something which disappears but leaves an 
aftermath which we endeavour to hold onto in our quest to try and re-capture 
the essence of the thing that has disappeared. For example, this was evident in 
Barthes’ desire to find the photograph which, for him, captured the essence of 
the Mother he had lost. This desire is viewed as nostalgic, a desire to hang onto 
   70 
the good times of the past but this helps us not only to remember the good 
times but also to create new meaning from the people and events of the past. 
 Phelan’s ideas about mourning, and specifically her assertion that 
‘theatre and performance respond to a psychic need to rehearse for loss, and 
especially for death’ (1997: 3), inform my analysis of the reason’s artists feel 
compelled to re-perform past performances. Using this notion as a starting 
point, the thesis explores the relationship between re-performance, death and 
mourning, analysing our desire to hold onto what we have lost and what Phelan 
describes as ‘the possibility that something substantial can be made from the 
outline left after the body has disappeared’ (1997: 3). As I discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, this research argues that it is this possibility which 
drives the human desire, even need, to hold onto the lost object, even if what 
we end up holding onto is not the lost object but a stand in. Whilst we may not 
be able to hold onto the lost other, Phelan argues that what we can hold onto 
may still be substantial and may even help us to process and come to terms 
with the loss. Re-performances, then, may enable us to find a way to survive 
the loss of others. With this in mind I contend that the relationship between re-
performance and death is particularly significant when considered in connection 
with the deaths of others, and our ability to survive these deaths. As such, the 
relation between re-performance, mourning and melancholia is also pertinent.  
 
Mourning and Melancholia 
In his 1917 essay ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, Freud explores and compares 
these two conditions, suggesting that they share many of the same symptoms 
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but differ in some fundamental aspects. Freud suggests that one of the key 
differences between the two conditions is that ‘we rely on its [mourning’s] being 
overcome after a certain lapse of time’, whereas melancholia is a longer-term 
affliction (2001: 244). Freud’s notion is that whereas mourning is a process of 
letting go, coming to terms with, or at least accepting the loss of the other, 
melancholia is about not being able to accept that there is something to mourn. 
Freud describes the features of melancholia as being similar to those of 
mourning and suggests that melancholia may even be caused by a blockage to 
the normal process of mourning. He asserts that in mourning ‘nothing hinders 
these processes from proceeding along the normal path… this path is blocked 
for the work of melancholia’ (2001: 257). The blockage to which Freud refers is 
the inability to accept that there is a reason to mourn. Both conditions can be 
caused by a loss of some form or another. Mourning ‘is for the most part 
occasioned only by a real loss of the object, by its death’ (2001: 256). 
Melancholia, it seems, is caused by us failing to detach ourselves from the lost 
object and it is the inability to detach that is of interest in this thesis. Freud 
states that ‘just as mourning impels the ego to give up the object by declaring 
the object to be dead and offering the ego an inducement of continuing to live 
so does each single struggle of ambivalence loosen the fixation of the libido to 
the object by disparaging it, denigrating it and even as it were killing it’ (2001: 
257). Implicit in this statement is the notion that during both mourning and 
melancholia one attempts to distance oneself from an object. Our relationship 
with that object is severed and in the case of mourning we are forced to find a 
way to separate ourselves from the object in order for us to survive its death.  
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This idea is also present in Butler’s analysis of mourning in Precarious Life, 
where she states that ties between ourselves and others ‘constitute what we 
are’ and are ‘ties or bonds that compose us’ (2004: 22). What both Freud and 
Butler assert is that the self is not independent but is created through shared 
bonds and relationships with others and that in mourning these ties or bonds 
are severed. However, melancholia may be caused by someone being unable 
to detach themselves from the lost or dead object, and in their attempts to do so 
they disparage and denigrate the lost object in order to try and survive its loss. 
In this way mourning and melancholia are linked. We become melancholic 
because we are unable to separate ourselves sufficiently from the lost object in 
order to mourn its death and instead remain entwined with both the object and 
its death. This sense of us being entwined and entangled with the lost object, 
unable to accept its loss is present in the act of re-performance. 
 In re-performance the self takes on the role of the lost other, repeating 
their actions in order to re-perform their works. Sufferers of melancholia live in a 
state of psychic death, unable to live without the lost object, unable to survive 
its death but also unable to die with it. Comparatively, those who engage in re-
performance are unable to re-create the initial version of the performance but 
remain haunted by its specters, thus unable to detach themselves from it in 
order to mourn its loss. Within this research, Freud’s concept of melancholia is 
also used to explore the relationship between performance, re-performance and 
death as I assert that re-performance, despite its melancholic nature, helps to 
prepare us for loss because it reminds us that the dead, whilst dead, do not 
disappear instantaneously or entirely. 
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 Julia Kristeva uses the analogy of a black sun to present us with an 
image of melancholia as ‘an abyss of sorrow, a noncommunicable grief’ that 
cannot be explained through the symbolic system of language (1989: 3). 
Instead of trying to explain it through language Kristeva draws upon the 
narrative of dreams and an analysis of art. Kristeva explores these narratives as 
well as other art forms in order to seek out what they can teach us about 
depression and melancholia. Throughout the thesis I draw upon Kristeva’s 
notion of melancholia in order to explore the ways in which the act of re-
performance can be seen as a melancholic one. Kristeva’s writings on 
melancholia are developed from Freud’s earlier writing on the subject and builds 
upon his description of the condition to present us with an image of melancholic 
death, describing the sufferer of melancholia as ‘already elsewhere, absent, a 
living corpse’ (1989: 74). She uses the term ‘embodying death’ to describe 
someone ‘being as if she were dead, playing dead’ (1989: 74, 73; emphasis in 
original). It is this relationship between life and death that I examine through my 
writings on re-performance and its relationship with death and disappearance. 
In re-performing past pieces artists are engaging in a melancholic act, 
becoming the living corpse that Kristeva describes. They are ‘playing dead’ by 
repeating the actions of a past performance, creating a new performance, 
which, is haunted by the specter of the previous performance (1989: 73; 
emphasis in original). This argument is made in my analysis of Martin O’Brien 
and Sheree Rose’s performances and, in particular, their creation of Dust to 
Dust in 2015, in which O’Brien played dead and acted as a stand in for Bob 
Flanagan. The connection between the specter and the living corpse, as 
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described above, is clear. Both the specter and the living corpse are terms 
which denote something tangible, visceral and physical. Thus, the living corpse 
provides the specter with a body, making it visible through the act of re-
performance.  
 The act of ‘playing dead’ can arguably be seen as unhealthy because it 
appears as a refusal to move on (1989: 73; emphasis in original), an inability to 
leave the dead in the past and a desire to join the dead, rather than the living. If 
acts of re-performance can, as this work will argue, be seen as melancholic 
acts, they can also be viewed as unhealthy acts. That is, these acts embody the 
melancholic desire to hold onto or join the lost other and a refusal or inability to 
move on, which according to Freud, is the aim of mourning. 
 Kristeva emphasises the relationship between melancholia and death, 
and melancholia and mourning when she states that ‘depression, like mourning, 
conceals an aggressiveness toward the lost object, thus revealing the 
ambivalence of the depressed person with respect to the object of mourning’ 
(1989: 11). Those who are not transformed into a state of psychic death through 
melancholia are, instead, Kristeva seems to suggest, transformed into hateful, 
vengeful beings who hate themselves because they hate the other and they 
have implanted the other within the self. Their anger towards the other then, is 
inverted and becomes melancholic hatred of the self, or, in Kristeva’s words, 
‘the complaint against oneself would therefore be a complaint against another, 
and putting oneself to death but a tragic disguise for massacring an other’ 
(1989: 11). Melancholia then, according to Kristeva, is the inability to accept the 
loss of the other, which leads to the lines between the self and other becoming 
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blurred, as the self plays dead, taking on the role of the other, and inverting 
their anger with the other, absorbing it into themselves. Parallels can be drawn 
between this internalisation of feelings towards the other and the way in which 
artists embody the work of others when they engage in acts of re-performance. 
Both are acts which suggest an internalisation of the other, and a desire to 
subvert the boundaries between self and other in such a way that they appear 
to be one, albeit a fluid, permeable, unstable one. That one is, of course, 
different from either the self or other but subsumes the self and other in such a 
way that the specter of the other can be glimpsed within the self. 
 
Survival verses Annihilation 
The arguably melancholic desire to save and document performances can 
easily be viewed in relation to our desire to hold onto the people and things that 
we have lost. This research contends that our desire to hold onto things, which 
are by nature ephemeral and which it is therefore impossible to retain 
indefinitely, is fueled by our fear of the finality of death. Drawing on Simon 
Critchely's 2011 text, The Book of Dead Philosophers, in which he asserts that 
‘what defines human life in our corner of the planet at the present time is not 
just a fear of death, but an overwhelming terror of annihilation’ (2011: 1; 
emphasis in original), Critchley’s use of the term annihilation means something 
worse than death. As I suggested earlier, we live in a world where death and 
terror surround us, and this is a crucial factor in our current relationship with 
death. Terrorism, war, nuclear weapons; these are concepts which are familiar 
to us and notions which speak of mass murder, multiple deaths and in many 
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cases no body or official grave to mourn. This is the kind of terror to which 
Critchley is referring when he describes ‘a terror both of the inevitability of our 
demise with its prospect of pain and possibly meaningless suffering, and the 
horror of what lies in the grave other than our body nailed into a box and 
lowered into the earth to become wormfood’ (2011: 1). This implies that the 
terror of annihilation is the terror of pain, illness, dying and death but also of 
what happens to us after death and the notion that once we die, we cease to 
exist. Critchley’s use of the term annihilation implies total destruction and 
disappearance, not just death. It is not the actual event of death that we fear but 
the belief that death is the end, that once we die, we vanish forever. The 
annihilation of which Critchley speaks, is our total obliteration and the 
knowledge that eventually our lives may be forgotten, our graves untended and 
our loss no longer mourned.  
 This idea is something that Thomas Laqueur picks up on in his text, The 
Work of the Dead, in which he states that ‘the dead we imagine do not want to 
be forgotten and are reluctant to go, and we - the living - are reluctant to let 
them go or forget them lest thereby we truly lose them’ (2015: 62). Implicit in 
this statement is the suggestion that as long as we remember the dead, we 
never truly loose them. Laqueur questions our motivation to bury the dead when 
he asks ‘do the dead matter?’ and asserts that ‘even as we … deny that the 
holy exists anywhere in our world, especially in a dead body, we still want our 
special bodies, our special dead’ (2011: 35, 43). Dead bodies do matter, they 
are crucial to the process of mourning and to preventing those who must 
survive the deaths of others from falling into melancholia. The body is proof of 
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the death, the gravesite or the urn are places for us to mourn and signifiers that 
there is indeed something to mourn. Without those signifiers we become more 
vulnerable to melancholia as we struggle to accept the reality of our loss. This 
concept is also explored by Butler in Precarious Life in which she asserts that 
following September 11th the US government refused to publicly acknowledge 
the deaths of those it killed as part of the War on Terror, arguing that ‘those who 
remain faceless or whose faces are presented to us as so many symbols of evil, 
authorize us to become senseless before those lives we have eradicated, and 
whose grievability is indefinitely postponed’ (2004: XVIII). What Butler is arguing 
here is that when deaths go unacknowledged, when there is no monument, no 
gravesite, no acknowledgement of loss, we are unable to grieve or mourn those 
loses. This refusal to acknowledge these deaths is a political act which serves 
to reiterate ‘the conditions of loss and victimization that come to justify a more 
or less permanent war,’ (2004: XIX). If the only deaths that are acknowledged or 
discussed are those inflicted upon the west, then war can be justified because 
the west can be viewed solely as the victims of terror without consideration of 
the terror they inflict upon others when retaliating. in his 2003 essay 
Necroploitics Achille Mbembe argues that ‘the ultimate expression of 
sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate 
who may live and who must die’ (2003: 11). By only acknowledging the deaths 
of those who die as a result of terrorist attacks and not those who die as a result 
of the war on terror governments express their sovereignty, their right to decide 
‘who must die’ (Mbembe 2003: 11) and those ‘whose grievability is indefinitely 
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postponed’ (Butler 2004: XVIII), because their deaths are not publicly 
acknowledged. 
 The gravesite or urn also serve another significant purpose in the 
process of mourning, they are leftovers of the lives that are no longer lived and 
as such they serve not only as a signifier of death but also of life. There was a 
life, there is now a loss to mourn and as long as that loss is being mourned, that 
life is being remembered and annihilation is being avoided. With this in mind 
Butler’s argument about some lives and deaths being ungrievable also seems 
to suggest that without grief and without mourning the other does not simply die 
but is annihilated and this has serious consequences for a world in which so 
many deaths in the name of the War on Terror go unacknowledged. In much 
the same way that as long as a death is being mourned the life has not been 
annihilated and as long as a performance is being re-performed it will also avoid 
annihilation. By ensuring that something of us remains after our deaths and 
enabling those left behind to create something new and meaningful from our 
echoes and traces, as happens in re-performance, perhaps we can stave off 
annihilation. Critchley claims that ‘death and life are never-ceasing 
transformations’ (2011: 56), and this is also the case with re-performance. 
 Re-performance can be seen as a means of preventing performance 
from disappearing, of creating something from the things left behind. The initial 
performance lives on, in and through, the re-performance, which it haunts like 
one of Derrida’s specters. It is transformed from the initial performance into the 
re-performance, much like the ‘never-ceasing transformations’, which Critchley 
claims occur between life and death (2011: 56). Thus, I draw parallels between 
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the transformations that exist in re-performance and in life and death, claiming 
that re-performance has important lessons to teach us about life and death. 
Death does not have to mean annihilation. Life, like re-performance, can be 
transformed into something new and meaningful but that in order for this to 
happen, a performance must be re-performed, and a life must be acknowledged 
and mourned.  
 This thesis will employ each of the themes discussed above in relation to 
one another, weaving a non-linear path back and forth between each of these 
notions and enabling them to speak to both each other and the chosen case 
studies in order to provide new and original insights into the relationship 
between performance, re-performance and death; a relationship which, may 
enable us to understand the world in which we live. This is a world haunted by 
the specters of death, war and terror but not of those events that have gone 
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Chapter Two - Desire and Fear: Death and Finitude 
 
This chapter will explore the relationship between finitude, death and abjection 
in performance and re-performance. Focusing specifically on the performance 
work of Ron Athey with Julie Tolentino, and Sheree Rose with Martin O’Brien 
and with Bob Flanagan, this chapter will analyse the relationship between the 
bodies of the performers and the way in which their performances are received. 
In doing so, the chapter aims to develop an understanding of the relationship 
between desire and fear and the ways in which they converge by drawing upon 
Julia Kristeva’s theorisation of abjection. It will relate the concept of abjection to 
notions of finitude and death through exploring the embodied frailties of the 
performers. All bodies have their frailties, every body will die one day and, as 
Kristeva states ‘the corpse represents fundamental pollution’ (1989: 109). Thus, 
death is the ultimate abjection and ‘the human corpse is a fount of impurity and 
must not be touched’ (1989: 109). The case studies in this chapter remind us of 
our body’s finitude and, therefore, foregrounds bodily abjection. The term 
finitude is used to describe the way in which everything has a life span, nothing 
will last forever. In relation to re-performance the term is used to examine the 
ways in which re-performance can help develop our understanding of how to 
deal with loss and death. 
 All of the performances examined in this chapter are either re-
performances or deal with issues related to re-performance, such as death and 
finitude. The case studies will be used to explore the ways in which the artists’ 
differing non-normative bodies affect these re-performances. I am using the 
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term non-normative in the sense that Rosi Braidotti defines in her 1994 text 
Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory, which states that ‘Western thought has a logic of binary 
oppositions that treats difference as that which is other than the accepted norm’ 
(78).  I will draw upon this definition to explain the ways in which the 
performances discussed in this chapter can be considered to be non-normative. 
Through an analysis of Julia Kristeva’s concept of abjection, as outlined in her 
1982 book, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, and specifically her notion 
of abject bodies, this chapter argues that these bodies’ status as non-normative 
and other, combined with the nature of their performance work, causes the 
bodies of the performers to become abject bodies. This is intertwined with an 
analysis of Petra Kuppers’ writings on disability art and performances to 
suggest that these bodies are ones which seek to use their performance work in 
order to make manifest their illness, their position as sick and dying bodies, thus 
re-enforcing their bodily abjection. I argue that Athey, Tolentino, Flanagan, 
Rose and O’Brien’s open, bleeding, wounded, weeping bodies exemplify 
Braidotti’s description of the monster, which she states is, ‘the bodily incarnation 
of difference from the basic human norm’, and goes on to describe as ‘a 
deviant, an an-omaly... abnormal’ (1994: 78). The fact that Athey, O’Brien and 
Flanagan all suffer(ed) from chronic illnesses further emphasises their status as 
non-normative because they deviate from the socially accepted norm of the 
healthy subject. The ways in which their performances make their illnesses 
visible enables an understanding of how they deviate from the “norm” because 
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we can see evidence of their illness flowing out of their bodily orifices and 
reminding us of our shared mortality and finitude. 
 They are bodies that operate in liminal states and which destabilise 
socially constructed norms through their subversive performance practices. The 
prominence of the body in Athey, Tolentino, O’Brien, Flanagan and Rose’s 
performances, specifically their abuse of their bodies, their breaching of their 
bodies boundaries and their foregrounding of bodily fragility, create subversive 
performance practices. These subversive practices are considered non-
normative because they highlight the fragility of our own bodies and cause us to 
question our wholeness and completeness as subjects. The performances 
present bodily orifices and holes in such a way that we are each reminded that 
our position as a subject is precarious and dependent upon our relation to the 
other. Our subjectivity is determined by our opposition to the other, as 
presented to us in these performances, but it is also brought into question by 
the breaching of the bodily boundaries that separate the self from the other, 
reminding us that our subjectivity, like our bodies, is permeable and fragile.  
 Throughout this chapter the relationships between the artists will also be 
examined in terms of the impact it has upon their re-performance work. At issue 
is the desire and fear that we feel in witnessing these performances, and the 
chapter questions whether this differs as the body of the artist presenting the 
performance changes from performance to re-performance. The fact that all of 
the artists present performances, which can be considered non-normative in 
one way or another, allows for an exploration of different notions of non-
normativity and of how the ways in which the artists deviate from the “norm” 
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affects the reception of the performances and re-performance that they create. 
The chapter also questions whether the re-performances are received in the 
same way as the initial version of the performance. 
 Moreover, the chapter examines the ways in which the re-performances 
that they create contain echoes and traces of the initial or earlier versions of the 
performance, which causes the re-performances to become haunted by them. 
This is integrated with an exploration into the concept of re-performance as a 
‘bodily archive’ in which performances can be housed in order to prevent them 
from disappearing. Through its analysis of several re-performances and their 
initial performances this chapter questions whether the different physical body 
of the artists affects the re-performance’s ability to be viewed as a form of bodily 
archive. The concept of a bodily archive is related to Diana Taylor’s concept of 
repertoire, as defined in her 2003 text, The Archive and The Repertoire. This 
chapter questions our desire to hold onto that which is lost and asserts that re-
performance can also be seen as an act of remembering or memorialising the 
lost other. Through re-performance, even when the re-performance is 
performed by a different body, the initial performance remains. The result of 
this, this chapter asserts, is that re-performance becomes a way of inscribing 
loss upon the body. These questions are linked to writings on mourning, grief, 
loss and melancholia, such as those suggested by Freud in his 1917 essay 
‘Mourning and Melancholia’ and Julia Kristeva’s 1987 book, Black Sun. The 
Chapter, therefore, argues that the kind of bodily transmission and 
remembering that re-performance enacts is an act of grieving but not one of 
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letting go. Thus, it links this to notions of death and finitude, asserting that re-
performance is a way of understanding both loss and death. 
 
Dangerous Bodies: The Risk of Contamination 
The orifices, wounds and bodily fluids make Athey and O’Brien’s bodies 
dangerous. They are a source of fear for those with whom they come into 
contact because they contain the risk of infection. This is particularly pertinent in 
relation to the performance practices with which they are engaged, as the 
excess of bodily fluids in Athey and O'Brien's work is also suggestive of 
contamination. In Regimes of Hardship (2012) O'Brien repeatedly beats his 
chest, causing him to cough up excess mucus, whilst in Self-obliteration #1 
(2009) Athey cuts himself, causing himself to bleed heavily. These actions, 
when considered in relation to the artists’ illnesses, can be seen as both 
dangerous and transgressive; in O’Brien’s case, dangerous to himself and in 
Athey’s dangerous to both himself and others. This is due to the risk of infection 
involved in Athey’s work, which is not present in O’Brien’s. 
In light of their performance practices I contend that the bodily 
transmission that occurs between artists such as these is also perceived as 
dangerous, as it suggests a risk of disease and contamination through leaking, 
bleeding bodies, bodies without boundaries, bodies full of wounds and holes. 
Thus, this links the act of bodily transmission to the concept of death and 
finitude, because whilst bodily transmission presents multiple possibilities for 
performance to continue it also highlights the vulnerability of the body. The fact 
   85 
that Athey is HIV positive is pertinent here because HIV is transmitted by 
contact with infected blood and in the performance Athey’s “infected” blood was 
leaking and pouring from his body. As an audience member at one of Athey’s 
performances, McGrath felt that his position placed him at risk. McGrath points 
to this risk in his article, ‘Trusting in Rubber; Performing Boundaries During the 
AIDS Epidemic’ when he asks ‘what if the pressure of Athey’s blood increased 
suddenly, causing blood to spurt out, leap the two feet from him to me, locate 
some break in my skin?’ (1995: 24). He feared Athey’s body and his proximity to 
it. McGrath viewed Athey’s body as dangerous because it was wounded, cut 
and bleeding. In this sense his illness appeared to be oozing out, putting the 
audience at risk of contamination and possibly death. 
This raises interesting questions in relation to wounds and holes. Would 
McGrath fear Athey’s body if it was not wounded, if the illness was contained 
inside Athey’s body as opposed to leaking out of it? In Powers of Horror 
Kristeva states that holes and orifices have long been considered dangerous 
and transgressive when she notes that ‘anything that leaks out of the masculine 
or feminine body defiles’ (1982: 102). This is supported by Amelia Jones’ 
analysis of Athey’s work, in which she states that, ‘I still feel his suffering as like 
mine, or at least as pointing to aspects of my experiences that make me aware 
of my fear of finding myself cored and flayed as Athey seems to seek out in his 
work’ (Jones 2009: 50). Jones seems to fear the actual wound, as if it may 
somehow transfer itself from his body to hers. Athey’s wound, his hole, is an 
opening and as such is a signifier of the fact that the body is porous and 
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permeable. I contend that Jones fears the wound because it reminds her of her 
own permeability. 
 Whilst McGrath and Jones fear different aspects of Athey’s body, both 
fears are of his orifices because openings and wounds are suggestive of the 
fact that self and other are not binary opposites. This, therefore, implies that that 
which has afflicted the other may also afflict the self. Jones states that ‘at its 
most effective the wound has the capacity to defy the absolute binaries of 
self/other and real/representation. It exposes the impossibility of the self and 
other being the same and yet also of their being complete opposites’ (2009: 52). 
This can also be said of the blood which pours or flows from the wound. In both 
cases the spectators’ fears are born out of the notion of leaking. The open 
wound and the blood which leaks out of it pose a risk because they are no 
longer contained inside the body of the other. They flow freely and, therefore, 
raise the possibility that wounds, illness and even death may be transferred 
from body to body through openings, orifices and wounds. Kristeva makes it 
clear that Self/Other isn’t a fixed binary but a breachable boundary when she 
states that ‘the boundary between subject and object is shaken, and when even 
the limit between inside and outside becomes uncertain,’ she also describes it 
as ‘the ambiguous opposition I/Other, Inside/Outside – an opposition that is 
vigorous but pervious, violent but uncertain’ (1982: 141,7). 
 Kristeva asserts that concern about the security of the boundaries of 
others provokes concern about one’s own boundaries. Seeing Athey’s 
boundaries being violated alerts the spectator to the possibility that their own 
boundaries are also open to violation. Thus, bodies such as those of Athey and 
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O’Brien are bodies operating beyond boundaries in several ways. Bodily fluids 
transgress the boundary between inside and outside. These artists status as 
human beings with incurable illnesses positions them on the boundaries of sick 
and healthy, life and death.  
 It is the fact that these bodies operate on boundaries which draws 
attention to their abject bodies. Kristeva writes that ‘it is thus not lack of 
cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity system, 
order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the 
ambiguous, the composite’ (1982: 4). This is why Athey and O’Brien’s abjection 
and actions arouse fear in some of those who witness their performances. Their 
audiences fear the other’s abjection because in breaking the boundary between 
self and other the artists raise the possibility that the self could also become 
abject. The otherness of the body presented in performance threatens the 
security of the spectator’s subjectivity. Kristeva states that ‘The body’s inside ... 
shows up in order to compensate for the collapse of the border between inside 
and outside. It is as if the skin, a fragile container, no longer guaranteed the 
integrity of one’s “own and clean self” (1982: 53). This throws the spectator into 
a state of fear and confusion as they begin to realise that without the protection 
of skin the boundary separating inside and outside is broken. This in turn, leads 
them to question whether the boundary between self and other can be broken 
just as easily.   
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Inside/Outside: Wounds and Bodily Boundaries 
Jones discusses the wound as a site of both fear and desire, stating that ‘the 
wound we perceive as actually violating the body of the other, ripping into the 
skin, making it bleed, penetrating its orifices or forging new holes, pricks us with 
fear and desire’ (2009:53). I contend that this desire is abjection and this is 
supported by Kristeva’s assertion, in relation to the wound, that ‘urine, blood, 
sperm, excrement then show up in order to reassure a subject that is lacking its 
“own and clean self”’ (1982: 53). Kristeva is arguing that the bodies wounds and 
orifices exist as a constant reminder of bodily excess, the fact that the self 
cannot be contained. As such they are reminders of bodily abjection. She 
asserts that ’the abjection of those flows from within suddenly become the sole 
object of sexual desire – a true “ab-ject”’(1982: 53). Here Kristeva’s use of the 
term ‘ab-ject’ points to the etymology of the term which means to cast out. The 
Oxford Dictionary explains that it comes ‘from Latin abjectus, past participle of 
abicere ‘reject’, from ab- ‘away’ + jacere ‘to throw’ (2018: 1). Kristeva’s use of 
the terms in relation to bodily fluids points to the fact that they are an excess, a 
waste and something to be discarded. Despite the fact that Kristeva uses the 
term to describe the combination of fear and desire that we experience when 
we are faced with our own bodily wounds and fluids and although Kristeva is 
talking about the wounds of the self, whilst Jones is discussing our responses to 
the physical wounds of the other, both in effect are proposing desire and the 
bloody wound are linked through abjection. We desire the abject, but this desire 
scares us, so we negate it, replacing it with repulsion. Sickened by our desires 
we refuse them, hide them and try to deny them. Fear and desire, like inside 
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and outside are not dichotomous opposites. It is the lack of certainty, the 
fragility of the borders between inside and outside, and self and other, as 
represented by the open wound, lead to the combination of fear and desire that 
is abjection. 
In analysing Jones’ fear of the wound being transferred from the other to 
the self, there is clearly a link between this and Kristeva’s discussion of abject 
bodily fluids which flow from the self, leading to both fear and desire. Jones 
states that we fear Athey’s wounds because we view them ‘on some level as a 
violation of bodily coherence that we feel could happen to us’ (2009:50 
emphasis in original). Notions of fear and abjection are further enhanced, as we 
can see from McGrath’s article, by the knowledge that the bodily fluids we 
witness flowing from Athey’s wounds are infected. They do not merely speak of 
the loss of the ‘own and clean self’ to which Kristeva refers but also to the risk of 
illness and possibly death, the ultimate abjection (1982: 53). It is almost 
impossible to view Athey’s performances without acknowledging his illness, and 
that the notion of his body as one in the process of dying will always affect the 
way in which his work is viewed. 
 
Visible Illnesses 
Whilst I contend that Athey’s work seeks to make his illness visible, in doing so 
it simultaneously reminds us that whilst it may be dying his body is most 
certainly not dead. Dead bodies do not bleed, they do not move, and they do 
not speak. In this sense,  Athey’s work is suggestive of the notion that dying is a 
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process and reminds us that death is the end of that process rather than the 
process itself. As I have already explained performance artist, Martin O’Brien, 
also uses bodily fluids in performance and I will analyse his work in relation to 
Athey’s in order to examine the way in which they simultaneously make the 
artists’ illness visible and use the visceral nature of their performances to 
remind us that they are still alive. O’Brien suffers from Cystic Fibrosis, a chronic 
lung disease which significantly reduces the life expectancy of sufferers. In his 
2011 performance, Mucus Factory, O’Brien repeatedly beat his chest in order to 
release excess mucus. O’Brien then collected the mucus in pots before 
combining it with glitter. The act of beating someone’s chest in order to get them 
to cough up mucus is a recognised treatment for Cystic Fibrosis sufferers, 
however, O’Brien’s repeated use of the technique, followed by his collection of 
the mucus and his ‘artificial attempt to use mucus as a substance for vanity and 
pleasure’, cause the performance to become abject (O’Brien 2012: 2). O’Brien’s 
mucus, much like Athey’s blood, symbolises his illness and therefore his use of 
it in performance reminds us that his body is that of someone who is chronically 
ill. His body is also considered to be non-normative because of his illness and 
his use of a medical procedure in performance serves to highlight this fact, 
presenting O’Brien’s body as a medical body. Whilst O’Brien’s subsequent 
attempts to use the mucus for pleasurable purposes exemplify Jones and 
Kristeva’s comments about abjection, we fear O’Brien’s body because it 
reminds us of the fragility of our own bodies and indeed our lives. 
This exemplifies Kristeva's assertion that ‘excrement and its equivalents 
(decay, infection, disease, corpse, etc.) stand for the danger to identity that 
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comes from without: the ego threatened by the non-ego, society threatened by 
its outside, life by death’ and it is this threat that we feel when we witness 
O’Brien and Athey’s performances (1982: 71). The blood and mucus symbolise 
decay, infection, disease and the corpse and, as such, of life threatened by 
death. They also remind us that this threat comes from something outside the 
self, something other than the self. Hence, the fear of infection and 
contamination that McGrath describes feeling when witnessing Athey’s 
performance. 
In their everyday lives Athey and O’Brien’s illnesses are not always 
visible in the way that ‘people with physical impairments are ... hypervisible, 
instantly defined in their physicality’ (Kuppers 2001: 25). Therefore, the work 
they create seeks to make the invisible visible. O’Brien’s durational 
performances, which involve prolonged periods of physical exertion, often bring 
his illness to the forefront of his work. His repeated beating of his chest in order 
to loosen mucus in Mucus Factory led to the production of excess mucus. The 
production and subsequent use of the mucus caused O’Brien’s illness to 
become visible. In this way, O’Brien presents his body as one which is sick or 
dying, forcing spectators to bear witness to his illness in a way that they would 
not otherwise be able to. Athey’s use of bloodletting in his performances can be 
said to serve the same purpose. The presence of his blood represents his 
status as HIV positive and brings the issue of his illness to the forefront of his 
work. 
In a conversation with Martin O’Brien, Athey stated that ‘in 1980 I started 
making performance, which including bloodletting. I understood this, and 
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actionism in general, as an expression beyond language. But pre-public 
awareness of HIV, blood was blood in a 70s body art context. Then during the 
height of the AIDS pandemic, any blood spilled conjured up HIV,’ (Athey 2012: 
1). Athey was aware that his use of blood in performance, together with public 
knowledge of his HIV positive status, would cause his work to be read in 
relation to the AIDS epidemic and therefore to make his illness visible. This also 
affects the way in which his work is received. For example, the controversy 
resulting from his 1994 performance Four Scenes in a Harsh Life, in which he 
‘incised a scarification pattern into the back of Darryl Carlton, made imprints 
from the wound, which was then run out on lines over the audience. Carlton, not 
HIV positive, became guilty by association, and the story went, that blood was 
either dripping or being thrown onto the audience’ (Johnson 2014: 2). This is 
highlighted by Jennifer Doyle’s comment that 
 
 anytime someone bleeds in the presence of others, there are of course 
protocols one must take to minimize risk of exposure to blood-born agents. 
These protocols are in fact a part of his performances. Athey is HIV-positive and 
developed his "signature" work in the midst of the AIDS crisis. So, the fact that 
his work confronts us with our limits regarding things like blood and fear of 
contamination is not incidental to either its poetics or its meaning (2008: 2).  
 
 
Doyle’s understanding of Athey’s work is clearly influenced by her 
knowledge of his status as HIV-positive, which she reads as central to the 
meaning that she makes from the piece. 
The work of visual and performance artist Hannah Wilke, and in 
particular, her Intra-venus series 1992 and 2007, despite using a different 
methodology to that of Athey and O’Brien,  also serves to make her illness 
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visible. In Intra-venus Wilke created a series of photographs and videos which 
documented her battle with lymphoma and her subsequent death. Her work 
shows the physical affect her illness had on her body as well as the way it 
affected her life. By documenting her illness in this way, Wilke created a visual 
record of her illness, confronting us not only with her sick body but her dying 
one. The deterioration of Wilke’s health is inescapable and forces us to 
acknowledge her slow decline and eventual death.  
Similarly, in her controversial 2009 performance, Involuntary Dances, 
artist Rita Marcalo attempted to find ways in which her illness could be 
performed. The 24-hour performance, saw Marcalo, who suffers from epilepsy, 
trying to induce seizures. In Marcalo’s description of the performance she states 
that ‘to present my ‘involuntary dances’ to an audience, I threw a 24 hour 
‘performance party’. The party incorporated various audience-participation 
activities such as quizzes, structured improvisations, etc. During this party I put 
myself through a series of experiences which were likely to lead me to having 
an epileptic seizure’ (2012: 1). Marcalo goes on to state that she broke ‘all the 
rules: drinking alcohol and coffee, eating dark chocolate, smoking cigarettes, 
coming off her medication and going without sleep’ (Gardner 2009: 2). The work 
caused controversy as some ‘disability charities and the tabloid press turned on 
the piece and its creator, branding both it and her irresponsible’ (Verrent 2012: 
1). It is not relevant to the context of my argument to enter into either of these 
debates here, however, it is interesting that Marcalo herself describes the 
performance as her seeking to find ways of presenting her epilepsy, of 
developing her own understanding of it and of trying to make it visible in a world 
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in which many believe that such illnesses should be kept hidden, that they are 
part of the private rather than the public sphere. She states that her ‘idea[was] 
to just present it’, indicating that she wanted to position her illness at the 
forefront of her work (Marcalo 2012: 2). In her 2007 text, The Scar of Visibility: 
Medical Performances and Contemporary Art Kuppers states that ‘Western 
biomedical science, with its visualizing power, sometimes tells different stories 
about our insides than the narratives that common sense can make knowable’ 
(33). I contend that the work of all of these artists seeks to make the invisible 
visible and to explore illness and disability within the context of Performance 
Art. Attempting to make knowable those stories that appear beyond 
comprehension and present them as messy, frail human bodies rather than 
neatly contained and defined medical bodies. 
 
Surviving with Illness, The Living Corpse 
Artists, such as Athey, who seek to make their illnesses visible in their 
performances present their body as one which has survived death. This brings 
into question Phelan’s notion that performance prepares us for death because it 
disappears once it is over and in doing so reminds us of the fleeting, transient 
nature of life. Athey’s work contradicts this notion because his body is 
presented as one which has survived death, or at least is a body which is dying 
slowly, piece by piece and drop by drop rather than disappearing 
instantaneously. 
In her 1997 text Mourning Sex Phelan explores this notion, claiming that 
‘not even the dead will hold still: they do not leave us all at once, which would 
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be horribly violent but clear. They fall away from us piece by piece until we 
cannot bear the withering decomposition of their form of relation to us’ (1997: 
41). Athey’s performances have a peculiar relationship with death and dying 
because the use of blood is a strong, visceral reminder of the illness which 
threatens to kill him, and  as I argued earlier in the chapter, possibly infect us, 
but simultaneously it serves as a pertinent reminder that he is still very much 
alive. 
Rather than challenging Phelan’s claim, performances such as Athey’s 
strengthen it because spectators are reminded not only that he is dying but, 
perhaps more pertinently, that he is not yet dead. His body is one in the process 
of dying and wounding is part of the process of life but also part of the process 
of dying. Performance serves to prepare us for death precisely because it does 
not disappear all at once but bit by bit. Artists like Athey force spectators to 
watch as they disappear almost unbearably slowly, ebbing and flowing away so 
that spectators are compelled to watch in horror as a mass of blood and flesh 
are paraded before them, reminding them that death is not instantaneous but a 
terrifyingly slow and painful process, a process which, when it happens to 
others, they must witness and somehow find a way to survive. 
Linking back to my earlier discussion of the use of blood and wounds in 
his work and the Kristevan concept of abjection, I argue that Athey’s 
performances also prepare us for death by breaking down the traditional 
boundaries that exist between self and other. His use of wounds and blood blur 
these boundaries, causing spectators to consider the pain and wounds of the 
other as if they were our own. Phelan claims that ‘the hole in the body is the 
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physical mark of the separation between one and the Other. That hole stands 
as beckoning lure and unbreachable threshold’ (1997: 32). The hole or wound 
serves to separate the body of the self from that of the other, but the blood 
leaking from the wound also positions the wound as an orifice, something 
penetrable which opens up the body of the other and, therefore, the possibility 
of contamination and even merging of the self and other. 
As such, it promotes a longing towards the ‘unbreachable threshold’ of 
the other and a desire to cross the boundary between self and other (Phelan 
1997: 32). It also, however, reminds us that this boundary does exist and forces 
us to separate the self from the other in order to survive the death of the other. 
Failure to do so; as Freud tells us in his 1917 essay ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’, will prevent the normal process of mourning and lead to a state of 
melancholia. Freud describes the features of melancholia as being similar to 
those of mourning and suggests that melancholia may even result from an 
inability to mourn when he states that ‘in it [mourning] nothing hinders these 
processes from proceeding along the normal path… this path is blocked for the 
work of melancholia,’ (2001: 257). This blockage is something which prevents 
the separation of the self from the other and may well occur as the result of 
bodily identification, such as that described above. If we view the wound as an 
opening, an opportunity for the self to enter into the other, then witnessing the 
wounds of the other could play a vital role in understanding how to separate the 
self from the other and therefore in understanding how to prevent mourning 
becoming melancholia. 
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Linked to this notion of separating the self from the other, I will now 
analyse the performance work created by Martin O’Brien and Sheree Rose, 
arguing that the style and content of their performance, combined with the 
personal associations between the artists causes the self/other boundary to be 
crossed, thus leading to them embarking upon the path of melancholia, rather 
than that of mourning. I will also suggest that their performance is haunted by 
the earlier work Rose created with Bob Flanagan and, therefore, causes a 
bodily transmission to take place between Flanagan and O’Brien.  
 
Bodily Transmission 
Performance artists, Bob Flanagan and Martin O’Brien both suffer(ed) from 
Cystic Fibrosis. Flanagan and his partner, Sheree Rose, created ‘work that 
provocatively explored themes of pain/pleasure and sadomasochism, illness 
and death’ (O’Brien 2013:1). They worked and lived together in a masochistic 
partnership, in which Flanagan ‘lived as her [Rose’s] full time slave’ (O’Brien 
2013: 1). In 2012 Rose collaborated with O’Brien in his performance project 
Regimes of Hardship, during which ‘O’Brien relinquishes control over his body 
to Rose, who decides on the duration and intensity of each part of the regime, 
much like the experience of pain within illness to which the body must submit’ 
(O’Brien 2013: 2). The regimes to which O’Brien submitted included BDSM 
practices, such as Rose beating O’Brien, using a scalpel to ‘cut her initial into 
Martin’s chest’ and making him ‘kiss her feet’ (Brown, 2012: 1). This description 
of the performance highlights Rose’s activity and agency within the piece and 
when considered independently from notions of re-performance and body 
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transmission Rose occupies a subject position within the piece. However, 
because of this thesis focus on re-performance and its reading of Regimes of 
Hardship as a means of bodily transmission from Flanagan to O’Brien Rose’s 
role is considered in a different way, namely as the person who enables the 
bodily transmission to take place. 
Rose’s collaboration with O’Brien in Regimes of Hardship explores, and 
in some ways builds upon, her earlier work with Flanagan. In both cases Rose 
takes on the role of the sadistic female, torturing her partner, who hands over 
control of his body to her. In O’Brien’s description of the performance he claims 
that ‘the legacy of their [Rose and Flanagan’s] practice is considered’ and it is 
certainly difficult not to transpose readings of Rose and Flanagan’s work onto 
the performance (O’Brien 2013: 2). Rose’s presence in both pieces and the 
exploration of masochism, allows traces of Flanagan’s work to be seen in 
O’Brien’s, and because of this, Rose and O’Brien’s work can be viewed as a re-
performance of Rose’s work with Flanagan. 
Rose’s presence in both performances represents a generational 
passing on, a bodily transmission from one artist to another (from Flanagan to 
O’Brien). In Regimes of Hardship Flanagan’s body is replaced by O’Brien’s, 
allowing his work to be witnessed by a new generation of artists and audiences, 
as O’Brien’s body breathes new life into Flanagan’s work. Flanagan’s death, 
from Cystic Fibrosis, in 1996 prevents him from being physically present in the 
work Rose and O’Brien created in 2012, but his presence is still visible due to 
the similar nature of the performances created as well as the fact that both 
Flanagan and O’Brien suffer(ed) from Cystic Fibrosis. For these reasons Rose’s 
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work with both Flanagan and O’Brien is inextricably bound together, and 
O’Brien and Rose’s performance cannot be analysed without considering her 
earlier work with Flanagan.  
Because Flanagan is unable to be physically present in the performance 
the bodily transmission from Flanagan to O’Brien takes place through the 
vehicle of another body, that of Rose. I contend that there is a maternal nature 
to the role that Rose plays in Regimes of Hardship, because it is through her 
female body that the transmission occurs. Without Rose’s physical presence 
Flanagan’s specter would not be visible in the performance and therefore, she 
plays the maternal role of life giver, breathing new life into Flanagan through 
O’Brien’s body. However, notions of Rose as a mother figure become 
problematic when we consider the masochistic nature of the performance. The 
idea of a loving, nurturing mother figure does not fit with seeing Rose 
repeatedly spank and beat O’Brien, causing him considerable pain. This raises 
the question of whether the masochistic nature of the performance prevents it 
from being viewed as an act of bodily transmission and subverts the image of 
Rose as a mother figure or strengthens the links between Flanagan and 
O’Brien’s work because both artists use masochism as a means for creating 
performance.  
Sadomasochism played a significant role in both Rose and O’Brien’s 
work and their relationship. Prior to her relationship with Flanagan Rose had 
been married and she describes how following her divorce one of her ‘goals in 
life was to empower women’ (Rose 2009: 96). Rose goes on to explain that 
following her divorce ‘I decided that I was going to be the aggressive one’ 
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(2009: 97). This led to the sadomasochistic nature of Rose and Flanagan’s work 
and relationship, work that Rose continued with O’Brien following Flanagan’s 
death. Thus, it can be argued that Rose’s work with O’Brien was not just a way 
of continuing to explore her relationship with Flanagan but also a way for her to 
continue her interest in feminism and empowering women. 
 
The Masochistic Mother-Figure 
Giles Deleuze’s introduction to Leopold Von Sacher-Masoch’s 1991 book 
Venus in Furs explores the idea of a masochistic mother figure and I apply his 
notion of the mother figure within masochism to Rose’s role in her performances 
with Flanagan and O’Brien. 
Deleuze uses the fantasy of the three mothers in which he argues ‘a 
point of great significance … is the symbolic transfer or redistribution of all 
paternal functions to the threefold feminine figure: the father is excluded and 
completely nullified’(1991: 61). Deleuze goes on to question why the masochist 
wishes to be beaten asking, ‘is it not precisely the father-image in him that is 
thus miniaturized, beaten, ridiculed and humiliated?’(Deleuze 1991: 60). He 
also asserts that ‘the formula of masochism is the humiliated father’ (Deleuze 
1991: 60). Following Deleuze’s claims I assert that it is the father who is beaten 
and humiliated and the mother who inflicts the pain, enabling Rose to play the 
dual roles of mother and sadist. This has further connotations for the 
performance when we consider Deleuze’s claim that ‘what the subject atones 
for is his resemblance to the father and the father’s likeness in him’ (Deleuze 
1991: 60). Flanagan is placed in the role of father because he is from an older 
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generation of artists and he created work with Rose, which shared the same 
masochistic nature as Rose’s work with O’Brien. Therefore, we can view 
O’Brien and Rose’s work as O’Brien atoning for the sin of being like Flanagan. 
This likeness is created by the fact that both men suffer(ed) from Cystic Fibrosis 
and, therefore, share symptoms and bodily frailties which cause O’Brien’s body 
to resemble Flanagan’s. O’Brien, therefore, is being punished for his deviation 
from socially accepted norms, his failure to fulfil the role of a healthy, 
heterosexual, dominant male subject. This failure can be seen to be the result 
of his likeness to Flanagan (the father figure), hence his desire to expel the 
father and any likeness between the two. This, of course, raises questions 
concerning who plays the Father figure in Flanagan and Rose’s work, as the 
same argument can be made for Flanagan’s desire to occupy the masochistic 
position as O’Brien’s, but who does Flanagan resemble and why should he 
punished for this likeness? These questions are worth noting because they 
generate a sense of genealogy which fits in with my concept of bodily 
transmission. They highlight the possibility that O’Brien is one in a long line of 
“fathers and sons” whose bodies and performances participate in acts of 
transmission. 
Deleuze also states that ‘the oral mother as the ideal of masochism is 
expected to assume all the functions of the other female figures;’ (1991: 63). 
What this comment suggests is that the figure of the torturer in masochism is 
not so much a torturer but a torturess; that it is possible to be both a mother 
figure and a sadist, as the oral mother takes on the roles of all the female 
figures and cancels out the father figure, leaving the masochistic subject solely 
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at the mercy of his mother(s). Deleuze claims that ‘the threefold division of the 
mother literally expels the father from the masochistic universe’ (1991: 63-64). 
Whilst this supports my argument that Rose fulfils the role of mother in her work 
with O’Brien, the nature of the performance itself challenges Deleuze’s notion of 
the Father being expelled. Although Rose can be assigned the dual roles of 
mother and sadist, in her fulfilment of these roles she does not banish Flanagan 
but makes him visible. Through her presence in O’Brien’s work, and the 
masochistic nature of the performance, we are reminded of Rose’s earlier work 
with Flanagan and therefore his specter can be seen haunting the performance. 
Flanagan’s presence also raises questions about the role of Flanagan as the 
father and my notion of Rose as the vessel through which Flanagan’s work is 
passed on to O’Brien. Could it be that in punishing O’Brien for his likeness to 
Flanagan, Rose is actually creating or accentuating this likeness? Or did 
O’Brien select Rose to play this role precisely because she would remind him of 
this likeness and, therefore, fulfil his desire to be punished for it? 
In relation to the second idea, I contend that O’Brien wanted to be 
reminded of why he was being punished, why he deserved to be beaten and to 
explore the similarities between himself and Flanagan whilst simultaneously 
being punished for his perceived sins. These sins of course extend beyond his 
likeness to Flanagan to his perceived sin of being ill. His lack of health, his 
inability to embody the dominant masculine subject position because of his 
illness and his sexuality could all be viewed as “sins” within a social structure 
where the norm is a healthy, heterosexual male. This does not however, mean 
that O’Brien is passive or powerless. His performances explore the limits of his 
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body and physical endurance, therefore, his body in performance signifies the 
fact that illness and/or disability does 
not equal weakness.     
 
  Figure 1: Bob Flanagan 
Supermasochist 
Deleuze suggests that the father ‘though abolished in the symbolic order, 
nevertheless, continues to act in the order of the real, or of experience’ 
(1991:64). As such, despite being abolished, the father remains present. 
Deleuze describes the ‘aggressive and hallucinatory return of the father in a 
world that has symbolically abolished him’ and this  argument provides a way of 
reading Flanagan’s presence in Rose and O’Brien’s work (1991: 64). 
Flanagan’s physical presence is not a necessary component of the 
performance. O’Brien fulfils the role that Flanagan once played and therefore 
Rose and O’Brien abolish Flanagan from the physical world of their 
performance. However, they cannot succeed in banishing him entirely and the 
This is also the case in Flanagan’s work. 
As this image of him, looking like a 
superhero complete with a cape and mask, 
shows his performances do not present 
him as weak or feeble. Instead, he 
appears, strong, determined and resilient. 
It is this appearance which, for me, 
prevents him from being limited to the 
passive role of the masochist or the role of 
abolished, banished father. Instead he 
appears as an ever present, somewhat 
threatening, specter. 
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echoes and traces of him are present throughout the performance. Every time 
Rose spanks O’Brien, Flanagan’s body is being re-inscribed onto O’Brien’s. 
Flanagan’s presence is beaten into being and comes to existence, in a rather 
hallucinatory fashion, on O’Brien’s body. The bodies of O’Brien and Flanagan 
become interwoven until it becomes impossible to look at O’Brien without 
seeing Flanagan. In this way, O’Brien as the father figure, returns to the world of 
the performance from which he had been banished. Returning as a terrifying 
specter, who haunts the work Rose and O’Brien create, and reminds us why 
O’Brien seeks out such punishment. 
 
The Object of the Mother 
By positioning Rose in the role of mother figure and as the vessel through which 
the bodily transmission from Flanagan to O’Brien takes place, I am placing her 
firmly in the role of the feminine other. She is the other that provides a mirror for 
Flanagan and O’Brien; they are able to fulfil the role of masculine subject 
because she occupies the opposite position of feminine object. This fits in with 
Braidotti’s claim that ‘women have been physically and symbolically 
dispossessed of a place from whence to speak’ (1994: 119). Even when she 
plays the role of the dominant sadist Rose is unable to occupy the dominant 
subject position and finds herself reduced to the status of empty vessel. I have 
not examined Rose’s performance in its own right, rather I have interrogated it 
in relation to bodily transmission between Flanagan and O’Brien. Therefore, 
Rose becomes almost excluded and invisible. In this sense, rather than the 
Mother banishing the Father, as discussed earlier, it is Rose who is banished. 
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She disappears as the focus is on seeing Flanagan through O’Brien. This 
reading of the performance is troubled by the fact that Rose is actually 
extremely visible in the performances she created with both Flanagan and 
O’Brien. It is Rose’s presence which enables comparisons to be drawn between 
Flanagan’s and O’Brien’s work and without her the transmission would not 
occur. Furthermore, the sadistic role she plays in the performances pushes her 
into an active, aggressive and traditionally masculine role. However, Deleuze 
argues that the role of the sadist, far from being dominant, is prompted by and 
works in conjunction with her masochistic victim when he states that ‘she enjoys 
hurting and torturing others, but it is significant that her actions are ... performed 
in concert with a man,’ (1991: 41). Deleuze’s use of the term ‘in concert’ 
suggests that Rose and Flanagan work together as equal partners (1991: 41). 
Rose’s position as the mother and the sadist disrupts the subject/object 
dichotomy, much like my earlier argument that the use of wounds and orifices 
disrupts the self/other dichotomy. These two notions are linked through the 
concept of abjection and the  role of the mother also fits with this, as Braidotti 
states ‘the mother’s body as the threshold of existence is both sacred and 
soiled, holy and hellish’ she goes on to describe it as ‘attractive and repulsive, 
all-powerful and therefore impossible to live with’ (1994: 81). For me, this 
summarises Rose’s role within the work. She is sacred, vital, essential even. 
She is the mother figure who allows O’Brien to resemble Flanagan and 
therefore enables Flanagan’s specter to reappear. Bradotti describes the ‘dual 
function of the maternal site as both life- and death-giver, as object of worship 
and terror’ and when seen in this light Rose becomes much more than an 
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empty vessel, she becomes the life giver, without whom there would be no 
return, no haunting and no specter, only death and disappearance. 
As I have argued, O’Brien and Rose’s work is haunted by Flanagan’s 
specter and this raises questions about what O’Brien is looking at when he sees 
Rose as the mirror through which his subjectivity is constituted. When looking at 
Rose, O’Brien is actually looking through her to the father (Flanagan), if this is 
the case, what impact does this have upon Rose’s ability to occupy the subject 
position? If O’Brien only sees Flanagan when he looks at Rose then Rose 
never truly occupies the subject position, she serves only as a mirror through 
which Flanagan and O’Brien can observe one another and as the vessel 
through which Flanagan’s specter becomes. Despite being reduced to the 
status of mirror or vessel the role that Rose plays in enabling the bodily 
transmission between Flanagan and O’Brien to take place is still vitally 
important, without her the transmission would not be possible. The argument 
here is that this transmission is from Flanagan to O’Brien and not from Rose to 
O’Brien, which suggests the impossibility of a female body occupying the 
dominant subject position. Rose cannot occupy the subject position in her 
relationship with O’Brien because he simply uses her as the mirror through 
which he creates his own subjectivity.  
I will now analyse Rose’s relationship with Flanagan in order to see 
whether it is possible for her to occupy the subject position in this relationship.  
Deleuze has argued for the separation of Masochism from Sadism in 
order to present an image of the masochistic male who remains dominant. 
Deleuze suggests that it is the masochistic male who creates the sadistic 
   107 
female, rather than the other way around, placing him firmly in control. Using 
examples from Sacher-Masoch’s writing Deleuze highlights the reluctance of 
some of the females to take on their roles as sadists. When seen from this 
perspective Rose is still unable to occupy the dominant subject position, instead 
she becomes a reluctant and somewhat passive object, a tool in her male 
partner and subject’s desire to fulfil his masochistic role. Once again, the female 
is denied the right to be a subject. This concept is troubled by the nature of the 
performances Rose created with Flanagan and O’Brien because, as seen in the 
image below, she appears striking and dominant which suggests that she does 
in fact occupy the subject position. Thus, destabilizing Deleuze’s reading of the 
female sadists’ role within masochism. 
 
Figure 2: Sheree Rose and Martin O’Brien Regimes of Hardship 
 Even in the role of mother to a son and/or the role of sadist the concept 
of the female subject remains an impossibility. Even when a woman appears to 
occupy this position, it is actually a carefully constructed facade designed to 
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support masculine fantasies of masochism and the Lacanian mirror phase. 
Despite Rose’s dominance she serves to enable Flanagan to be glimpsed 
through O’Brien, making her role in the performance vital, but only allowing her 
occupation of the subject position to function within the confines of the Lacanian 
mirror phase.  
 
Bodily Transmission and The Male/Female Binary 
This inability of the female to occupy the dominant subject position is inked to 
the pervasive dominance of culturally conditioned masculine and feminine roles 
and gender binaries, which will now be explored further, as I examine the 
concept of bodily transmission in relation to the work of performance artists, 
Ron Athey and Julie Tolentino, questioning whether bodily transmission can still 
occur in cases where the artists are of different genders. The bodily 
transmission and  haunting that is visible in O’Brien and Flanagan’s work are 
present for several reasons; Rose’s presence in both performances, the fact 
that both artists suffer(ed) from Cystic Fibrosis and the fact that both artists are 
male. I question whether bodily transmission can still occur in cases where the 
artists are of different genders. 
 In his 2009 piece Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic, Athey wore a blonde wig, 
which was pinned to his head. Athey, who was naked apart from the wig, began 
to vigorously brush the wig. He then removed the wig and the pins that had 
been holding it in place, causing his head to bleed. A series of actions, including 
yoga poses, holding and lying between panes of glass followed. These actions 
caused Athey’s head wound to bleed and the panes of glass to become 
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smeared with blood. In his review of the performance the performance Daniel 
Mufson states that when Athey ‘remove[s] the wig, we see that it has actually 
been pinned into the skin of his head, and he bleeds profusely as he removes 
the pins. He takes the glass panes out of their holders and starts to drip blood 
on them’ (Mufson 2009: 1). In 2011 Athey re-performed this piece alongside 
fellow performance artist Tolentino as part of her ongoing project, The Sky 
Remains the Same. The Shy Remains the Same is a project in which Tolentino 
re-performed performance art works that had previously been performed by 
other artists. Tolentino worked in conjunction with these artists, using her body 
as an archive for their performances. Tolentino and Athey’s re-performance of 
Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic poses pertinent questions about the role gender 
plays in bodily transmission. Is it possible for a female artist’s re-performance of 
a male artist’s work to be haunted by the initial performance? If so, does this 
haunting differ from that described above in the case of Martin O’Brien and Bob 
Flanagan, and in what ways does it differ? How central is the gender and or 
body of the artists in enabling haunting and transmission to take place?  
  In order to answer these questions this thesis will analyse the 
performance in relation to gender theory and in particular the writings of Judith 
Butler, which will be used in order to consider different ideas of the way in which 
gender and, importantly, the differences between genders are constructed. In 
her 2004 text Undoing Gender Butler examines notions of gender, trying to 
‘combat forms of essentialism which claim that gender is a truth that is 
somehow there, interior to the body, as a core or as an internal essence, as 
something that we cannot deny, something which, natural or not, is treated as 
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given’ (2004: 212). Butler’s statement stresses the ways in which gender has 
traditionally been viewed as a binary opposition. 
If man and woman are perceived as binary opposites, defined in their 
relation to each other, as that which the other is not i.e. man is not woman and 
woman is not man, it seems easy to assert that bodily transmission between 
Athey and Tolentino are prevented, or at the very least disrupted, by their 
differing genders. If Tolentino, as a woman, is defined by virtue of the fact that 
she is not a man (like Athey) and Athey in turn is defined as being a man 
because he is not a woman (like Tolentino), then how can he possibly be visible 
in her performance, in her body? These questions are heightened when we 
consider the nature of the performance being discussed. Self Obliteration 
#1Ecstatic is a Performance Art performance, and this means that the  body of 
the performer is central to the piece. The performance is created by and 
enacted upon the body. It is the body (bloody and visceral) that performs and if 
Tolentino’s body is not only not Athey’s body but is crucially defined by its 
difference from Athey’s body, how can his body (and therefore his performance) 
be seen in hers? When considered from this perspective the style of the 
performance appears to prevent Tolentino’s work from being haunted by 
Athey’s earlier performance. Instead, Tolentino’s work can only be read in 
relation to its difference from Athey’s, not for the similarities that they share. 
Butler, however, suggests other possibilities of gender, which take into 
account ‘the complex ways in which gendered lives are crafted and lived’ (2004: 
5). Butler argues for a concept of gender which sees gender as being in 
process, not static or biological, but socially constructed in such a way that the 
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boundaries between one gender and another are permeable, allowing for 
people to occupy different gender positions at different points in their lives 
(2004: 5). Butler asserts that gender is a social construct and that ‘one does not 
“do” one’s gender alone. One is always “doing” with and for another’ (2004: 1). 
This raises the possibility that gender is not a permanent and predetermined 
thing but something which can change and develop. What Butler is saying is 
that one may choose to perform one’s gender differently at different times in 
their life, for different reasons and for different audiences. Crucial to this idea is 
Butler’s insistence that gender is constructed socially rather than individually. 
The nature of a social construct means that it must be created with and for 
others and, therefore, implies that one’s gender is not fixed or stable, but a 
constantly changing and developing entity, which one consciously constructs in 
order to meet one’s needs and desires, or perhaps even the needs and desires 
of others. She also argues that there may be more than two genders, a notion 
which disrupts the binary opposition between man/woman, male/female (2004: 
90). If there are more than two genders, then man and woman cannot be 
defined simply by their opposition to one another. This notion disrupts the 
heteronormativity that is implied by the dominant culturally conditioned binaries. 
This impacts upon our ability to see a male body in a female artist’s 
performance. If male and female cease to be binary opposites it becomes 
easier to see a male body in a female artist’s performance because it allows for 
a more fluid and interchangeable understanding of gender.  
 Such fluid border crossing of gender could appear in evidence through 
Tolentino’s repetition of Athey’s performance. Through the bloody, painful 
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wounds that we see these two bodies inflict upon themselves, Tolentino seems 
to masculinise her body by showing it to be as tough as his. Yet, equally 
Tolentino’s duplication and so enhancement of Athey’s actions with the blonde 
wig could appear to further emphasise the performance’s feminisation of his 
form. Indeed, Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic presents Athey’s body as an 
eroticised object and here I assert that this notion of hyper-femininity is further 
highlighted by Tolentino’s repetition of the performance because of the fact that 
her body is female, a fact that is overtly staged by her nudity. In his discussion 
of Athey’s work in Pleading in the Blood: The Art and Performances of Ron 
Athey, Dominic Johnson describes Athey’s work as exploring ‘manifestations of 
visceral excess’ and ‘high-camp glamour’ (2012: 31). Self-obliteration #1 
Ecstatic exemplifies this, as the excess of blood in the performance is 
counterbalanced by the presentation of Athey in a blonde wig, which represents 
stereotypical notions of filmic glamour. Early in the performance, before he pulls 
off the wig, before the blood, Athey brushes the blonde wig, pointing to 
representations of glamourised hyper-femininity, before destabilising this image 
of himself by tearing off the wig, causing his scalp to bleed. Later on in the 
performance, when he repeats these actions alongside Tolentino, notions of 
glamourised hyper-femininity are once again present as they both brush their 
blonde wigs. Yet, despite the overt presentation of her female body, Tolentino 
also subverts ideas of femininity and glamour through her removal of the wig 
and presentation of her body covered in blood. It highlights that underneath the 
culturally constructed concepts of masculinity and femininity, all bodies share a 
vulnerability and fragility. 
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The Sky Remains the Same but everything else changes? 
I suggest that although Tolentino’s gender is clearly different from Athey’s, it is 
not the most significant factor affecting the transmission between the two artists. 
The main thing that causes Tolentino’s performance to differ from Athey’s is her 
presence. In the 2009 performance, Athey’s first of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic, 
Tolentino was not present as she was in the 2011 re-performance. In the 2011 
piece Athey re-performed Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic before performing it again 
alongside Tolentino. The fact that Athey performed the actions twice in 2011 
causes his re-performance to differ from his initial performance. In addition, the 
fact that Tolentino performed alongside Athey marks her performance as 
different from his by positioning her as both witness to and re-performer of his 
work. This very clearly presents her performance as a re-performance of or 
response to Athey’s. This is the crucial difference between the 2009 and 2011 
performances, not the fact that Athey is male and Tolentino female. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the artists’ differing genders has no bearing 
upon the way in which the performances are read and received. 
 
Male/Female and Masculine/Feminine 
One of the critical questions that a female artist re-performing a male artist’s 
work, or vice versa, raises is whether the female artist’s body, in this case 
Tolentino’s, feminises the male artist’s body or whether the male artist’s body, in 
this case Athey’s, masculinises hers? Using Butler’s notions of gender and her 
argument that ‘new forms of gender are possible’ I suggest that there are more 
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than two genders therefore they cannot function in binary opposition to one 
another (2004: 30). This means that Tolentino’s re-performance of Athey’s work 
could feasibly neither feminise his body or masculinise hers. 
 The act of re-performance, particularly the nature of this re-performance 
in which Athey’s original performance becomes doubled (being performed by 
first himself and then  alongside Tolentino), further confuses the male/female, 
subject/object and self/other binaries. How do we read these two bodies in 
relation to each other? And when we are presented with them side by side in 
the performance space performing the same set of bodily actions, we must read 
them in relation to each other. To suggest that Tolentino’s repetition of Athey’s 
performance masculinises her body by showing it to be as tough as his seems a 
logical reaction to the bloody, painful wounds we see these two bodies inflict 
upon themselves. Owing to the fact that they are two bodies, one male and one 
female, performing the same set of actions, their similarities become much 
more apparent than their differences, thus blurring the lines between masculine 
and feminine and throwing into turmoil the notion of them as two halves of a 
dichotomous pair. 
This blurring of lines and boundaries is further enhanced by the 
knowledge that both artists concerned are homosexual. Stereotypical views of 
homosexual men are that they are feminine and similarly stereotypical views of 
homosexual women are that they are masculine. As such, reading the re-
performance as an act which feminises Athey’s body or masculinises 
Tolentino’s appears to be relatively easy but, reading the performance in this 
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way simplifies the complex nature of the gender roles at play here and forces 
Athey and Tolentino into gender stereotypes into which they do not fit. 
Athey’s large frame and body covered with tattoos and piercings 
combined with the violent and bloody nature of the actions he performs in Self-
obliteration #1 Ecstatic clearly do not fit with the image of a feminised, 
homosexual male body. The level of self-inflicted pain and the visceral, bloody 
nature of the performance in conjunction with Athey’s physical appearance 
seem to negate the notion of homosexual men being feminine. Whilst 
Tolentino’s much smaller frame makes it difficult for her to be read as butch or 
masculine, the physical nature of the performance which serves to prevent 
Athey’s body from being feminised also prevents Tolentino’s from being read as 
feminine. The masculine/feminine dichotomy is too simple to be a useful tool for 
analysing the work because the idea of a masculine/feminine binary and the 
notion that homosexual bodies merely possess the traits more commonly 
associated with the opposite gender discounts myriad other gender possibilities. 
Gender, as Butler asserts, is a much more complex concept than this and 
should not be limited to the masculine/feminine divide and Athey and 
Tolentino’s performance serves to prove Butler’s point by crossing the gender 
boundary and refusing to remain on what could be seen as the correct side of 
the divide. 
Their refusal to conform to gender norms or stereotypes makes them 
subversive bodies. Butler has asserted, people who do not conform to 
heterosexual norms are often seen as dangerous because of the threat they 
pose to the male/female or masculine/feminine binary. She states that, ‘gender 
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is the mechanism by which notions of masculine and feminine are both 
produced and naturalised, but gender might very well be the apparatus by 
which such terms are deconstructed and denaturalized’ and I contend that 
Athey and Tolentino’s work threatens this binary on two levels (2004: 42). 
Firstly, the fact that both artists are homosexual destabilises the idea that desire 
and sexuality are normally heterosexual, as Butler claims ‘the “am” of “I am a 
man” encodes the prohibition “I may not love a man,” so that the ontological 
claim carries the force of prohibition itself’ by desiring the other who is the same 
gender or sex as themselves (2004: 199). Tolentino and Athey stage a desire, 
which does not conform to the perceived norms of their gender. According to 
Butler, homosexual desire destabilises gender norms because the whole notion 
of desire hinges on the relationship with the other and the concept of otherness 
is based on the model of sexual difference and she states that ‘homosexuality 
in particular leaves gender behind’ (2004: 184). Bearing in mind the concept of 
sexual difference, homosexual desire only makes sense to those who 
understand male and female as binary opposites within a Butch Femme 
aesthetic, which as discussed above, Athey and Tolentino do not fit into. 
Without this aesthetic, homosexual desire appears as desire for the self rather 
than the other, thus destabilising the premise of desire and the subject/object 
dichotomy. In this way, Athey and Tolentino refuse to conform, not only to the 
heterosexual norms which govern desire, but also to the norms which enable 
heterosexuals to make sense of homosexual desire, which is based on the 
notion that homosexual women are butch and homosexual men are feminine. 
   117 
If Tolentino’s actions masculinise Tolentino’s body as being as tough as 
Athey’s they must also serve to masculinise his body. Her body cannot be as 
masculine as his if his body is feminised, and the representation of his body as 
masculine, or Butch, disrupts notions of sexual desire and the 
masculine/feminine binary. What Tolentino and Athey present us with is a 
concept of bodies, gender and sexuality that are not fixed or stable but 
moveable and playful in such a way that the lines between male and female 
and masculine and feminine become blurred. This blurring of bodies is 
physically enacted in the performance space during the performance, in which it 
can at times be difficult to state definitively where one body ends and the other 
begins. The physical boundaries of the body become blurred and this confuses 
the gender binary because we cannot easily separate the masculine body from 
the feminine one. 
 
Bodily Transmission and The Body as Archive 
The similarities between their performances is re-iterated by the title of 
Tolentino’s project (of which Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic was a part), The Sky 
Remains the Same. Her use of the words ‘same’ and ‘remains’ indicate that 
something of the initial performance remains in the act of re-performance. She 
also describes the project of as one in which performances are archived, 
asserting that her project is one which seeks to capture performances, 
breathing new life in to them and preventing them from disappearing. I argue 
that Tolentino uses the term archive in a similar way to this research in order to 
denote a bodily archive, in which work is stored in and on the body rather than a 
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traditional archive. This also implies that she understands her work as being 
haunted by Athey’s and embraces this. Tolentino states that The Sky Remains 
the Same is a project in which she ‘invites select collaborators to choose a work 
from their own performance history to archive into/onto the artist’s body’ (2008: 
2). This provides an insight into the reasons behind Tolentino’s re-performance 
and why she chose to copy his actions directly. In so doing, she turns her 
performance into a re-performance of Athey’s, rather than a response to or re-
creation of his work. Tolentino’s rhetoric of archives and inscription is 
suggestive of the fact that she is driven by a desire to memorialise his work 
through her performance and her emphasis on the similarities between the two 
performances suggests that she wishes her work to be read in relation to 
Athey’s. This notion is enhanced by the fact that Tolentino and Athey performed 
together. I claim that this positions her as a witness to his work places her in the 
role of faithful pupil who studies another’s and seeks to create it herself. This is 
suggestive of the fact that she wants her performance to be as similar to 
Athey’s as possible.  
However, as I mentioned earlier, it is the fact that Athey performed 
alongside Tolentino, which serves to mark her performance out as different to 
his initial version of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic, when she did not share the 
performance space with him. The fact that Athey had already performed the 
piece once and then repeated the performance alongside Tolentino further 
highlighted the differences between this and the initial Self-obliteration #1 
Ecstatic from 2009. In 2009 there was a single artist and a single performance 
but in 2011 we see two artists and arguably two separate performances, albeit 
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of the same work, and this doubles the repetition. Tolentino’s performance was 
not a repetition of Athey’s initial performance but a repetition of a repetition. 
This of course raises questions about which performance Tolentino is re-
performing, is it the initial Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic or Athey’s repetition of it? 
And how does this affect the nature of her repetition and the way in which it is 
received? These issues are exemplified  in the image below in which Tolentino 
and Athey can be seen together.
  
Figure 3: Ron Athey and Julie Tolentino Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic (2011) 
At first glance these questions may not appear that important, why does 
it matter which of Athey’s performances Tolentino is re-creating? Surely both 
performances were the same? But to think this way is to miss a vital point about 
the bodily transmission, which takes place between Athey and Tolentino during 
the re-performance. Athey himself re-performs Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic and 
this performance is markedly different from his initial presentation of the piece. 
As I have already noted the fact that in 2011 Athey performed the piece twice, 
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serves as a marker of this difference, but there are also other factors which 
signify the difference between this and earlier versions of the performance. The 
date, the time, the place of the performance are all different and even though 
the work is being re-performed by the same artist Athey’s body is not the same 
body upon which the initial performance was enacted. This is because Athey’s 
body has already been, very physically, marked, wounded and scarred by the 
initial performance. Therefore, in the re-performance, Athey can be said to be 
re-tracing past steps, re-opening old wounds and breathing new life into them in 
the present performance. If we consider this in relation to Taylor’s notion of 
repertoire, or as a kind of bodily archive, Athey’s actions during the re-
performance can be seen as him delving into his own bodily archive in order to 
repeat the performance. 
Tolentino’s re-performance then is different again. In a sense, her actions 
are the same as Athey’s, a re-tracing of steps, but the steps that Tolentino re-
traces are not her own, they are Athey’s. Therefore, the wounds that Tolentino 
can arguably be described as re-opening must undergo a process of bodily 
transmission because they are not her wounds, they are Athey’s. 
When it is read in this way, Athey’s own re-performance becomes central 
to the bodily transmission which takes place. He re-performs for Tolentino, 
gifting her his performance, by inscribing it upon his body. She then inscribes it 
upon her own body so that both artists’ bodies are marked with the same 
wounds, the same cuts, the same performance. Thus, Athey is entrusting his 
work, his legacy, to Tolentino who takes on the role of archivist, within my use 
of the term and the sphere of bodily archives, faithfully collecting and storing the 
   121 
work in order to prevent it from disappearing. It is Athey’s own repetition, which 
makes the process of bodily transmission between the artists possible, as it 
positions him and Tolentino alongside one another and suggests that they are 
working together in order to try and hold on to Athey’s performance. 
This transmission, however, is disrupted by the fact that Tolentino is not 
Athey, her body is not his and, in the same way that Athey’s repetition of his 
earlier work is not the earlier work, Tolentino’s performance is not Athey’s. This, 
for me is the predicament facing performers who seek to create re-
performances. No matter how carefully Tolentino studies Athey or how hard she 
tries to copy his movements, actions and gestures exactly, and indeed no 
matter how successful she may be in her attempts, her performance can never 
be the same as Athey’s. I firmly believe that re-performance can serve as a 
means for archiving performance, for allowing it to continue past the life of the 
initial performance and, in many cases, past the life of the initial performer. 
However, the archive created by re-performance is not a traditional one. It is a 
bodily archive which relies on physical bodies and their presence in the 
performance space. Whilst many performance studies scholars argue, as do I, 
that this is the only way to capture a live and transient art form, the bodily 
archive can be a difficult space to negotiate.  
The fact that we are bodies in process, which never stand still and never 
remain the same, means that it is impossible for a re-performance, even when 
performed by the initial artist, to be the same as the initial performance. 
Therefore, something is lost during process of transmission and that the 
performance contained in this bodily archive is not the initial performance. This 
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raises questions about the value and usefulness as an archive, which I will 
address later on in the thesis. For now, I argue that in performances such as 
Athey and Tolentino’s The Sky Remains The Same/ Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic 
a bodily transmission does occur between the two artists as the performance is 
passed on from one to the other. However, during this process of passing on 
the performance itself is transformed and is differentiated from the original 
performance, allowing the later performance to memorialise the earlier one but 
never to become it.  
 
Repetition, The Copy, The Fake 
In her text  Mourning Sex Phelan discusses loss and mourning, asking ‘is 
history a cable? a telephone? a faded memory? a painting we keep copying?’ 
(1997: 119). Phelan’s questions identify two key concerns for re-performance as 
means of archiving performance. Her use of the terms ‘cable’ and ‘telephone’ 
are suggestive of a dialogue and the possibility of communication with the past. 
The kind of bodily transmission I have discussed in relation to the case studies 
in this chapter fit with this notion of communicating with the past. Through their 
performances and re-performances, the artists enter into a dialogue with one 
another, using their performances as a means of bodily communication, which 
enables them to transcend barriers of time, space and death. Despite the fact 
that initial performances and their re-performances may have been created at 
different times, in different locations and in the case of Flanagan and O’Brien, in 
spite of Flanagan’s death, the performances are able to enter into a dialogue 
with one another and provide audiences with new ways of understanding the 
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performances, through their references to one another. Through their bodily 
communication history is passed on, the history of one artist is given to another, 
and because of the physical nature of the performances, this history is given 
new life in the artist’s body. 
Phelan’s use of the words ‘memory’ and ‘copying’ imply that the act of 
copying, or in this case re-performing, is also an act of remembering. She is 
suggesting that repetition creates memory or at least recalls memories, which 
then prevent us from forgetting that which we have lost. It is through this 
process, we are able to hold on to the lost object, in this case a performance, 
and prevent it from ever disappearing entirely. This does not mean however, 
that the object remains intact, in its initial form for all eternity. Rather, the object 
is shaped, changed, transformed through this continual process of repetition 
and recollection so that, as discussed above, in relation to Athey and 
Tolentino’s work, what we end up with is a remnant rather than a replica or the 
lost object itself. This is insinuated by Phelan’s question ‘is history... a painting 
we keep copying?’ (1997: 119). As Rebecca Schneider asserts in her 2012 text, 
Performing Remains, the copy is not the original, it is always marked as 
different, ‘the first time was true ... the second time, the third time, the nth times 
are not actual’ (2011: 180; emphasis in original). The term copy is often seen as 
derogatory, copy is synonymous with fake, or imitation. However, this does not 
mean that it does not have value. I contend that re-performances have 
immense value for artists and for the history of performance. In Unmarked: The 
Politics of Performance Peggy Phelan states that ‘Performance cannot be 
saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of 
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representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other 
than performance’ (1993: 146). Re-performance is never the original 
performance, but it is a means through which we can capture the nature of 
performance. I assert that even with modern technology re-performance is the 
only way to keep hold of an art form in which the body is so central because it 
allows artists to pass performances from one body to another. Phelan has also 
claimed that ‘the desire to preserve and represent the performance event is a 
desire we should resist. For what one otherwise preserves is an illustration, a 
pop-up anatomical drawing that stands in for the thing that one most wants to 
save, the embodied performance’ (1997: 3). I argue that performance 
documentation such as photographs, video footage or text, fails to capture the 
bodily nature of the performance event. As Athey has stated ‘documentation is 
really manipulative... it’s still a gaze that the camera forces you to take on’ 
(2014). As such, despite the fact that the performance itself is re-shaped during 
the process of bodily transmission, I contend that re-performance and the bodily 
archive play a central role in preserving performance. 
 
Bodily Archives, Memorial and Melancholia 
As Taylor has highlighted, the notion of written verses bodily archives is bound 
up with the concept of a patriarchal society in which language; both the spoken 
and written word is privileged over the body. This is highlighted by her 
statement that ‘it is only because Western culture is wedded to the word, 
whether written or spoken, that language claims such epistemic and 
explanatory power’ (2003: 24). Taylor goes on to explain that the repertoire 
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‘transmits live, embodies actions’ and ‘as such traditions are stored in the body’ 
(2003: 24). The notion of traditions being stored in the body highlights the 
visceral nature of the repertoire and allows me to apply Taylor’s ideas to the 
traditional archive versus the bodily archive. In doing so, I assert that the kind of 
bodily archive I have described above, and in particular the concept of bodily 
transmission between artists, provides a space for bodily remembering, 
memorialising, grieving and mourning.  
This notion of bodily transmission also serves to link it to the concept of 
Melancholia. The act of trying to hold onto something which we have lost can 
be read in relation to the melancholic failure to detach the self from the lost 
other. In his 1917 essay ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ Freud claims that 
melancholia occurs when the path of mourning is blocked by an inability to let 
go of the lost other. He states that ‘in it [mourning] nothing hinders these 
processes from proceeding along the normal path through the preconscious to 
consciousness. This path is blocked for the work of melancholia,’ (2001: 257).   
Therefore I argue that Rose and O’Brien seek to keep Flanagan alive 
through their performance and their performance is a melancholic refusal to 
separate the self from the lost other, something Freud insists is vital to the 
process of mourning when he describes the demand that ‘all libido shall be 
withdrawn from its attachments to that object’ (1917: 244). However, this 
reading of acts of re-performance is problematic when we consider Athey and 
Tolentino’s work. Athey is still very much alive, as can be seen by the bloody, 
visceral nature of his own re-performance of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic and 
this, of course, raises questions about Tolentino’s desire to memorialise him 
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when he refuses to occupy the position of lost other. In Athey and Tolentino’s 
case her project The Sky Remains the Same is an act of grieving for an 
anticipated loss, rather than a loss which has already taken place. The fact that 
Athey is HIV positive, as discussed above, means that his is a body which 
exists on the boundary of life and death and is, therefore, under constant threat 
of death, making him hyper aware of the fragility of life. I suggest then that 
Athey and Tolentino are not seeking to keep the lost other alive, but to ensure 
that something of the self survives after their death.  
What is represented in performances such as O’Brien and Rose’s, as 
well as Athey and Tolentino’s, and indeed in re-performance in general, is a 
fear of death as the end, a fear of or refusal to let go. Rose and O’Brien’s 
performance presents an image of them as unwilling to let go of Flanagan and 
thus seeking to make his spectral presence visible in their work.  
The same can be said of Tolentino’s work, she appears unwilling to allow 
Athey or his performance to disappear. Therefore, The Sky Remains the Same 
must be considered in relation to the notion of legacy. Therefore, the bodily 
archive, that I have argued re-performance creates, must be considered in 
relation to a traditional archive, which Taylor describes as a place where things 
are ‘selected, classified, and presented for analysis’ but should also be 
understood as a possible legacy for performance (2003:23). Taylor contends 
that ‘the archive and the repertoire exist in a constant state of interaction’ and 
that they do not form ‘a binary’ (2003: 28). Taylor also states that ‘the repertoire, 
expands the traditional archive’ and it does so by creating a living legacy of 
performance (2003: 36). I claim that bodily transmission is the most effective 
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way in which performance can continue to live beyond the life of the initial 
performance, because it is the only way to capture the transient and ephemeral 
nature of performance. Whilst, as discussed above, re-performance as archive 
has its limits and can be problematic I feel that it is also the most useful way 
that performance can create a performative or bodily legacy, the most valuable 
way in which it can leave something behind for future artists, audiences, 
theorists and critics. 
O’Brien and Rose’s work is different to Tolentino and Athey’s, in the 
sense that, in her own rhetoric about The Sky Remains The Same project, 
Tolentino is clear in her use of the term archive, describing the performance as 
an ‘intimate exchange and trace of ephemeral performance [which] aims to 
archive the impossible, the inquiry of a work’s potential and an irreplaceable 
piece of one’s past’ (2009: 1). O’Brien and Rose’s work is different because 
they do not discuss it in terms of re-performance. On his website O’Brien states 
that in his and Rose’s work ‘the legacy of their [Rose and Flanagan’s] practice is 
considered’, but he does not enter into discussions of re-performance (2012: 2). 
O’Brien, therefore, acknowledges that his work with Sheree Rose will conjure 
memories of her work with Flanagan, but he doesn’t seem to be consciously 
trying to evoke those memories. 
Despite the fact that this clearly distinguishes O’Brien and Rose’s work 
from Tolentino and Athey’s, the performances still share many similarities, in 
terms of their use of bodily transmission and their use of performance as 
memorial. In Mourning Sex Phelan states that ‘performance and theatre have a 
special relation to art as memorial’ and I assert that re-performance is central to 
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this relationship (1997: 3). Re-performance, as described above, prevents 
performance from disappearing because it allows the initial performance to 
become inscribed upon a new body. Thus, re-performance enables 
performance to “cheat” death because even though the body is finite and will 
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Chapter Three - Echoes, Traces and Remains 
 
In this chapter I intend to explore what Schechner terms the aftermath of a 
performance. As I explained in the introduction an aftermath consists of 
those things left over and/or behind; those things that I  call the echoes and 
traces of performance. My interest here is in how these echoes and traces 
can be used as a means of remembering and re-creating or re-performing a 
piece. In this chapter I will build upon the notion of bodily archives that I 
developed in chapter two in order to question more traditional notions of 
archives. I assert that the physical remnants left behind after performances, 
such as Athey and O’Brien’s, provide a more useful insight into the 
performances than traditional archival materials such as photographs, video 
footage and some forms of critical writing about performance. Athey’s 
performance Self Obliteration #1 Ecstatic, which was also analaysed in the 
previous chapter, and Martin O’Brien’s performance Mucus Factory will be 
used as case studies and the aftermath of these performance events will be 
examined in relation to Schechner’s notion of aftermath. 
Athey’s Self Obliteration #1 Ecstatic  was described in the previous 
chapter in relation to Athey’s re-performance of it alongside Julie Tolentino 
as part of her project The Sky Remains the Same but in this chapter I will 
focus on the way in which Athey’s actions which include; removing a blonde 
wig which had been pinned to his head and caused his head to bleed. Athey 
also lay between panes of glass, which he shifted over his body led to 
Athey’s blood being dripped onto the performance area and the way in 
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which Athey’s flowing blood can be viewed as creating an aftermath of the 
performance. 
In his 2011 performance Mucus Factory O’Brien performed actions such 
and beating his chest and jumping up and down, which cause him to cough 
up mucus. He then collected the mucus in small pots, reminiscent of those 
used to collect medical samples, before mixing the mucus with glitter and 
inserting it into his anus using a nebulizer. The aftermath of Mucus Factory 
is the mucus and glitter stored in the containers and in this chapter this 
aftermath is analysed for the insight it can offer into the performance event 
that had taken place. 
In Unmarked: The Politics of Performance Phelan argues that, ‘defined 
by its ephemeral nature, performance art cannot be documented’ (1996: 31). 
Phelan’s argument points to the fact that the traditional archival materials I 
have described above fail to capture the live nature of performance art. This 
is also highlighted by Philip Auslander in his 2008 text, Liveness: 
Performance in a Mediatized Culture, in which he states that ‘the common 
assumption is that the live event is “real” and that mediatized events are 
secondary and somehow artificial reproductions of the real’ (2008: 3). I 
contend that whilst the live is clearly differentiated from the mediatized and 
that any attempt to capture live performance through media misses 
something of what makes the live performance, the element of presence, it 
does not mean that a live performance cannot be replicated through re-
performance. However, as Auslander explains when he describes the 
‘reductive binary opposition of the live and the mediatized’  (2008: 3), simply 
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placing the live and the mediatized in a binary opposition fails to take into 
account any possibility for the mediatized to be considered actual and 
equally for the live to be seen as artificial. I contend that by taking into 
account the prospect of a bodily archive we open up important possibilities 
for considering that the live may also be a reproduction. Just because 
something is live does not guarantee originality any more than being 
mediatized guarantees artificiality. However, my  main contention, like 
Auslander’s is that the live and the mediatized are different in significant 
ways. By positioning Auslander’s statements alongside Schneider, Phelan 
and Taylor’s discussions of re-performance and performance’s 
ephemerality, I assert that it is the concept of presence that makes re-
performance a more purposeful way of recording or documenting previous 
live performances than any form of media. A live, bodily presence is required 
in order to create a performance and without a body performance will 
disappear, it will die. 
In her 2005 text Utopia in Performance: Finding Hope at the Theater, Jill 
Dolan asks ‘How can we capture, in our discourse, not just the outlines of a 
performance’s structure and form, its content and the contours of its narrative, 
but the ineffable emotion it provokes in its moment of presence?’ (2005: 9). It is 
my assertion, throughout this chapter, that we cannot capture the emotion 
Dolan describes, though lexical discourse, but that it can be contained in a 
bodily archive of re-performance. Developing the points outlined in the previous 
chapter, I will explore Taylor and Phelan’s writing, as well as Rebecca 
Schneider’s text, Performing Remains, in order to argue that re-performance is 
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a form of what I will call a bodily archive. Re-performance provides a means of 
preserving an art form that, I assert, needs to be performed in order to prevent it 
from disappearing. This section of the chapter argues that performance cannot 
be contained or housed in a traditional archive and requires a physical body in 
order to preserve it because any other form of documentation would fail to 
capture the live aspect, which is so vital to performance. As Phelan has 
claimed, when performance is documented ‘it turns into that document… and 
ceases to be performance art’ (1997: 31). Re-performance enables 
performance to be documented whilst still being performance art. 
Auslander asserts that ‘the performance is always at one level raw 
material for documentation, the final product through which it will be circulated 
and with which it will inevitably become identified’ (2001: 38). In describing live 
performance as raw material for documentation, Auslander acknowledges the 
transformative process that performance undergoes when it is documented, and 
that during this transformation the live nature of the performance is lost. This 
idea is developed from Taylor’s concept of the repertoire and Schneider’s 
argument that what she terms re-enactment (which as I explained in the 
introduction, differs slightly from what I call re-performance) provides an insight 
into the initial performance. This is an insight which could not be gained from 
viewing video and photographic documentation of the performances because, 
as Schneider asserts, ‘the experience of re-enactment is an intense, embodied 
inquiry into temporal repetition, temporal recurrence’ (2011: 1-2). She 
continues, by arguing that, re-performance is ‘a way of accessing what they 
[people who engage in re-enactment] feel the documentary evidence upon 
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which they rely misses – that is, live experience’ (2011: 10). Schneider’s 
argument suggests that re-performance provides a way of accessing 
performance after it has ended without losing the live aspect, something which 
is often missing from photographic or video documentation. This is supported by 
Taylor’s argument that ‘the repertoire requires presence’ (2007: 20). A video or 
photograph cannot take the place of a performance because it does not involve 
a live, physical, embodied action or interaction between performer and 
spectator. In contrast, a re-performance, which as I have already argued, can 
be perceived as a bodily archive, does require the physical presence of a 
performer and an interaction between performer and spectator. 
This provides re-performance with the opportunity to enable a new 
generation of audiences to experience performance events, despite not being 
able to witness the initial performance.  Therefore, re-performance also acts as 
a way of preserving performance, preventing it from completely disappearing 
once the performance has finished. I contend that it is this which allows re-
performance to strengthen performance’s ability to ‘respond to the psychic need 
to rehearse for loss, and especially for death’ (Phelan 1997: 3). The partial 
preservation of performance through re-performance strengthens this ability 
because it teaches us that the dead ‘do not leave us all at once’ but ebb away 
slowly, piece by piece and memory by memory (Phelan 1997: 41). Re-
performance allows performances, like people, to leave behind a variety of 
echoes and traces, bodily remnants, objects and relics of the performance, as 
well as the memories of those involved in the event. All of these things fit into 
Schechner’s notion of aftermath, which he describes as ‘the continuing life of 
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the performance … This phase of the performance process may extend for 
years or even centuries – in fact, the duration of the aftermath is indefinite’ 
(Schechner 2013: 246). It is this aftermath which, I assert, provides possibilities 
for the afterlife of performance. These echoes and traces of performance can 
be fruitfully used in order to create new performances, which appear to be 
haunted by the initial or earlier versions of the performance. This is what I term 
re-performance, whose aim, as I have previously mentioned, is not to create a 
performance, which is identical to the initial performance. Such a pursuit is one 
which would necessarily be doomed to fail because every re-creation or re-
enactment is always marked as such and hence is marked as different from the 
initial performance. Rather, the aim is to create something new from the 
remnants of the initial piece. In re-performance, artists create something which 
is distinctly different from the initial performance, but which bears similarities to 
it. The result is a performance, which is simultaneously similar to and different 
from the initial piece. The re-performance then, whilst marked as different, is 
haunted by the initial performance because the echoes and traces of the initial 
performance are made visible by the re-performance. By making these echoes 
and traces visible re-performance provides an insight into the initial 
performance by reminding spectators of the initial performance and keeping it 
alive in their memories. In much the same way, a photograph of a lost loved one 
reminds us of them and keeps them alive through our recollections of shared 
experiences. 
Throughout this chapter, in addition to the aforementioned case studies 
of Athey and O’Brien,  I will explore the work of artists Sheree Rose with Bob 
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Flanagan as well as Dani Ploeger analysing the aftermath of their performance 
works and investigating their usefulness as documentation of this work. 
Schechner states that ‘the aftermath persists in physical evidence, critical 
responses, archives and memories’ (2013: 247).  It is the physical evidence and 
memories, which I am interested in examining and assert that they can form 
part of a collective remembering amongst spectators, which enables the 
aftermath of a performance to continue (2013 :247). I will argue that these 
bodily echoes and traces are useful for those seeking to re-perform the work of 
others. This is because, rather than photographic or video material, which may 
lend itself well to re-creations of the performance, the bodily fragments allow 
artists to make their own meaning from the performance, thus enabling them to 
re-perform the piece in interesting and different ways. These are ways which 
reference the earlier performance whilst simultaneously seeking to create 
something new and different from the remnants. 
What is created from the remnants is dependent upon both the artist and 
audience involved in the re-performance. This idea is highlighted by Helen 
Freshwater in her book Theatre and Audience, in which she states that 
‘watching the best theatre and performance we are together and alone’ (2009: 
6). It is this sense of audience members as a collective that I contend creates a 
collective remembering amongst those who witness a performance event. Each 
audience member has an individual experience when witnessing a performance 
or re-performance and this impacts upon their reading of the piece. However, 
key to this is the fact that they are aware of their position of part of a ‘temporary 
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community’ (Freshwater 2009: 7). It is the knowledge of this position which 
creates a collective experience and remembering amongst spectators. 
Through my analysis of  Athey and O’Brien’s work this chapter aims to 
explore the notion that the physical, bodily remnants (in this case blood, mucus 
and other bodily fluids) left behind provide an embodied archive of their work, 
which is more in keeping with the nature of their performances, in which the 
body is foregrounded.  
 
Things Left Behind 
In Schechner’s notion of Aftermath he notes that the aftermath ‘consists of the 
response by the agents of official culture – reviewers and critics – plus the ever-
increasing amount of photographic, video, and digital records. There are also 
the memories of those participating in and attending the event’ (2013: 247). At 
times, photographic and video documentation have been privileged over other 
types of documentation. As I discussed earlier in the chapter in relation to 
Auslander, there is a sense that photographs and video footage record the 
“truth” of the event, and that this form of documentation is more durable than 
memories or bodily remnants, which inevitably fade. This idea is highlighted by 
Taylor’s statements that ‘individual instances of performances disappear from 
the repertoire. This happens to a lesser degree in the archive’ and the archive 
and the repertoire ‘too readily falls into a binary, with the written constituting 
hegemonic power and the repertoire providing the anti-hegemonic challenge’ 
(2009: 20, 22). Taylor’s statements suggest that the archive has been privileged 
over the repertoire and perhaps that this is, at least in part, owing to the fact 
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that the archive has been viewed as more resilient than the repertoire. Whilst 
photographs and videos serve as documentation, allowing those who were not 
present at the performance itself to experience it second hand through a 
digitised medium, bodily remnants provide a different kind of proof, much like 
evidence in a crime scene or the process of an autopsy in which the body is 
examined in order to gather information about past events. The kind of proof 
that bodily remnants provides is one which fits in with Taylor’s concept of the 
repertoire. Taylor argues that the repertoire ‘requires presence: people 
participate in the production and reproduction of knowledge by “being there,” 
being a part of the transmission’ (2003: 20). The scars on the artist’s body and 
the blood on the floor of the performance area, serve as a reminder of the 
performance. This enables them to  ‘participate in the transmission of social 
knowledge, memory, and identity’, creating a sense of collective experience and 
remembering in spectators (Taylor 2007: 16). They also hint at the possibility of 
re-performance, as Schneider asserts that ‘reenactment art poses a certain 
challenge to our longstanding thrall, fueled by art-historical analyses to the 
notion that live performance disappears by insisting that, to the contrary, the live 
is a vehicle for recurrence’ (2011: 29). Schneider goes on to argue that 
‘reenactment troubles linear temporality by offering at least the suggestion of 
recurrence, or return’ (2011: 30). Liveness is often associated with 
disappearance, an argument highlighted by Phelan’s claim that ‘performance’s 
only life is in the present’ (1993:146). Yet, I contend that through the repertoire 
and the many possibilities for re-performance or re-enactment that it provides 
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performance may not disappear entirely, rather it can recur numerous times in 
myriad performances. 
As I suggested earlier, the physical, bodily remnants of a performance 
can offer fruitful ways for thinking about re-performance. Re-performance, which 
I have already described as differing from re-enactment, is a way of making new 
meaning and new performances from the leftovers of earlier work. Considered 
in this way, re-performance can be compared with De Oliviera’s description of 
installation art, in which she states that, ‘the audience is encouraged to choose 
its own interpretation’ and ‘experience works in an open-ended manner and 
[spectators] become authors and generators of their own meanings’ (2003: 
16,17). The main difference is of course that, in re-performance, it is the new 
generation of artists,  or artists returning to older works, the re-performers, who 
seek to create their own work from the remnants of earlier performances. These 
artists become the ‘authors and generators of their own meanings’ rather than 
the spectators or audience members. The work of Martin O’Brien serves as a 
useful example of this process7. As stated in chapter two, O’Brien’s work has 
often been discussed in conjunction with Bob Flanagan’s. When asked about 
this, O’Brien has said ‘I reject the idea that I'm Bob Flanagan Junior, but also it 
is important to reference him or at least acknowledge him and my position as a 
                                                 
7 The work of French artist Orlan also explores the notion of relics. In 1993 
Orlan created what she describes as ‘a reliquey with my own flesh’ (Orlan 
2014). Discussing her work at the Science Gallery in Dublin Orlan explains how 
she created a series entited My Flesh, The Text and The Languages, in which 
flesh from her previous plastic surgery operations was ‘presented always in the 
same way and always with the same text’. The flesh was presented in cases, 
surrounded by different translations of the same text. As she explains, ‘the 
ideas was to use the same text but always in a different transaltion’. Thus, Orlan 
created relics from her body in much the same way as Athey and O’Brien. 
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young artist with CF post-Bob Flanagan’ (2011: 2). This can be seen when 
comparing Bob Flanagan and Sheree Rose’s 1994 performance Autopsy with 
O’Brien’s 2015 piece Anatomy of a Bite.  
In Autopsy ‘Flanagan lies on a table... a metal table, which looks specific 
to a non-domestic, professional, medical setting, and which could be an 
authentic autopsy table’ (Kuppers 2007: 82). Flanagan remains mute and still 
throughout the performance in which Rose ‘describes the history of their 
relationship and acts out parts of her narrative on Flanagan’ (Kuppers 2007: 
83). Rose uses BDSM acts in order to act out her narrative. Flanagan’s 
appearance can easily be compared to that of a corpse, until, as Kuppers 
explains ‘the interventions on Flanagan’s body become more extreme, and the 
corpse wakes up: we hear him moan and arch with pain’ (2007: 83). Kupper’s 
description of the piece shares striking similarities with my experience of 
witnessing/ participating in O’Brien’s 2015 performance Anatomy of a Bite. In 
this performance participants were asked to collect O’Brien’s mucus, which was 
then stored in petri-dish style containers. They also bit O’Brien and a 
photograph was taken of the wound that they created. These two objects were 
then displayed in a gallery. I contend that these remnants served as 
documentation of the performance because they prove that it took place and 
because they offer an insight into and understanding of the performance, in 
much the same way that I assert re-performance serves as documentation. 
 What they provide us with is a visceral point of access into the 
performance and enable us to understand the very physical and bodily nature of 
the piece, which after all was all about human interaction between two bodies: 
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that of the performer, who lay passively as if he were a corpse, and the 
audience member, who engaged with the corpse in such a way as to bring it to 
life, and present it as a living corpse. O’Brien did not speak, he did not move 
except when responding to the audience member’s touch, thus creating the 
image of the corpse. However, this image was disrupted by his physical 
reactions to the audience member’s interventions on his body. Corpses cannot 
choke, they cannot cough up mucus and they cannot flinch. Yet, O’Brien did all 
of these things and the mucus filled petri-dishes and images of the bite marks 
are evidence of this. The aftermath of O’Brien’s performance provided evidence 
of his life, his body, his illness and the way in which those things respond to 
their interactions with others. The messy, blurry nature of the aftermath of 
O’Brien’s performance highlights the messy, blurry nature of human interaction 
and the ways in which bodies can become interlinked through these interactions 
and, therefore, they provide us with an insight, not necessarily into the precise 
actions that constituted the performance, but into the relationships that were 
forged between performer and audience member. 
In Anatomy of a bite participants were invited one by one into a small 
performance area, reminiscent of an old fashioned lecture hall. O’Brien was 
hidden behind a hospital style curtain and participants were greeted by his 
sister, who introduced herself and explained that during the performance we 
would be making “prints” from O’Brien’s body. Participants were asked to don 
an apron and latex gloves before the curtain was moved aside to reveal a metal 
bed, reminiscent of a hospital trolley, on which there was a figure (O’Brien) 
covered completely with a white sheet. O’Brien was perfectly still beneath the 
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sheet and the combination of his stillness, the fact that he was covered head to 
toe in a white sheet, and the hospital style bed, curtain and aprons immediately 
made me think of a corpse. This can be linked to Drew Leder’s discussion of 
medical  touches in which he states that ‘the patient largely assumes a corpse-
like pose beneath the physician’s probing eyes, ears, and fingers’ (322: 2007). 
Leder’s writing is focused on the relationship between a doctor and a patient but 
that doesn’t mean that it cannot be pertinently applied to my discussion of the 
interaction between artist and witness in Anatomy of a Bite. In this performance 
O’Brien both exemplifies and disrupts Leder’s description of the corpse like 
patient. He exemplifies it because O’Brien is positioned as the patient or corpse 
and the participants as the doctor, but the fact that O’Brien has chosen to 
position himself in this way provides him with a sense of agency which, I assert, 
is missing from Leder’s description. Thus, this enables O’Brien to destabilise the 
notion of the corpse-like patient in much the same way that Flanagan did in 
Autopsy through his responses to Rose’s actions. Flanagan and O’Brien’s 
disruption of their presentation of themselves as a corpse serves as a fitting 
reminder that sick or ill bodies are not the same as dead ones and that dying is 
not the same as death. 
 Throughout the performance, led by O’Brien’s sister, I cut various holes 
in the white sheet, revealing different parts of O’Brien’s body and used those 
body parts to make “prints”. First, I placed a metal clamp in O’Brien’s mouth, 
forcing it open. Then I force fed O’Brien milk, which caused him to cough,  
before removing the metal clamp and allowing O’Brien to close his mouth. 
Following this I beat O’Brien’s chest, causing him to cough up mucus, which I 
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collected in a plastic container. Finally, I bit O’Brien on the arm, causing him to 
moan in pain. The actions which I  performed on O’Brien’s body, like those 
Rose performed on Flanagan in Autopsy, woke the corpse, as his body 
responded to my interventions on it, proving that O’Brien was not a corpse but 
very much alive. Leder explains that the corpse ‘when opened and probed, 
reveal such hidden secrets, becomes medicine’s epistemic touchstone, the 
“ideal patient” so to speak’ (322: 2007). O’Brien’s living body is not the “ideal 
patient” that Leder describes, as I have already noted, he coughed, moved, 
twitched etc, reacting to my touch involuntarily. Yet, apart from his involuntary 
responses to my actions, O’Brien remained still and silent throughout the piece, 
much like Flanagan did in Autopsy. The use of medical equipment, such as 
petri-dishes, scissors and aprons, in both pieces together with Flanagan and 
O’Brien’s lack of movement create striking similarities between the two 
performances and allow O’Brien’s work to be read as a re-performance of 
Flanagan and Rose’s. 
 I contend that re-performances, such as those created by O’Brien, can 
be viewed as documentation of the initial performance, thus allowing the bodily 
remnants of performances to be seen as part of its documentation. I assert that 
they are part of the documentation of the performance because they provide 
useful material for creating other performance works, which differ from but 
reference the initial performance. I will now go on to explore the similarities and 
differences between what can be seen as the more traditional documentation of 
performances and physical, bodily remnants. Here I will draw upon Taylor’s 
notion of repertoire and my own use of the term bodily archive to contend that 
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despite their differences both serve as an important reminder of what has 
passed and both assist in the process of re-performance.  
 
Bodily Remnants and Excess 
Spectators of O’Brien’s re-performance can gain a sense of the issues and 
themes of the initial performance as well as the communication between 
performers and spectators. This is important when considering performance’s 
relationship with death. As Phelan asserts ‘the dead … do not leave us all at 
once’ (1997: 41), and I argue that the remnants of the performance work in 
much the same way as photographs and keepsakes of a lost loved one, 
preventing them from leaving us ‘all at once’. The polaroid’s and petri-dishes of 
mucus in particular operate in this way because although they are a record of 
the performance event, they themselves are ephemeral  and as such can be 
described as an ephemeral record of an ephemeral act. Just as memories of 
loved ones will fade, the mucus and photographs will not last forever. 
O’Brien’s decision to display the photographs of his bite marks and the 
pots of his mucus in a gallery space supports the notion of them as 
documentation. This is also supported by his own discussion of the work, in 
which he describes the way in which the performance became focused on the 
production of these ‘relics’ and creating something ‘which looked right’ (O’Brien 
2015). This emphasis was the result of the fact that O’Brien was aware that the 
products of the performance would be displayed in the main gallery space at 
Midlands Arts Centre after the performance. O’Brien explained how as the 
performance went on O’Brien and his sister began to think of it as being like ‘a 
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factory or production line’ with participants coming in ‘to produce a photograph 
and a pot of mucus and take it away’ (O’Brien 2015). This created a different 
focus for the performance and invoked notions of O’Brien’s body as a machine 
or factory, producing mucus, which would then be displayed in a gallery.  
Galleries, much like libraries, are seen as traditional and privileged 
spaces in which to house archival documentation, and O’Brien’s act of 
displaying the remnants of his performance troubles the notion of the archive as 
a privileged space. This is due to the fact that the messy, leaky bodily remnants 
of O’Brien’s work differ from the more traditional archival objects such as 
photographic, video and written documentation. It is also a subversive use of 
the gallery space, because it presents O’Brien’s mucus and bite marks as works 
of art. The fact that Midlands Arts Centre is a family-centered performance 
venue makes O’Brien’s display of mucus and bite marks in this venue more 
subversive than it might be in another gallery space. In fact, in discussion with 
O’Brien he stated that when the venue saw examples of his work, they became 
worried about the performance and the decision was taken to move O’Brien’s 
performance from the central space to a smaller theatre space within the venue 
(O’Brien 2015). This is suggestive of the dissident nature of O’Brien’s work and 
the fact that the venue felt it was not in keeping with their family friendly ethos. 
The echoes and traces of O’Brien’s work were to be hidden, tidied away and 
kept put of view because the messy, leaky, bodily acts that the performance 
consisted of were seen as transgressive. This subversive use of gallery space 
is common in Performance Art performances, as artists often seek to 
experiment with boundaries and trouble culturally conditioned binaries. For 
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example, this was evident in Marina Abramović and Ulay’s use of a gallery 
space in their 1977 performance Imponderabilia. In the piece Abramović and 
Ulay stood facing one another naked in a gallery doorway and visitors to the 
gallery had to pass between them. The small amount of space in the doorway 
meant that during the performance visitors to the gallery were forced to touch 
their naked bodies in order to enter or exit the gallery space. Abramović and 
Ulay’s use of the gallery space can be considered subversive because it forced 
visitors to touch and interact with the “art work”, something which is sometimes  
frowned upon in traditional art galleries. In her description of the piece, Erika 
Fischer-Litche says that Abramović and Ulay ‘provoked physical contact to 
highlight the established dichotomies of public vs private and seeing vs 
touching’ (2008: 65). O’Brien’s actions can be read in a similar way as he 
highlights the dichotomies of inside versus outside and life versus art through 
his creation of art work out of his mucus, a bodily substance which is usually 
stored inside the body. Thus, O’Brien makes the inside of his body visible to 
participants and visitors to the gallery. This is even more destabilising when 
considered in conjunction with the knowledge that O’Brien suffers from Cystic 
Fibrosis where the mucus that is the sign and symptom of his illness. 
Additionally, by presenting his body as the subject of his art work O’Brien 
explores the ways in which life can be turned into or produce works of art. 
Following this, although photographs can arguably be viewed as 
“traditional” archival material, the small, often blurry, Polaroid photographs that 
were taken of the performance event are not what one might expect to find in 
an archive. Taylor asserts that ‘what makes an object archival is the process 
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whereby it is selected, classified and presented for analysis’ (2007: 19). 
O’Brien’s Polaroid’s were neither selected nor classified; they were simply 
displayed with none of the labels or signposting that one may expect to find in 
an archive and as such subvert the notion of the archive. When I viewed the 
photographs, several months after participating in the performance, I was not 
only unable to identify the bite mark I had inflicted upon O’Brien’s body but at 
times I was unable to clearly identify O’Brien’s body parts at all. The close up, 
blurry photographs, taken by O’Brien’s sister during the performance event, 
show various limbs out of context, out of focus, in such a way that was almost 
impossible to identify them as belonging to the same body let alone consider 
them as traditional works of art fit to occupy the privileged space of an art 
gallery. The inclusion of the pots of mucus further destabilises the idea of them 
as archival objects because mucus is a bodily fluid, one of which Cystic Fibrosis 
sufferers like O’Brien produce in excess. As mentioned in chapter two, the act 
of beating a Cystic Fibrosis sufferer on the chest until they cough up excess 
mucus is a medical treatment to temporarily alleviate the symptoms. As O’Brien 
explains, ‘in cystic fibrosis it is not a foreign force or growth that causes death 
but, instead, the body drowns itself by overproducing mucus’ (2014: 58).  
Implicit in O’Brien’s statement is the notion that the act of removing and 
collecting mucus is helping to stave off death. Therefore, it is one you would be 
more likely to find in a hospital than as part of a performance or an archive. This 
concept fits in with my earlier argument that O’Brien’s presentation of his body 
suggests a corpse or medical body displayed on the hospital style bed during 
the performance. 
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Healing and Harm 
The objects displayed in the gallery following O’Brien’s performance are, I 
contend, more of an archive of horror and bodily excess than any form of work 
of art. The blurry nature of the photographs, in which we only see various parts 
of the body wounded, scarred, bitten and the pots of mucus speak of violence, 
in terms of the wounds inflicted by the biting of O’Brien’s body. They also 
represent sexuality because there is a sexual element to the bite marks and the 
connection between two bodies that occurs through the act of biting. Indeed, in 
discussion with O’Brien he revealed that one participant chose to give him a 
love bite rather than actually bite him. There is also an element of excess, as 
seen in the excess mucus housed in the pots. What O’Brien created in Anatomy 
of a Bite is an exhibition of the body, one which highlights violence, sexuality 
and illness and which captures the leaky, permeable nature of bodily 
boundaries. By creating a performance in which bodily fluids such as mucus, 
which are usually contained within the body, are forced out of the body and in 
which the skin (the body’s boundary) is broken by those who participate in the 
performance, O’Brien’s  Anatomy of a Bite presents the body as something 
which is not fully contained but which can be opened and penetrated. 
Other performance artists, such as Marina Abramović, Ron Athey and 
Franko B, have also used bodily fluids in their performances but in their cases it 
has been predominantly blood, which is suggestive of pain, wounding and, as I 
discussed in chapter two, the corpse and abjection. In contrast to this, O’Brien’s 
use of the mucus explores the possibility of the production and collection of a 
bodily fluid as healing rather than harming. Yet, I assert that the act of beating 
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him on the chest blurs the boundaries between healing and harming as the act 
of beating has both negative and painful connotations. O’Brien’s use of the act 
of beating his chest and the subsequent production of mucus in his 
performance blurs the boundaries between medical treatments, performance art 
and archival documentation. O’Brien’s mucus is a bodily remnant, a physical 
trace of his performance. Therefore, I contend that it is both a piece of 
performance art and a form of documentation.  
The content of the performance examined the boundaries between 
health/illness, life/death. When discussing the performance with O’Brien he 
talked about exploring the ‘tension between treatment and torture’, stating that 
within the performance ‘everything was verging on the edge between being 
helpful and harmful’ with participants not really knowing which side of the divide 
their actions were on (O’Brien 2015). Additionally, the products or leftovers of 
the piece explored the boundary between performance and documentation. 
O’Brien described the photographs and pots of mucus as ‘relics’, but also 
asserted, as I do, that ‘by putting them in there [the gallery] they also become 
objects in their own right’ (O’Brien 2015). 
As discussed in the second chapter, O’Brien’s body’s over production of 
mucus is also something that O’Brien explored in his 2011 performance Mucus 
Factory. In this piece O’Brien beat his chest in order to produce mucus, which 
was then placed in jars, before being combined with glitter and used as a 
lubricant as he inserted the end of a Nebulizer machine into his rectum. The 
playful and sexual overtones of this performance fit in with a narrative of bodily 
excess. As the mucus flowed from O’Brien’s body it became an object of 
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pleasure, exploring the pleasure/pain dichotomy and suggesting that the 
experience of pain can become one of pleasure. The mucus and glitter strewn 
around the performance area are indicative of excesses, both of the body and 
of pleasure. 
The excess mucus produced in Mucus Factory differs from that produced 
in Anatomy of a Bite, because in Mucus Factory O’Brien never collected or 
displayed the mucus; it was produced as part of the performance and only used 
within it. In contrast, in Anatomy of a Bite O’Brien always had the intention of 
collecting and displaying the mucus which, as explained above, began to 
impact upon the nature of the performance itself. The notions of bodily remains 
and documentation explored in O’Brien’s work, and specifically in Mucus 
Factory can also be seen in the work of Ron Athey. Athey’s use of blood in his 
performances, which often leads to the performance area being awash with 
blood following a performance, as well as the physical wounds and scars that 
Athey inflicts upon himself, evoke similar notions of a bodily archive which 
speaks of the sexual, leaky and sometimes violent nature of the human body. 
 I assert that this is still the case despite the fact that Athey’s use of blood 
being different from O’Brien’s collection of mucus, because O’Brien’s collection 
is suggestive of medicine and science because in Anatomy of a Bite by the 
petri-dish-style pots used to collect the mucus. Contrastingly, in Athey’s case 
the blood flows freely. It is  un-contained, unrestricted and, therefore, could 
arguably not be used for any scientific or medical purposes.  
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Figure 4: Ron Athey Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic (2008) 
 
Figure 5: Martin O’Brien Mucus Factory (2011) 
The contrast between the excess of mucus in O’Brien’s work and the 
excess of blood in Athey’s is illustrated in the two figures above. In figure one 
we see blood dripping from Athey’s head, flowing down his face. This invokes 
images of a leaky, porous body which refuses to be contained. In contrast in 
figure two  O’Brien’s mucus is carefully stored in small pots, in neat rows 
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underneath the metal bed upon which he is lying. In contrast to Athey’s oozing 
blood these pots of mucus speak to control and containment. Whilst later in 
Mucus Factory, O’Brien goes on to subvert this medicated/ scientific image by 
pouring the mucus out of the pots and mixing it with glitter, the initial impression 
is one of containment. The mucus seen here, as with that collected in Anatomy 
of a Bite, could easily be labelled and stored in ways in which Athey’s blood 
could not. Again, this links to my earlier suggestion that the generation of 
excess fluids from wounds inflicted upon the body creates a narrative of pain 
and danger, whilst O’Brien’s coughing up and collecting of the mucus is more 
easily read in conjunction with notions of medicine and healing. This raises 
questions as to whether the healing effect of beating O’Brien’s chest legitimises 
the pain caused by action, preventing it from being seen as transgressive in the 
way that Athey’s bloodletting is. In spite of the fact that healing can, at times, be 
considered subversive. Such as, the act of beating O’Brien’s chest in Anatomy 
of a Bite. It is the notion of healing which is present in O’Brien’s work that 
differentiates it from Athey’s. It also raises questions about whether O’Brien’s 
actions can also be seen as transgressive because he is appropriating medical 
techniques for the purpose of his performance. These concepts are clearly 
explored in Anatomy of a Bite in which O’Brien explains that participants often 
searched for legitimacy, asking questions about their actions and the benefits 
they would have for O’Brien’s body. This is something which O’Brien was 
interested in exploring when creating the piece, as he states: 
‘there’s the legitimate nature of some of it [the beating of the chest], in 
the eyes of the medical profession but then what happens if you’re asking for 
another kind of interaction... what I wanted to get was this sort of tension 
between treatment and torture, everything was verging on the edge of being 
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helpful and harmful and you don’t really know whether you are treating me or 
torturing me or both at the same time’ (O’Brien 2015). 
 
It is interesting to consider the ways in which using medical techniques, 
even ones which cause physical pain, can be seen as socially acceptable 
because of the authority generally given to medical practitioners, whereas acts, 
such as biting, which seemingly have no positive outcome are considered 
dangerous and subversive. O’Brien noted that ‘three or four people didn’t want 
to bite me’ which may be owing to the risk involved in biting someone (O’Brien 
2015). I find it fascinating that force feeding O’Brien milk and beating his chest 
were seen as more acceptable than biting him because they were acts that 
could be considered helpful as well as harmful. For me, this is fascinating 
because in my experience of participating in the performance I found the biting 
the least disturbing of the acts I performed on O’Brien’s body. I think that this is 
because, whilst it can be dangerous, there can also be a playful nature to the 
act of biting someone. In contrast, force feeding someone using a metal clamp 
to keep their mouth open, causing them to cough uncontrollably and spit out 
most of the milk that you are feeding them, for me subverts the caring, healing 
nature of feeding, causing it to become an aggressive, violent act. However,  
the act of biting O’Brien crossed the boundary between O’Brien’s body and the 
bodies of participants, because of the somewhat intimate nature of biting 
someone and the breaking of the physical boundary of the skin that the biting 
often entailed. It is likely that it was the breaking or transgressing of these 
boundaries that led to participants feeling less comfortable with the act of biting 
O’Brien and ultimately led to some participants not completing the action. 
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 The image of Athey defies the notion of his body as a medical one; his 
bloodletting is not being used as a form of treatment and as far as I am aware 
brings no benefit to his health. I assert that this presents Athey’s bloodletting as 
more subversive and transgressive than O’Brien’s production of mucus owing to 
the fact that the subversive nature of O’Brien’s actions can arguably be offset 
by their healing potential, which is not the case with Athey’s. Pain has long 
been associated with medicine and healing. Many medical procedures are both 
painful and dangerous, but they are procedures to which many people are 
willing to submit because they believe that the long term effects will be worth 
the pain and danger that they are inflicting upon themselves. When witnessing 
Athey’s work there doesn’t appear to be a narrative of treatment or healing, just 
one of pain, wounding and violence. Athey’s body is presented as open, bloody 
and injured, but not through a medical procedure, through a series of self–
inflicted injuries, which speak of illegitimacy and transgression. This subversive 
nature of Athey’s work is further enhanced by the aftermath of his 
performances.  
 
Echoes, Traces and Repetition 
Following one of Athey’s performances, what is left behind is often a blood 
spattered area, a marked contrast to the pots of mucus displayed after O’Brien’s 
Anatomy of a Bite. The excess or leftovers of Athey’s performance refuse to be 
contained or classified and are, therefore, arguably not terribly useful to anyone 
wishing to document his work in a traditional archive. I suggest, however, that 
this is not the case for someone wishing to create a bodily archive or re-
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performance (in the manner that I described earlier in the chapter) of the piece. 
Much like a detective at a crime scene, piecing together the evidence in order to 
try and establish what went before, the aftermath of Athey’s performance 
provides fertile ground for gaining insight into and understanding of the work 
which took place and which has now disappeared. As I argued in chapter two, 
in my analysis of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic, no-one would be able to re-create 
Athey’s specific performance, not even Athey himself. As Phelan has asserted 
‘performance’s only life is in the present’ (1993: 146). Athey’s performance 
could never be repeated exactly but  it could be re-interpreted or re-imagined 
using its aftermath in order to give it a new life in the future. 
 The reason that I contend that it is not possible for anyone, Athey 
included, to re-create his performance exactly is because I believe that each 
performance of the work would mark itself as different from the initial 
performance, as discussed earlier in the chapter in relation to Schneider. This 
can be explored through the example of Marina Abramović’s Seven Easy 
Pieces in which she ‘reenacts seminal performance works by her peers dating 
from the 1960s and ’70s’ over a period of seven days at the Guggenheim 
museum in New York (2005: 2). As part of Seven Easy Pieces Abramović re-
performed her work Lips of Thomas, a piece that she first performed in 
Innsbruck in 1975. Despite both versions of the performance being performed 
by the same artist they are markedly different. This is evident from the fact that 
the initial Lips of Thomas was performed on its own, whilst the re-performance 
was part of the larger project, Seven Easy Pieces, to the fact that the initial 
performance took place in Innsbruck in the 1970’s and the re-performance took 
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place in New York in 2005. There are also other significant factors which 
differentiate between the two performances. During the initial performance 
Abramović ate honey and drank red wine before cutting the shape of a star into 
her stomach using a razor blade, causing a star shaped wound to appear on 
her stomach. Abramović then whipped herself repeatedly before lying on blocks 
of ice which had been laid out like a cross. The wound on Abramović’s stomach 
was then heated using a heater on the ceiling which also caused the wound the 
bleed. When she re-performed the piece in 2005 Abramović was effectively 
opening the old wound, cutting over the scars from the initial performance. 
                
Figure 6: Marina Abramović Lips of Thomas (1975) 
This is also what Athey would be doing if he were to re-perform any of his 
pieces and indeed, as I mentioned in chapter two,  what he did when he re-
performed Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic with Julie Tolentino. The fact that the 
body of the artist, be it Abramović or Athey, is scarred by the wounds inflicted 
upon themselves during the performance means that no two performances can 
ever be the same. This holds true for re-performances such as that of 
Abramović and Lips of Thomas, in which despite the fact that the performative 
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actions are the same, the act of inflicting a new wound, creating a new scar is 
different to that of re-opening an old wound, even if, as with Abramović  and 
Lips of Thomas, that wound is 30 years old.  
Despite this, I argue that the fact that these performances cannot be re-
created exactly from the echoes and traces that they leave behind does not 
prevent these echoes and traces from being useful to anyone wishing to 
explore the themes and issues in the initial performance. As outlined above, 
O’Brien’s mucus and Athey’s blood may resist and even subvert traditional 
notions of an archive because the aftermath, blood, mucus and bodily excess, 
which are left behind following these performances may not be able to be 
classified or contained. Despite this, because they are bodily substances, bodily 
remnants I contend that they can become part of a bodily archive. I assert that 
the fact that they are bodily remnants rather than photographic or video 
documentation and, therefore, speak more to the visceral, physical and bodily 
nature of the performances than a photograph or video footage might is the 
reason that they are so useful as a form of documentation.  
This is also, the case for the wounds and scars that artists such as Athey 
and O’Brien inflict upon themselves during their performances. As I discussed in 
relation to Marina Abramović and her performances Lips of Thomas and Seven 
Easy Pieces, the scar remains. Scars are durable and resilient. Unlike the 
ephemeral nature of performance, scars do not disappear, they only fade.  
Therefore, the many wounds, marks and scars on an artist’s body create a 
physical map of their performance history, enabling them to produce a very 
untraditional archive of their past work. Analysing this concept in relation to 
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Athey’s performance work l use my term bodily archive to argue that, whilst it 
may not fit with what many see as archival documentation, Athey’s body houses 
a valuable record of the performances that he has created. The enduring scars 
create a marked contrast to the ephemeral performance and serve as useful 
echoes and traces of the more fleeting and transient performance. As Fisher-
Litche asserted in her 2008 text The Transformative Power of Performance: A 
New Aesthetics, ‘whatever the performers do unto their bodies leaves 
perceptible traces on those bodies, indicating a process of transformation’ 
(2008: 90). Owing to the fact that Athey’s actions serve as more than a surface 
marking of the skin, the act of breaking of the skin’s boundaries and the depth 
of the cuts create a permanent reminder of his action, a scar, an in depth 
marking of his performance history. Wounds, such as those which can be seen 
in the image below, will undoubtedly make their mark on the body in the form of 
scars. As the wounds heal, the scars remain, a permanent reminder of what 
happened. 
 
Figure 7: Ron Athey Self Obliteraion #1(2009) 
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These scars serve as more than a reminder of the performance, they 
also serve as a kind of vanishing point, a place where past, present and future 
meet. The scar itself belongs in the present, it is on the body in the here and 
now, but the wound that caused it belongs to the past. I contend that Athey’s 
physical marks, wounds and scars map his performance history, his individual 
experiences of pain and illness and his body’s ability to endure, both his 
performance and his illness. The scar is also the point at which inside and 
outside converge, the scar covers the wound. It is the visible manifestation of 
the wound, which is on the skin, the boundary of the body. Nevertheless, the 
scar can be opened in the manner of a dissection. The artist dissects 
themselves, reclaiming the scar. It is penetrable, and in penetrating or re-
opening the scar there is the possibility for the wound, which had initially been 
confined to the past, to be visible once again in both the present and the future. 
It is these possibilities for the future that I assert make physical marks and scars 
so interesting when considered in relation to the notion of a bodily archive and a 
narrative of re-performance. 
 
Haunting and Specters 
I will now move on to explore the ways in which the archival documentation 
together with Athey’s wounds and scars, can be used in order to create re-
performances. This is something that I have already briefly considered within 
the chapter, but here I will conduct an in depth analysis of Athey’s performance 
Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic and its subsequent re-performance with Tolentino 
as part of her performance project, The Sky Remains the Same. Using Jacques 
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Derrida’s concept of the specter, as outlined in his (1994) book, Specters of 
Marx, I will compare Athey’s initial performance of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic 
with the re-performance that he collaborated on with Tolentino, arguing that 
whilst the two performances are clearly different, the re-performance can be 
seen to be haunted by the initial performance. It is my contention that this is the 
case for all re-performances, and it is this haunting which allows re-performance 
to be viewed as a means of documenting performance in a bodily archive.  
Taylor asserts that ‘the repertoire both keeps and transforms 
choreographies of meaning’ (2007: 20) and I assert that the bodily archive 
serves the same purpose. As the video footage of the 2011 performance shows 
the piece begins with Athey re-performing Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic. He 
completes the actions involved in the performance twice, the first time solo and 
the second time alongside Tolentino. Tolentino’s presence, together with the 
fact that the actions are repeated, clearly differentiates their work from the initial 
2009 performance, but there are also more complex and, I argue, important 
differences. In the 2011 piece we can see Athey and Tolentino facing one 
another as they perform; they create a kind of mirror image. The image however 
is distorted as their actions are not synchronised. Tolentino and Athey are 
visibly different from one another, and the fact that Athey had already 
performed the actions once meant that his body was already covered in blood. 
Whilst Tolentino’s body was being covered in blood for the first time, Athey’s 
body was being re-covered, adding another layer of blood to that which was 
already there. This has the effect of presenting Tolentino’s performance as a 
copy or repetition and positioning Athey as a specter whose presence Tolentino 
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is trying to invoke by repeating the actions that she witnessed. In the video 
there are moments when the mirror image becomes less distorted, when their 
actions are in time with one another, and with both faces obscured by the 
blonde wigs, both bodies obscured by their actions, it is difficult to positively say 
which is Athey and which is Tolentino. 
 








Figure 9: Julie Tolentino Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic Figure 10: Ron Athey Self-
obliteration #1 Ecstatic 
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However, (as can be seen in figures 8,9 and 10) on the whole the 
physical distinctions between the two artists clearly mark the re-performance as 
different to the initial version. I contend that despite these differences, the re-
performance remains haunted by the specter of the initial work. We can clearly 
witness Athey performing the same set of acts two years later, re-opening the 
old wounds, cutting open his scars. At the same time Tolentino is creating new 
wounds and scars, perhaps in places where there previously weren’t any. This 
is a crucial point when considering the ways in which the 2009 and 2011 
versions of this piece are simultaneously the same and different.  
As I have already argued, Athey is re-opening old wounds, going over 
old ground so to speak, but for Tolentino these actions are new. How do these 
two things work in collaboration with one another? The repetition of Athey’s 
actions (repeated for the second and third time) and the newness of Tolentino’s 
actions work in collaboration with one another? For me, there is a clear sense of 
Athey repeating his actions for Tolentino, with the express purpose of showing 
them to her, so that she can inscribe them upon her body. This creates the idea 
of him “passing on” his performance to Tolentino, and this concept is 
heightened by the fact, as mentioned in chapter two, that Athey performs the 
actions not once but twice during the piece. After witnessing Athey complete the 
actions of vigorously brushing, then pulling off his wig before lying between the 
planes of glass, we see him repeat them, this time alongside Tolentino. 
I assert that re-performances are always haunted by the specter of the 
initial performance, and it is this haunting, which allows them to become an 
embodied form of documentation of the initial performance. In re-performing, 
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and being haunted by the initial performance, re-performance both retains and 
transforms the initial performance. As such, they enable new audiences to gain 
insight into and knowledge of the initial performance, without reproducing it in 
its entirety. This, I assert, is what videos, photographs and other archival 
documentation also do and it is, therefore, this process of haunting which 
enables re-performance to serve as a bodily archive. 
 
Interacting with the Archive 
Dani Ploeger’s 2011 performance Electrode is an example of interaction 
between the bodily archive and more traditional archival forms. The 
performance can also, I contend, be considered a re-performance. In the piece, 
as described by Ploeger 
 
an Anuform® anal electrode connected to a modified Peritone EMG sensor 
registers the activity of my sphincter muscle... I fake the orgasm of an 
anonymous subject who took part in an experiment into the nature of the male 
orgasm in 1980. I attempt to replicate the subject’s sphincter muscle contraction 
pattern ... I repeatedly perform the same pattern. (2011: 1) 
 
Ploeger re-performs the orgasm previously performed by the anonymous 
subject with the graph from the experiment displayed on the wall of the 
performance space and the graph being created by Ploeger displayed 
underneath. Therefore, despite the fact that the initial performance wasn’t a 
performance as such but an experiment, Ploeger’s piece can still be considered 
a re-performance. This is owing to the fact that in the piece Ploeger attempts to 
re-create the sphincter contraction pattern that had previously been created by 
the anonymous subject. In her analysis of the performance, Alissa Clarke 
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described the piece as ‘a process of faking through reenactment’ (2013: 160). 
Drawing, as I do, upon Schneider’s writing on the subject, Clarke states that ‘No 
matter how rigorously and precisely Ploeger works... the two line graphs 
projected on the wall never exactly match’ (2013: 160). The fact that Ploeger 
attempts to create something which had previously been created and that these 
attempts were always doomed to fail, marks the piece as a re-performance. 
After all, as Schneider claims, it is the nature of re-performance that ‘the first 
time was true. The second time is false, etiolated, hollow, or infelicitous. The 
second time, the third time, the nth times are not actual’ (2011: 180). 
Schneider’s comment suggests that re-performances will always differ from the 
initial performances which they cite. However, I assert that the fact they are 
marked as different does not prevent them from serving as references to the 
initial performance. 
 Taylor states ‘embodied and performed acts generate, record, and 
transmit knowledge’ (2003: 21). This transmission of knowledge is not in 
opposition to traditional archives but, drawing upon Auslander’s argument that 
‘the relationship of liveness and mediatization must be seen as a relation of 
dependence and imbrication rather than opposition’ (2002: 53), I place this 
alongside Taylor’s claim that ‘the repertoire ... expands the traditional archive’ 
(2003: 26). Ploeger’s body is interacting with the archive, he takes an archival 
object (the results of the experiment) and breathes life into it by creating a 
bodily action, a performance. I build upon my earlier suggestion that the archive 
and the repertoire are not in binary opposition to one another by arguing that 
because both house elements of the past, which enable memories, 
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performances and legacies to be passed on from one generation to another, 
they can co-exist in such a way as to allow the past to never be fully past. That 
co-existence provides opportunities for the past to become the present, or at 
least for linear notions of time to de disrupted in crucial ways. I contend that this 
is important because it allows us to see that death is not the end. It may be the 
end of a life, just as each performance has an end, but that the life, like the 
performance, does not simply disappear. Rather something of it remains and 
those remains can form part of a legacy, possible futures haunted by the 
specters of the past. 
 I assert that the notions of legacies, something I discuss in more detail in 
chapter six,  and archives are traditionally linked, they share a concern with 
remains. An archive, Derrida suggests, ‘has the force of law, of a law which is 
the law of the house, of the house as place, domicile, family lineage, or 
institution’ (1996: 7). In linking the archive to law Derrida’s implies that the 
archive has authority. However, he also suggests that the archive is a way of 
remaining, retaining and passing on and it is my contestation that re-
performance creates a bodily archive of performances for the same purpose, to 
enable them to remain. This can be seen in Electrode,  in which, Ploeger 
marries the initial and re-performances, the repetition and the original and, in 
doing so, also brings together both the live and the mediatized and the 
traditional archive and the bodily archive. In the performance, which I described 
at the beginning of this chapter, we see ‘the data from Ploeger’s real-time 
replications ... projected onto the wall as a second line graph situated directly 
beneath the graph of the earlier, anonymous subject’ (Clarke 2012: 160). The 
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mediated images of the two orgasms plotted on top of one another interacts 
with Ploeger’s live body in the space as he creates his copy in front of the 
watching audience. In so doing Ploeger is both interacting with the mediated 
image of the initial performance and creating a re-performance.  
 Further to my earlier argument, the re-performance is not the initial 
performance, and no matter how hard Ploeger tries to achieve this, it never will 
be. I assert that what Ploeger creates in Electrode is not a copy but rather a 
dialogue, a legacy, an interaction between his body and the body of the 
anonymous subject, who produced the initial orgasm and the initial line graph. 
Ploeger’s re-performance of the orgasm experiment is haunted by the initial 
performance, not in the visceral, bodily, spectral way that in chapter two I 
argued that Flanagan haunted Regimes of Hardship, but in a less tangible, 
more ephemeral way. This haunting is created by the fact that Ploeger is 
operating in dialogue with the archive, as the documentation of the experiment 
shares the performance space with him during the performance, just like Athey 
and Tolentino shared the performance space during their re-performance of 
Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic, which I discussed in chapter two. By displaying the 
line graph, which represents the initial orgasm recorded by the experiment, 
Ploeger is taking the experiment out of the archive and creating a physical, 
bodily performance from it. He is thus creating his own bodily archive. Here, I 
once again draw upon Taylor’s discussion of the repertoire and Auslander’s 
exploration of the live and the mediatized to analyse the ways in which both 
traditional archive and bodily archive and live and mediatized converge within 
Ploeger’s performance of Electrode. In her discussion of the repertoire, Taylor 
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positions the archive and the repertoire in relation to one another. She contends 
that ‘the relationship between the archive and the repertoire, as I see it, is 
certainly not sequential… nor is it a binary’ (2003: 22). In Electrode Ploeger 
places the live and the mediated, the archive and the repertoire and the initial 
performance and re-performance not in opposition to one another but in 
conjunction with one another to enhance our understanding of them both. 
However, despite the fact that Ploeger’s re-performance of Electrode is a bodily 
interaction with the archive, this interaction is different to those between two live 
performances. However, this does not prevent Ploeger from creating a re-
performance which suggests that when boundaries are broken the results can 
be both provocative and useful.  
 When we watch Ploeger attempting to re-create the orgasm of the 
anonymous subject in Electrode we are reminded of the simultaneous presence 
and absence of the subject. The anonymous subject is not in the performance 
space, there orgasm is not live but the line graph which recorded it is there and 
through Ploeger’s live actions we can gain an insight into and understanding of 
the orgasm experiment which took place. Ploeger’s actions bring the orgasm 
experiment out of the archive and into the embodied realm of live re-
performance. 
 
Re-performance as Documentation 
The final section of this chapter builds upon the earlier argument that re-
performance can be seen as a form of documenting performance. In 
Performance Studies An Introduction Schechner asserts that ‘performances are 
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made from bits of restored behavior, but every performance is different from 
every other. First, fixed bits of behavior can be recombined in endless 
variations. Second, no event can exactly copy another event’ (2006: 23). I 
contend that Schechner’s statement is especially true for re-performance in 
which elements of earlier performances are restored and recombined to create 
new performances with different meanings and intentions. I contend that it is not 
just fixed bits of behaviour which can be recombined in re-performance, but also 
the echoes and traces of the initial performance. This can be seen very clearly 
in the work that Martin O’Brien and Sheree Rose have created together which I 
analysed in chapter two. In Regimes of Hardship Rose spanked and beat 
O’Brien, enacting upon his body some of the actions that she had previously 
enacted upon her partner Bob Flanagan. Thus, this reminded spectators who 
had seen or knew of her work with Flanagan of this work, by replacing 
Flanagan’s body with O’Brien’s. Moreover, when Rose donated her archives, to 
the One Archives at the University of Southern California, O’Brien was flown 
over to Los Angeles for a six week residency in which he and Rose went 
through her archives, which housed records of both her life and work with 
Flanagan, and together they used the archive in order to create a performance. 
This resulted in a performance in which O’Brien was placed in a metal cage, a 
cage in which Flanagan had previously been placed during some of his 
performances with Rose. In this case Rose and O’Brien took a physical remnant 
of her work with Flanagan and used it in order to create a new performance, 
thus evoking memories of Rose and Flanagan’s practice and allowing for new 
considerations of their work.  
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Whatever understandings spectators of Rose and Flanagan’s work had, 
witnessing Rose’s later work with O’Brien would raise pertinent questions and 
significant points for re-consideration of Rose and Flanagan’s work without 
detracting from the fact that Rose and O’Brien’s works are performances in and 
of themselves. For me, this is the crux of the matter when considering re-
performance as a means of documenting performance. As Phelan has famously 
said documentation of a performance is never the performance itself. A 
photograph, a memory, video footage, are not performance, any more than a 
re-performance is the initial performance, but all of these forms enable 
audiences to gain insight into and understanding of the performance. As 
Dekker, Giannachi and Van Saaze assert in their article ‘Expanding 
Documentation’ ‘artists creating what could be described as ephemeral, 
conceptual, performative, processual, networked and “mixed reality” artworks 
have expanded our understanding of what a document could be, and so 
challenged our evaluation of its relationship to an artwork’ (2017: 77). I would 
add to this that that artists engaging in re-performance have also expanded our 
understanding of what documentation could be. This, in turn, has also allowed 
re-performance to expand our understanding of the relationship between 
performance and death. However, the crucial difference for re-performance is 
the fact that it does this without losing the liveness and ephemerality of 
performance. When we attempt to preserve or document performance we 
inevitably turn to more apparently solid, durable forms of documentation. 
Although seen as more durable and reliable, all forms of documentation are 
finite, and nothing lasts forever. We turn to writing, photographs and video 
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documentation, but these kinds of documentation of performance will never be 
performance. Whilst a re-performance will never be the initial performance it is a 
way of preserving the physical, embodied, transient and ephemeral nature of 
performance. Re-performances, photographs, letters, videos, memories, are all 
echoes and traces. They will never be the initial performance or the lost other, 
but they can serve as proof that they existed and that because of these echoes 
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Chapter Four - Loss and Mourning 
 
Through an analysis of the work of artists including, Jo Spence, Hannah Wilke, 
Sheree Rose and Martin O’Brien, this chapter argues that re-performance 
strengthens Phelan’s argument, which I have cited earlier in the thesis, that 
‘theatre and performance respond to the psychic need to rehearse for loss, and 
especially for death’ (1997: 3). It reminds us that, whilst performances 
disappear and can never be repeated exactly. This disappearance, like the loss 
of a loved one, does not happen all at once and this allows the process of re-
performance to reflect the process of mourning. In order to develop this 
argument, this chapter explores the fruitful possibilities of a dialogue between 
Barthes’ writing on photography, specifically Camera Lucida, and Schneider’s 
writing on re-performance in Performing Remains. The performative works that I 
have chosen as case studies for this chapter are examined for what they can 
teach us about the relationship between performance, loss and mourning.  
Barthes claims that ‘what the photograph reproduces to infinity has 
occurred only once: the Photograph mechanically repeats what can never be 
repeated existentially’ (Barthes 2000: 4). By applying this claim, firstly to 
performative photography, such as that created by Wilke and Spence, then to 
performances, such as those by Dani Ploeger, Martin O’Brien and Sheree 
Rose, this chapter intends to highlight the similarities and differences in the 
relationship between photography and death and the relationship between 
performance, re-performance and death. I argue that through re-performance 
something of a performance can be preserved, in much the same way that a 
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photograph preserves or captures a specific moment and that this preservation 
can be linked to our understanding of and ways of dealing with loss. I will now 
introduce the three performances which are used as case studies in this 




Jo Spence’s The Final Project (1991-92) is a collection of photographs that she 
created whilst battling Leukaemia. Spence’s work drew on iconic images of 
death, using double exposure to impose these images onto her body, thus 
representing her body as if dead and  foreshadowing her own demise. The 
Final Project includes images of Spence with her face covered by a death 
mask, Spence’s head and shoulders on a grassy surface with weeds and plants 
growing over it and Spence standing over a freshly dug grave. The Final Project 
is similar in many ways to Hannah Wilke’s Intra-Venus Tapes. Intra-Venus 
Tapes is an exhibition of photographs and video footage taken during the last 
two and a half years of Wilke’s life, whilst she battled Lymphoma. They 
document her life, her illness and her subsequent death. The images include 
ones of Wilke lying in bed, posing with a blue towel wrapped around her head 
and with what was left of her hair wet and limp, covering part of her face as well 
as images of her posing in a white plastic shower cap. 
 As the chapter makes links between photography and re-performance it 
will move from photographic works such as Spence and Wilke’s to performance 
works, specifically those by Martin O’Brien and Sheree Rose. As I discussed in 
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previous chapters, O’Brien and Rose have created several collaborative 
performances, some of which, as O’Brien explains, used him as a ‘substitute for 
Flanagan’ (O’Brien interview 2015). It is my contention that the work that 
O’Brien and Rose created serves to document Rose’s earlier work with 
Flanagan, thus enabling the work to continue. I argue that this is particularly the 
case in the trilogy of works that Rose and Flanagan conceived shortly before 
Flanagan’s death. The work, as described by Scarborough,  
 
was a Memento Mori trilogy involving three different casket 
installations. The first part, Video Coffin, displayed in the New York 
exhibition of Visiting Hours, consisted of an elaborate Catholic 
funerary casket containing a video monitor with Flanagan's face, 
which, when triggered by the approaching viewer, would change to 
reflect the viewer's face. The other two parts of the trilogy, 
unrealized because of Flanagan's death, included Dust to Dust, a 
Jewish pine coffin overflowing with thousands of small photographs 
of Flanagan; and The Viewing, an entombment featuring a camera 
placed in Flanagan's coffin after his death. 
(Scarborough 2010: 1)  
 
As Scarborough has noted, the second and third parts of the trilogy were 
unrealised because of Flanagan’s death. However, in an interview, O’Brien 
explained that he and Rose decided to continue the trilogy, with O’Brien 
replacing Flanagan. Rose and O’Brien created Dust to Dust and have 
discussed creating The Viewing. This raises several interesting questions: what 
impact would the fact that O’Brien is alive have on the way that The Viewing is 
received? How was the performance of Dust to Dust different when performed 
by Rose and O’Brien as opposed to Rose and Flanagan? In the performance of 
Dust to Dust, O’Brien lay in a coffin, covered in photographs of Flanagan, which 
was pulled through the streets of Los Angeles. It was O’Brien’s body that was 
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physically present, not Flanagan’s. However, the photographs that overflowed 
from the coffin were of Flanagan and not O’Brien. Thus, highlighting the use of 
him as a stand in for Flanagan. 
 
Melancholia and Substitution 
By examining Dust to Dust, this section argues that re-performance can be 
seen as a melancholic act. It can be viewed as an attempt to try and hold onto 
something which we have lost and, therefore, can be read in relation to the 
melancholic failure to detach the self from the lost other. I argue that even 
though Flanagan was not physically present in the performance, something of 
his presence, and his earlier work with Rose, remained. Hence, I read Rose and 
O’Brien’s actions as ones which demonstrate a refusal or inability to let go of 
Flanagan. 
 Freud’s notion of Melancholia, which I discussed in chapter two, was 
taken up by Julia Kristeva in her 1989 book, Black Sun: Depression and 
Melancholia, in which she describes melancholia as ‘an abyss of sorrow, a 
noncommunicable grief’, suggesting that it cannot be explained through the 
symbolic system of language (1989: 3). This raises questions about how 
melancholia can be explained or presented if not through a symbolic structure 
of language, and Kristeva hints at the fact that the key to communicating 
melancholia may be through the body when she describes the melancholic 
subject as ‘already elsewhere, absent, a living corpse’ (1989: 74). To me, this is 
suggestive of the desire to take on the role of the lost other in an effort to make 
them remain. By becoming a living a corpse, we become like the lost other, 
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embodying them and inscribing them upon ourselves in order not to lose them. 
Kristeva, however describes the living corpse as absent, I assert that the 
absence Kristeva is describing here is the absence of the self, rather than that 
of the lost other. The self becomes consumed by the other and thus effectively 
become a corpse themselves because they are merely the vessel through 
which the lost other remains. In order for the other to become present the self 
must be made to disappear. Therefore, the kind of re-performances enacted by 
artists such as O’Brien and Rose could be considered melancholic acts. As I 
discussed in chapter two, with Rose’s assistance O’Brien repeats the actions of 
the other (Flanagan), inscribing them upon his own body, in order to allow 
Flanagan to continue living in and through his body. Thus, O’Brien becomes an 
absent body, like the ‘living corpse’ that Kristeva describes (1989: 74). 
Therefore I argue that Rose and O’Brien seek to keep Flanagan alive 
through their performance of Dust to Dust and that their performance is a 
melancholic refusal to separate the self from the lost other, something Freud 
insists is vital to the process of mourning when he describes the demand that 
‘all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object’ (1917: 244). 
I assert, that what is represented in performances such as Dust to Dust, 
and indeed in re-performance in general, is a fear of death as the end, a fear of 
or refusal to let go. Rose and O’Brien’s performance presents an image of them 
as unwilling to let go of Flanagan and thus seeking to make his spectral 
presence visible in their work.  
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Loss and Presence 
Drawing upon Roland Barthes’ text, Camera Lucida, and placing it in dialogue 
with Taylor and Schneider’s writings, I argue that re-performance functions in a 
similar way to Barthes’ search for The Winter Garden Photograph, a picture in 
which he felt that he had found the essence of his recently deceased Mother. 
What Barthes was searching for was something which, for him, captured ‘a 
quality (a soul)’ (2000:75; emphasis in original), the essence of his Mother. 
Something which Barthes found in a picture that he called The Winter Garden 
Photograph. Drawing upon Schechner’s notion of me, not me and not not me, 
as outlined in Performance Studies an Introduction, I argue that The Winter 
Garden Photograph is of the woman who would become Barthes’ Mother, but, 
at the time the photograph was taken, she was a five year old girl; a girl who 
would grow up to become his Mother, but was not yet his Mother. When 
describing me, not me and not not me, Schechner states that ‘while performing 
actors are not themselves, nor are they the characters’ (2017: 72). Barthes 
found it in a photograph that was not of his Mother, but was also not not of his 
Mother.  I assert that this is why Barthes found something in the photograph 
which, for him, captured the essence of his Mother because the five year old girl 
in the photograph was not his mother, but was also not not his Mother. I 
contend that this is also the case with re-performance. The re-performances 
examined in this chapter are not direct re-enactments or re-creations, but they 
contain some recognisable reference to the initial performance, enough for 
them to be identifiable as re-performances. Thus, they function in a similar way 
to Barthes’ Winter Garden Photograph, because they are not the initial 
   176 
performance, but they are also not not the initial performance, because they are 
haunted by it.  
 For example, as I explained earlier in the chapter, Rose and Flanagan 
never performed Dust to Dust. They planned it as part of the trilogy, but 
Flanagan died before the piece could be realised. This fact complicates my 
positioning of the piece as a re-performance. However, I assert that Dust to 
Dust can still be considered a re-performance because it is haunted by 
specters, both the specter of the performance that Rose and Flanagan were 
never able to create and the specter of Flanagan’s presence. This sense of 
haunting is produced by the nature of the performance; which, as noted earlier 
in the chapter, featured a body in a coffin, covered with thousands of tiny 
photographs, being pulled through the streets of Los Angeles. The body in the 
coffin was O’Brien’s, whilst the tiny photographs that covered it were of 
Flanagan. The result of this, I argue, was that O’Brien was physically present, 
but that Flanagan also retained a presence.  
 The photographs of Flanagan surrounded and covered O’Brien’s body, 
almost shrouding him in Flanagan’s spectral presence, in much the same way 
that, as I have argued earlier on in this thesis, re-performances are haunted by 
earlier or initial versions of the performance. O’Brien’s position as a substitute 
for Flanagan fits with Kristeva’s description of melancholia (as outlined above), 
presenting him as a living corpse and Rose’s act of pulling the living corpse 
through the streets represents her inability to let go. O’Brien is not Flanagan 
and the performance is undoubtedly  different to the one Rose and Flanagan 
would have created but by replacing Flanagan Rose is able to keep hold of him 
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in some way. In his role as stand in O’Brien is not Flanagan but he is also not 
not Flanagan. This notion is developed from Schneider’s discussion of the 
American Civil War reenactors in Performing Remains who ‘find reenactment to 
be if not the thing itself (the past), somehow also not not the thing (the past)’ 
(Schneider 2011:8 emphasis in original). O’Brien is not Flanagan, his and 
Rose’s performance of Dust to Dust is not the performance detailed in the plans 
in the archive, their performance is not the initial performances, but it is also not 
not the initial performance. 
 
Performance and Loss 
As noted in the previous section, some performance studies scholars, such as 
Phelan and Schneider, have argued that what differentiates performance from 
other art forms is its ephemerality. Phelan states that ‘performance cannot be 
saved, recorded, documented or otherwise participate in the circulation of 
representations of representations’ (1993: 146). This sentiment is echoed by 
Schneider’s comment that performance ‘takes place in a “now” understood as 
singular, immediate, and vanishing’ (2011: 87). In this chapter I interrogate 
Phelan’s claim and explore the ways in which performance can help to prepare 
us for loss by analysing the relationship between performance and death. 
Drawing upon Jo Spence’s The Final Project, Hannah Wilke’s Intra-Venus 
Tapes, as well as Martin O’Brien and Sheree Rose’s performance of Dust to 
Dust, which I have previously discussed, this section of the chapter argues that 
whilst performance prepares us for loss it does so not because performance 
disappears but precisely because performance remains. Performance may not 
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be able to be recorded or held in an archive, but I contend that it is never fully 
lost because it can be re-performed. Through re-performance performance can 
no longer be considered ephemeral, because it can be re-created, re-performed 
or re-enacted, and that it is this possibility of re-performance that actually 
enables performance to fulfil Phelan’s claim. 
 
Photography and Death: Presence and Time 
Building upon my analysis of Barthes’ Camera Lucida, this section of the 
chapter focuses on the performative photography of Hannah Wilke and Jo 
Spence, specifically their respective works documenting their illnesses and 
subsequent deaths, namely Intra-Venus Tapes and The Final Project. It also 
considers Martin O’Brien and Sheree Rose’s collaborative performance Dust to 
Dust. These works are analysed in light of my assertion that, whilst photography 
‘stops the body, arresting its movement through time’ (1997: 156), performance 
maintains a different relationship with death. I argue that performances, such as 
those mentioned above, help to prepare us for loss precisely because, unlike 
photographs they do not arrest the body, forcing it into stillness. As Phelan has 
highlighted, the dead do not ‘hold still’ (1997: 41), rather the corpse 
decomposes, it shifts, moves and changes. It is this movement within death that 
enables me to relate it to both performance and re-performance, and to suggest 
that through movement, both the movement of the dead and the movement in 
performance, re-performance can prepare us for loss. 
 This can be seen in the works of Spence and Wilke through the ways in 
which we see them move through illness but never in a linear way, rather they 
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move in a pendular manner ‘both following footsteps and leaving footsteps to 
follow in directions not always, or only, forward’ (Schneider, 2011: 11; emphasis 
in original). Hannah Wilke died of Lymphoma in 1993 and Intra-Venus Series, a 
‘group of monumental photographs documenting her final illness and treatment 
was exhibited posthumously at Ronald Feldman Fine Arts in 1994’ (Scharlatt: 
2015). The video installation Intra-Venus Tapes, documenting the last years of 
Wilke’s life, was subsequently exhibited in 2007. Thus, in Wilke’s Intra-Venus 
Tapes, we witness her final demise and death from lymphoma, fourteen years 
after the event. The fact that this work was exhibited posthumously is 
suggestive of an act of haunting. Many actors, singers, directors, writers and 
artists have had their work published, printed or exhibited posthumously and the 
word itself evokes interesting notions of time; post, past, but present. The work 
exists in the here and now, but after the life of its creator and this disrupts linear 
notions of time. It also disrupts the notion that once someone dies, they cease 
to exist, causing re-performance to align live performance with more traditional 
concepts of art and literature, in which, they can be seen as leaving a legacy for 
future generations. The very notion of posthumous fights against the finality of 
death and suggests that even after an artist’s physical death they can still be 
present and can perhaps even still have agency. This agency is evident in our 
ability to watch Wilke die in film and photographs years after her actual death. 
This ability allows Intra-Venus Tapes to serve as a form of re-performance, 
because it can be viewed as a means of bringing her back to life in the present, 
because we witness her presence around us in the videos and photographs 
that make up the exhibition. 
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 The tapes themselves were created by Wilke during the last two and a 
half years of her life and have been edited down to the version we see in the 
exhibition. 
 
Figure 11: Hannah Wilke Intra-Venus Tapes (1990-93) 
As  can be seen in figure 1 the exhibition is composed of sixteen video monitors 
in which ‘each channel has its own sound track, but rather than always being 
audible simultaneously, sound often seems to move from one monitor to 
another’ (Burton 2007: 354). This means that in Intra-Venus Tapes we are able 
to both see and hear Wilke. Her presence, whilst not physical, is very much 
there. In their 2011 text Performing Presence: Between the Live and the 
Simulated Giannachi and Kaye state that ‘presence is thus processual: a 
dynamic structure of intention, feeling, and perception emergent in the 
contextual performance and reception of the sign, rather than a quality inherent 
to the body, individual, or action or established in the real or illusory stabilities of 
a specific time and space’ (2011: 91). Thus, suggesting that presence does not 
have to be physical or bodily in order to exist. In Intra-Venus Tapes Wilke is 
almost overwhelmingly present in the assortment of photographic and video 
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images, which document her illness. She has a voice, a face, a body and a 
presence, one which disrupts all notions of the linearity of time. How is it 
possible for Wilke to be present fourteen years after her death? However, this 
presence is more the presencing of an absence. In her introduction to Tim 
Etchells’ certain fragments Phelan states that ‘witnessing allows the dead, the 
disappeared, the lost, to continue to live’ (1999: 13). Wilke is not physically 
present and through our witnessing of this somewhat disjointed version of her 
deterioration and eventual death, we are pertinently reminded that she will 
never be physically present again.  
 In spite of this, the fact that Wilke has any presence so long after her 
death disrupts linear notions of time and this disruption is further disrupted by 
the videos themselves. The videos, from a range of different dates and times 
during the last few years of Wilke’s life, play alongside one another. This means 
that visitors to the exhibition witness is a variety of images and sounds, which 
do not obey the linear order of time. On one screen we see Wilke moving, 
walking, in the next we see her lying in bed appearing fragile, then her voice 
comes loud, clear, strong from yet another video. In short, time in Intra-Venus 
Tapes, as Hamlet once said, ‘is out of joint’ (1601: 8). As the videos, which are 
played simultaneously, spectators move back and forth throughout the last 
years of Wilke’s life, depending on which of the many screens they choose to 
look at. The result of this is a blurring of the boundaries of time. Rather than 
simply moving forward in a linear way from the past to the present and then 
towards the future, the videos allow us to move back and forth between past 
and present. Which monitor we look at determines which snippet of the two and 
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a half years of Wilke’s life which she chronicled that we see. Thus, we see 
Wilke not simply dying, getting increasingly sick, but moving towards and away 
from her death. The boundaries of time are further blurred by the fact that the 
footage that we are watching was created over such a long period of time. We 
never get to see the whole two and a half years of Wilke’s life, instead we see 
moments, snippets and flashes of it. The fact that we only see limited moments 
of a much longer period of time makes it difficult for us to grasp the idea that the 
footage was collected over such a long period of time. It also makes it difficult to 
understand dying as a linear process because Wilke appears to move towards 
and away from death at various points, challenging the assumption that ‘the 
body lives before it dies. In terms of terminal illness, death happens when the 
illness within the body surmounts the health within the body’ (Phelan 1997: 
159). As humans we understand death to be something which occurs when 
illness takes over the body, consumes it. This, especially in cases of chronic 
illness, is seen as a progression, a person’s health deteriorates until the point at 
which they die O’Brien asserts that ‘I endure the regulation of my body in order 
to survive, in order to continue being-towards-death, rather than arriving at 
biological death itself’ (2014: 58). O’Brien’s description of being-towards-death 
describes the position of someone suffering from a chronic illness, someone 
whose illness will progress until their inevitable death. The way in which Wilke 
appears to move simultaneously towards and away from death disrupts the 
above understandings of illness and death because it enacts what Deleuze 
suggests in Cinema 2:The Time Image when he states that ‘the past does not 
follow the present that it is no longer, it co-exists with the present it was’ (1989: 
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79). Implicit in Deleuze’s comment is the idea that time, in cinema, and, in this 
case, in performative video, is non-linear. The past co-exists with the present, 
thus the past does not necessarily come before the present. Wilke does not 
simply become more and more ill until her death, rather the present at times 
appears to come before the past with Wilke sometimes appearing to be 
recovering from her illness. Of course the linearity, or non-linearity, of time in 
Intra-Venus Tapes is dependent upon which of the monitors we watch at any 
given time and, therefore, our understanding of the installation and particularly 
of notions of time within the installation are singular, individual and private. We 
do not experience Wilke’s death in the same way as one another, it is specific to 
our personal experience of witnessing. 
The effect of time appearing non-linear in Intra-Venus Tapes also serves 
to destabilise notions of illness and death. Her husband, Donald Goddard, who 
worked on preparing the installation, said that ‘it has been difficult for me, 
seeing Hannah so alive’ (2015: 135). This, summarises the destabilising effect 
the Intra-Venus Tapes  have on spectators. Those who know Wilke’s personal 
history know that she is dead, that what they are witnessing is something that 
has already happened, something that is in the past. The act of witnessing it in 
the here and now of the present disrupts this notion. The event is past, but the 
witnessing is present, thus we see Wilke alive in the present, despite being 
aware of the fact that her death is already a past event. This reminds us that 
death cannot be confined to the past. The loss of a loved one is not something 
that we mourn and then move on from, it remains with us always, and perhaps 
mourning is less about learning to let go of the lost object, as Freud argued, and 
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more about learning to live with the loss and the spectral hauntings of the lost 
other that this brings with it, as they continue to be present in our memories. I 
assert that Wilke’s spectral presence in Intra-Venus Tapes makes the exhibition 
something more than a traditional archive or record because in the tapes  Wilke 
is able to simultaneously be both present absent and this, I contend is what 
Goddard finds so painful about the tapes, the fact that Wilke is almost tangibly 
present but remains absent. 
 
Film and Movement: Bodies in Process 
Wilke’s body is not arrested in Intra-Venus Tapes, rather it is free, it moves, it 
speaks and it refuses the confinement which one may expect death to impose 
upon it.  Amelia Jones has argued that ‘the photographic portrait ... is a death 
mask, a coffin, a lifeless screen stifling all breath and sensation and movement’ 
(2002: 4). Whilst this may be true when considering photographic images, it is 
certainly not the case for Intra-Venus Tapes. The fact that Intra-Venus Tapes is 
a video installation causes it to differ from both the earlier Intra-Venus Series 
photographs and other photographic installations, and I contend that the most 
significant difference is film’s inability to arrest the body in the same way that 
photography does. This sense of movement is evident in Burton’s analysis of 
Intra-Venus Tapes, in which she describes ‘Wilke moving closer and closer to 
death’ (2007: 354). In Intra-Venus Tapes Wilke’s body is a moving one, it fits in 
with Phelan’s claim that ‘film suggests that time stops without a living, moving 
body, but that the body itself does not stop moving;’ (1997: 156). 
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Film, like photography, captures moments in time and records past 
events, but it usually does so without capturing the body in stillness. In film the 
body continues to move, to walk, to talk, thus it continues to live, as a filmic 
body. As Phelan has stated ‘the movie camera can manipulate time: it slows 
time down, speeds it up, and perhaps most spectacularly, reverses the 
sequential, forward direction of time’ (1997: 159). It is this disruption of the 
linearity of both time and life, the fact that Wilke appears alive so long after 
death, thus suggesting that death is not the end, which makes Intra-Venus 
Tapes both fascinating and difficult to witness. The act of witnessing Wilke’s last 
years of life in the knowledge that her death occurred several years before 
serves to make her absence more keenly felt. It is like listening to a voicemail 
left by a lost loved one, hearing their voice serves to remind us that this is not a 
voice we will ever hear again, causing us to think about how we miss this voice 
and creating a longing to hear it. It disrupts our understanding of loss because 
the voice, like Wilke’s filmed image, belongs firmly in the realm of the past and 
of those we lost, yet in Intra-Venus Tapes it speaks to us very much alive and 
present. In her discussion of photography Jones suggests that ‘if the image is a 
kind of memory screen, the photographic self‐portrait is thus a site of reciprocal 
exchange where the “past” subject (the artist) comes alive through the “present” 
memories of the viewer’ (2002: 8). Despite the many differences between 
photographs and film, some of which I have discussed above, I agree with 
Jones and suggest that this is what Intra-Venus Tapes does. It brings both 
Wilke and the past back to life in the present. 
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 As mentioned earlier in the chapter, this thesis contends that in Intra-
Venus Tapes the past is brought to life in the present, enabling us to witness it 
as if it were happening in the here and now, but in the knowledge that the actual 
event occurred in the past. In the videos Wilke is alive, but in reality she is dead. 
Thus, Wilke appears as not dead but also not not dead. She emerges as a 
spectral presence. Derrida has described the specter as ‘a paradoxical 
incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the 
spirit’ (1993: 5). This description is evocative of a ghostly presence, a haunting, 
created by Wilke being present in the work so long after her death. However, it 
also suggests a bodily materiality. Derrida’s notion of the ‘becoming-body’ 
seems both tangible and visceral (1993: 5). This fits with the fact that Wilke 
appears so alive in the videos. We see her face, watch her move, hear her 
voice. It is the fact that she appears alive in the exhibition, when we know she is 
not, that creates a sense of haunting and enables Wilke to have a spectral 
presence. This notion is supported by Phelan’s statement that ‘witnessing 
allows the dead, the disappeared, to continue to live as we rediscover their 
force in our ongoing present’ (1999: 12-13). What Phelan’s comment suggests 
is that it is the act of witnessing which enables the dead to live, that Wilke’s 
spectral presence only occurs because someone is witnessing the exhibition. 
The specter needs a body to bear witness to their disappearance, whether that 
be the body of a spectator or in the case of re-performance the body of the re-
performer. In either case, it is the act of witnessing which allows the past (be it a 
past life or a past performance) to exist in the present and which causes the 
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disruption of linear notions of time that we experience in works like Intra-Venus 
Tapes. 
In her analysis of the film Silverlake Life: The View from here (a 
documentary film recording the journey of filmmaker Tom Joslin from his 
diagnosis to his death from AIDS which I analyse in more detail in a later 
chapter), Phelan asserts that ‘the film suggest that time stops without a living, 
moving body, but that the body itself does not stop moving; cinema is one place 
where the still-moving body leaves a trace’, and I argue that this is also the case 
for Intra-Venus Tapes (1997: 156). What the Tapes present is not Wilke alive, 
she has not come back from the dead (or at least not fully), but her filmic body 
is present and this filmic body is a trace of Wilke’s physical body, of her life, a 
reminder of her existence and a spectral presence which haunts both the 
exhibition and those who witness it.  
 Phelan also states that Silverlake Life ‘broaches questions about the 
body’s time that upset the causal logic according to which “living” and “dying” 
are rendered separate states of being’ (1997: 159), and once again I suggest 
that this is also the case in Intra-Venus Tapes. We see Wilke’s body multiplied 
on the many screens which make up the exhibition, and in each image we are 
reminded that Wilke is simultaneously living and dying. In the footage Wilke is 
alive, she is not yet dead, but she is in the process of dying. We witness her 
deterioration, which is evident in her hair loss, the mounting number of wounds, 
cuts, scars and bandages and her increasing weakness, which results in her 
struggling to stand. We see that she is dying, but crucially she is not yet dead. 
Therefore, what we see is the gradual process of Wilke’s demise, her 
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deterioration until the point at which ‘the illness within the body surmounts the 
health within the body’ (Phelan 1997: 159). 
 Although Phelan is talking about terminal illness in more general terms 
her description of the process of dying is especially pertinent when considered 
in relation to cancer patients such as Wilke. Cancer is a disease in which illness 
spreads. As Narvey explains, ‘death from cancer is an intrusive death, and 
although the aetiology might be from without, the result creates internal mutiny. 
The disobedient malignant cells now travel unchecked to locations in other 
tissues, spreading and rapidly proliferating, slowly mutating what was secure 
"self" into pathological "non-self" (2002:4). This fits with Phelan’s description of 
death as something which occurs when the body is overcome with illness. In the 
case of cancer death occurs when the percentage of cancerous cells is greater 
than that of non-cancerous ones. What we witness in Intra-Venus Tapes is this 
process, Wilke’s deterioration as the cancer cells over take her body. Even if, as 
I argued earlier in the chapter, we do not witness this deterioration in a linear 
way. Wilke’s decline may appear rapid as one screen shows Wilke with a full 
head of hair, mobile and standing, whilst the next screen shows her weak, bald, 
struggling to hold herself up, but no matter how fast this process may be it is not 
instantaneous. Life and death are not a boundary which one can break through 
in a single moment (although medically there may be a specific moment in 
which one is declared dead) rather it is a boundary which is broken down 
slowly, bit by bit during the process of dying. 
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Presence and Absence: Photography and Dying 
This is also the case in Jo Spence’s The Final Project, created between 1991 
and 1992. In The Final Project Spence used a technique called double 
exposure in order to create a montage effect. Thus, combining images of 
herself with images related to death, such as skeletons and newly dug graves. 
In their analysis of the project, Jacob and Tobin state that ‘the images perform 
an archival clash of temporal moments and themselves depict the dying body 
as a visual archive’ (2013 :33). I position The Final Project as a re-performance  
because it is part of the larger body of work in which Spence documented her 
deteriorating health. These works include the exhibitions The Picture of Health 
1982 and Narratives of Dis-ease 1990, in which Spence explored her 
experience of breast cancer. In Brian Lobel’s 2010 article ‘Playing More Than 
the Cancer Card’ he describes the images which make up The Picture of Health 
as exploring ‘the infantilizing of patients and representations of the ill female 
body’ (2010: 31). In her article ‘The Challenge of the Unruly Body’ in which she 
analyses Narratives of Dis-ease Ruth-Eloise Lewis explains that in these 
images Spence ‘was specifically concerned with the breast as an object of 
desire and subsequently as a possession placed in the hands of the medical 
institution’ (2012: 1). Lewis goes on to assert that Spence was ‘repossessing 
and claiming back her own body for herself’ (2012: 1). What these comments 
emphasise is the fact that in both exhibitions Spence sought to find ways to 
represent her illness and reclaim her body and this was also the case in The 
Final Project despite the fact that the images of Spence in The Final Project 
differ from those in the previous two exhibitions. Therefore, they can be 
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understood as a re-performance of her earlier works because they are still 
images which serve to record and represent Spence’s illness. 
 The Final Project differs from Spence’s previous works because whilst 
both The Picture of Health and Narratives of Dis-ease focus on finding ways to 
make Spence’s illness visible The Final Project serves to represent not 
Spence’s cancer but the process of her dying. The images which make up The 
Final Project use representations of death to record Spence’s final illness 
(Leukaemia) and subsequent death and in doing so they speak of a legacy, a 
desire to leave something behind after death. Jacob and Tobin also argue that 
the project recognises ‘the precarious balance of presence and absence, body 
and representation, life and death’ (2013: 33). This ability for photography to 
create both presence and absence was summarised by Susan Sontag when 
she stated that ‘a photograph is both a pseudo-presence and a token of 
absence’ (1977: 16). In much the same way as Wilke in Intra-Venus Tapes, the 
balance between presence and absence and life and death is created because 
Spence is present in the photographs that make up the exhibition, but we 
experience this presence in the knowledge that Spence is now absent (in a 
physical sense) and will never be physically present again. 
 This presence/absence is also produced by the fact that Spence created 
the work knowing that she was dying of Leukaemia and so arguably created the 
work in order to find a way to remain, to leave something behind. Jacob and 
Tobin hint at this when they describe ‘the process of the final project as both a 
declaration of present-ness and imminent absence’ (2013: 30). This is also 
suggested by Sontag’s statement that ‘a photograph passes for incontrovertible 
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proof that a given thing happened. The picture may distort; but there is always a 
presumption that something exists, or did exist, which is like what's in the 
picture’ (1977: 5). Indeed, in the case of The Final Project the photographs 
serve as proof that Spence existed. The images provide her with a legacy, a 
way of remaining, in her absence, something remains, the image, the memory, 
the past are all captured in the photographs which ‘appropriate the thing 
photographed’ (1997: 4). In photographing her illness Spence appropriates it, 
captures and uses it in order to create something which will live beyond her 
impending death. 
 Of course, appropriation does not simply refer to recording or 
documenting but it is evocative of ownership, authorship and power. In chapter 
two I argued that artists who create performances which make their illnesses 
visible reclaim their bodies and I contend that this is also what Spence did in 
creating The Final Project. By photographing her illness, Spence not only 
documents both her illness and her body but takes ownership of them. This was 
also the case with her earlier works The Picture of Health and Narratives of Dis-
ease, as can be seen from Lobel’s comment that in The Picture of Health 
Spence ‘brings into focus the exposed female body’ (2010: 31). I assert that not 
only do re-performances such as The Final Project and Intra-Venus Tapes 
provide opportunities for people to regain control of their bodies, but that they 
also enable the artists to leave something of themselves behind for those who 
will mourn their deaths. Thus, aiding their loved ones in surviving their loss. 
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The Process of Mourning 
In his essay ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ Freud discusses ‘the work of 
mourning’, implying that mourning is a process, one which must be worked 
through, before ‘the ego becomes free and uninhibited again’ (1915: 3). I 
contend that the process of re-performance serves as a mirror to the process of 
mourning. When a performance is re-performed several times, either by the 
same or another artist, it ‘fall[s] away...piece by piece’ (Phelan 1997: 41), much 
like the loved ones we have lost. This mirroring occurs because in order to let 
go of that which we have lost and enable ‘the ego [to] become free and 
uninhibited again’ (1915: 3), we must let it go bit by bit, piece by piece. It is a 
gradual letting go, through stages of loss and disappearance, as the 
performance becomes less recognisable with each re-performance, and the lost 
loved ones disappear a little more each time we remove an item connected to 
them. This enables performance to have the ‘especially potent lessons’ that 
Phelan describes (1997: 3). It is through watching a performance disappear, not 
instantly and irretrievably in the way many performance studies scholars, such 
as Phelan, have argued but, through a gradual process of disappearance in 
which an element or feature of the performance is lost with each re-
performance until eventually the re-performances become barely recognisable 
as the initial performances that they cite.  
 In Performing Remains Rebecca Schneider states that reenactors are 
trying ‘to bring that time – that prior moment – to the very fingertips of the 
present’ (2011: 2). I argue that this is also what Barthes was searching for when 
he found The Winter Garden Photograph and what many of us are searching 
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for when we look through photographs of lost loved ones. Critchley has argued 
that ‘the aspect of death that is hardest to endure [is] not our own death, but the 
deaths of those we love’ (2009: XXVII). I contend that this is why we try to bring 
the past to ‘the very fingertips of the present’ by looking through photographs 
and trinkets of those we have lost (2011: 2). We fear death, not our own deaths, 
but the deaths of others because we struggle to understand a present and 
imagine a future in which we exist without them. Critchley claims that ‘it is only 
in grief that we become most truly ourselves. That is, what it means to be a self 
does not consist in some delusory self-knowledge, but in the acknowledgement 
of that part of ourselves that we have irretrievably lost’ (2009: XXVII). What 
Critchley’s comments suggests is that in finding ways to survive the loss of 
those that we love we gain a better understanding of ourselves because when 
faced with such a loss we are forced to re-asses our relation to the lost object, 
just as Barthes re-assessed his relation to his Mother with the aid of the winter 
garden photograph. Thus, when we are faced with such a task we turn to the 
past for help. By bringing the past into the present we find ways for those that 
we have lost to remain, and this helps us to comprehend a future without them, 
to understand who we are in light of the loss we have suffered. Perhaps this is 
why Barthes found what he was looking for in a photograph that was not not of 
his Mother. In seeing her, a woman who was not his Mother, but whom he could 
recognise as his Mother, Barthes was maybe able to understand how she had 
existed without him, before his birth, and therefore able to imagine ways in 
which he could exist without her, ways in which he could survive her death. I 
assert that the same theory can be applied to re-performance. By recognising 
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something of a performance in a re-performance we begin to comprehend the 
many lives of performances. As I argued in the previous chapter, performances 
are neither singular or vanishing, they do not exist only in the present, but will 
leave echoes, traces and impressions in the future. This is what  allows re-
performance to strengthen rather than hinder performance’s relationship with 
death. Re-performance enables performance to remain, not the actual 
performance itself but the echoes and traces of it, just as the echoes and traces 
of the dead remain with those who knew and loved them. 
 
Past, Not Past and Not Not Past 
In Performing Remains Schneider argues that re-performance provides a way 
for performance to not only be past but also to exist in the present. She 
suggests that performances do not always have to disappear. Schneider 
asserts that ‘the past is the stuff of the future,’ (2011: 24). In making this 
suggestion Schneider is drawing upon non-linear notions of time, such as 
Deleuze’s in Cinema (1989), which I mentioned earlier in the chapter in relation 
to Wilke’s Intra-Venus Tapes. Deleuze argues that in film the present is split ‘in 
two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched towards to future while 
the other falls into the past’ (81: 1989). Deleuze’s argument is suggestive of the 
fact that the present is also the past and future, that neither present, nor past, 
nor future are singular or separate but that all three co-exist. Schneider 
develops Deleuze’s notion of time when she claims that ‘the past can disrupt 
the present’, that ‘neither are entirely “over” nor discrete, but partially and 
porously persist’ (2011: 24,15). What Schneider and Deleuze’s arguments 
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share is a belief that time is not always detached or linear and that the past 
does not always disappear. What Schneider is suggesting is that through re-
performance time stops being linear. Instead time becomes porous and leaky, 
like bodies, allowing the border between past and present to be crossed, 
multiple times. Like Schneider, I argue that re-performance disrupts linear 
notions of time, enabling re-performers to touch the past through their repetition 
and in doing so bring the past back to life in the present. This strengthens 
performance’s relationship with death because the dead, like performances, are 
not confined to the past but haunt the present and point towards possible 
futures and ways of remaining. Drawing upon the notion of presence that I 
discussed earlier in relation to Wilke being dead, not dead and not not dead in 
the exhibition of Intra-Venus Tapes, I argue that neither the dead nor 
performance are past. I contend that just as Barthes’ was able to recover the 
essence of his mother in a photograph of her from a time when she was not his 
mother, re-performance can allow us to recover an earlier performance in such 
a way that it is not past, or at least not singularly past. This enables re-
performance to strengthen performance’s relationship with death because it 
helps us to understand the ways in which the dead leave behind echoes and 
traces and, therefore, assists us in our understanding of our relationship to 
death and loss, specifically the deaths of loved ones, which we must find ways 
to survive. 
 Drawing, once again, upon Deleuzeian notions of time I suggest that re-
performance transcends boundaries, both the boundaries of time and the 
boundaries of the body. If we were to open a coffin months or years after its 
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burial what we would find inside would bear little more than a passing 
resemblance to the body that was initially placed inside it. Death does not stop 
the body. There is movement in the corpse as it decomposes. It is this 
decomposition that causes the corpse to be considered such an object of 
abjection and as it decomposes the corpse becomes a leftover, a remnant. The 
bones and fragments come to stand in for that which is no longer there, the 
body we can no longer touch, the loved one we can no longer hold. The corpse, 
through its presence, speaks of absence, and this is also what re-performance 
does. When Rose pulled a coffin containing O’Brien’s body, covered in tiny 
photographs of Flanagan, through the streets of Los Angeles her actions served 
as a means of mourning Flanagan’s absence. It functioned in a similar way to 
photographs, such as those in Wilke’s Intra-Venus and Spence’s The Final 
Project, highlighting how re-performance makes visible the ghostly presence of 
the artists and performances which are no longer there, thus enabling us to 
witness them disappearing as they dead do, slowly through the process of 
mourning that we must endure in order to survive their loss.  
 As I argued earlier in the chapter, O’Brien and Rose’s actions bring 
Flanagan’s specter out of the archive and if the archive is a place to store 
ghosts, then the bodily archive, which re-performance creates, is a place to set 
them free, to allow them to interact with the living bodies of the re-performers. It 
is the place to remind us that whilst the body and initial performance may be 
dead, the specter and the re-performance is and that through these remnants 
the past can be made present, allowing us to confront and possibly even come 
to terms with that past. Barthes’ Mother is present in The Winter Garden 
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Photograph, Spence is present in the photographs that make up The Final 
Project, Wilke is present in Intra-Venus tapes and Flanagan is present in the 
work Rose and O’Brien create. Through photography and re-performance, that 
which is no longer there can find some way to remain. I argue that re-
performance helps to prepare us for loss and death because it teaches us that 
performances, like the dead, never completely disappear. Performance, like the 
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Chapter Five -  Re-performance, Legacy and the Future 
 
Legacy and Passing on  
The central focus of this chapter is performance’s legacy and the possibility 
of re-performance providing a means of creating a legacy for performance 
and preventing its total annihilation and disappearance. Critchley argues that 
it is ‘the fear of death that enslaves us and leads us towards either 
temporary oblivion or the longing for immortality’ (2009: 3). Cricthley goes on 
to state that we seek ‘to escape death’ (2009: 3). In biological terms, there is 
no escape from death, no possibility of immortality. However, the creation of 
a legacy can help to quell the fear of death because through a legacy 
something of us remains. In this chapter I position Critchley’s 2009 text, The 
Book of Dead Philosophers, alongside Taylor’s The Archive and The 
Repertoire I also draw upon other recent writings on re-performance and re-
enactment. I also return to my earlier discussion of Derrida’s Specters of 
Marx and specifically his discussion of the specter in relation to the future. In 
doing so, I argue that this process of archiving a performance onto a body 
can enable performance, long considered a transient and ephemeral art 
form, to create a legacy that remains or persists. It creates a future, which 
can endure past the end of the initial performance because it is passed on or 
willed to another person or body. In this chapter, I contend that re-
performances enable performances to have a legacy by preventing them 
from disappearing completely and enabling them to re-appear in a later time 
and place, when they are brought to life through another body. Thus, re-
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performance creates a living legacy and enables performance to be not only 
the stuff of the past, but also of the present and the future. Throughout this 
chapter I will focus on Marina Abramović’s 2005 performance, Seven Easy 
Pieces, her 2010 performance, The Artist is Present, Martin Nachbar’s 2000 
performance project, Affects/Rework, and Jill Hocking’s Cabbage Leaf 
Blanket (2002). However, a range of other performances, which are 
analysed in detail elsewhere in the thesis, will also be drawn upon. 
 The notion of a performance’s legacy is, I argue, a crucial component of 
Seven Easy Pieces. The piece was a week-long performance event at the 
Guggenheim Museum in New York in which Abramović re-performed a 
series of what she considered to be seminal works from the 1960’s and 
1970’s. The works which Abramović re-performed included: Valie Export’s 
Action Pants: Genital Panic (a performance which I discuss in detail in 
chapter six) (1968), Vito Acconci’s Seedbed (1972) and Abramović’s own 
performance Lips of Thomas (1975). Although Seven Easy Pieces has been 
written about extensively, including in Spector et al’s 2007 text, Seven Easy 
Pieces, I offer a new approach by focusing on the way in which the 
retrospective creates a legacy of performances from the 1960s and 1970s. 
Seven Easy Pieces and Abramović’s re-performance of Lips of Thomas, 
raises issues of how to document performance, which is by nature 
ephemeral. Both the retrospective and individual re-performance suggest 
that the act of re-performance, in the case of works like Seven Easy Pieces, 
is about more than simply documenting performance, it is also a means of 
passing it on and keeping it alive as a legacy. Seven Easy Pieces 
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interrogates Phelan’s notion, highlighted earlier in the thesis, that 
performance disappears, and serves as an indication that, as I have 
previously discussed, performance’s only life may not be in the present. 
Abramović’s initial performance of Lips of Thomas (which took place in 
Innsbruck in 1975) was transient, fleeting and ephemeral but her 2005 re-
performance as part of Seven Easy Pieces provides the piece with a 
possible future. If Abramović was able to re-perform the piece thirty years 
later and present it to a new generation of audience members then the 
performance did not cease to exist at the end of the 1975 performance and, 
therefore, there is no reason to think it ceased to exist at the end of the 2005 
performance either. What Abramović demonstrates in Seven Easy Pieces is 
the ability for performances not simply to be preserved for posterity but to 
continue to exist for future generations of both artists and spectators. 
  The 2005 performance of Lips of Thomas was not the 1975 performance, 
just as I explained in chapter two that Ron Athey’s 2011 re-performance of 
Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic was not the same as his initial performance of 
the piece in 2009. The gallery in which the actions of Lips of Thomas were 
performed was different, the context (the 2005 performance being part of the 
larger performance event, Seven Easy Pieces) of the performance was 
different, and even the  
body of the artist performing the actions was different. Yes, both pieces were 
performed by Abramović, but her body had changed and aged during the 
thirty years that elapsed between the performances. Abramović’s ageing 
body highlights her mortality and is indicative of the need to create a legacy. 
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As bodies age we can become more aware of their fragility and mortality and 
this may fuel the desire to leave a legacy. This chapter aims to explore the 
role that acts of re-performance can play in the creation of a legacy.          
 
Time and Multiplicity: Past, Present and Future                                                                                          
 
Despite all of these changes, the 2005 performance in New York was 
haunted by the 1975 Innsbruck performance. As figures 12 and 13 above 
indicate, anyone witnessing both performances couldn’t fail to notice the 
echoes of the initial performance within the re-performance. Thus, this 
suggests that, although the initial performance ended, it never fully 
disappeared and could be glimpsed once again thirty years later. The long 
gap between the initial and re-performance of Lips of Thomas is an example 
of the way in which re-performance offers a legacy which endures and 
provides performance with a sense of longevity. 
 In chapter two I used Jacques Derrida’s concepts of hauntology and 
  Figure 12: Marina Abramović Lips of Thomas (1975) 
Figure 13: Marina Abramović Lips of Thomas (2015) 
Figure 12: Marina Abramović Lips of Thomas (1975) 
   202 
specters to analyse the ways in which re-performances are haunted by the 
specters of the initial, or earlier, versions of the performance. Here I once 
again draw upon these Derridian notions to argue that re-performance can 
be used as a way of creating a legacy of performance. In Specters of Marx 
Derrida suggests that it is possible to communicate with the specter when he 
says that ‘in order to inhabit even there where one is not, haunt all places, at 
the same time, to be atopic (mad and non-localizable), not only is it 
necessary to see from behind the visor, … it is also necessary to speak. And 
to hear voices’ (1994: 135; emphasis in original). Thus, Derrida is 
suggesting that communication with the specter is possible, that the specter 
can both speak and be spoken to. By linking this to the ability to ‘haunt all  
places at the same time,’ Derrida proposes that in communicating with the 
specter it is also possible to speak to both the past and the future from a 
position in the present. Derrida goes on to state that the specter ‘resonates, 
it invades everything’ and can ‘cross all borders’ (1994: 135). Thus, Derrida 
implies that the specter is unrestrained and cannot be confined to the past 
but that it actually enables communication between the past, present and 
future and it is for this reason that I have chosen to link it with the notion of 
legacy. A legacy is something which remains, and, in the case of 
performance it requires a body in order to ensure its future. Therefore, I 
contend that bodily transmission is integral to the legacy of performance. 
Whether in the case of Bob Flanagan, Sheree Rose and Martin O’Brien 
where the transmission occurs between bodies, or in Abramović’s case 
between different versions of the same body, the fact remains that 
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performance needs a body to survive. Hence, this forms the relationship 
between re-performance, the specter and legacy. 
 Another link between these three concepts that I wish to explore is their 
relation to time. In his discussion of the play, Hamlet, Derrida states that 
‘Hamlet already began with the expected return of the dead King. After the 
end of history, the spirit comes by coming back’ (1994: 10; emphasis in 
original). Hamlet’s King belongs to the past. He lived and died in the past. 
However, in his use of the term ‘coming back’, Derrida suggests that the 
specter of the King is here in the present. Building upon my discussion of 
time in chapter four, I argue that the past, through the specter, can exist in 
the present. The specter also seems to hold the possibility of its return, as 
Hamlet’s father does not just visit him once. Derrida describes the ghost of 
Hamlet’s father as ‘a ghost whose expected return repeats itself again and 
again’ (1994: 10). Thus, the specter returns many times, hinting at the notion 
that the specter, like re-performance, is capable of existing not only in the 
past and the present, but also in the future. It is the elements of haunting 
and repetition that, I assert, links the Derridian specter to the legacy created 
by re-performance. 
 If the past and the initial performance, can exist in the present, haunted 
by its specter, surely it can just as easily return again in the future? In re-
performance, just as in Derrida’s concepts of haunting and specters, the 
past, present and future are not clearly demarcated zones separated by 
impenetrable boundaries. Rather, they are lines which can easily be blurred 
and crossed. In 2005 Abramović re-performed actions that she had initially 
   204 
performed in 1975. In doing so she not only opened a dialogue between the 
past and present but also brought to the fore the possibility that these 
actions can be repeated again at some time in the future. Like Derrida’s 
specter, the legacy that re-performance creates can haunt all places and 
cross the borders of past, present and future. 
 The notion of repetition, which I discussed earlier, creates a correlation 
between Derrida’s discussion of Specters and Abramović’s actions when 
she re-performed Lips of Thomas. As part of the performance Abramović cut 
the shape of a star onto her stomach. During the initial performance she cut 
this for the first time, whilst in the 2005 re-performance Abramović was re-
opening the old wound, re-cutting over the scar tissue that remained from 
the initial performance. This, combined with the factors that I mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, marks the re-performance as different. However, the 
act of re-opening an old wound is also suggestive of haunting. The initial 
1975 performance never fully disappeared, its echoes and traces remained 
in the scar on Abramović’s stomach, and in re-opening that wound 
Abramović shows how performance can have multiple lives. Both the 1975 
Innsbruck performance and the 2005 re-performance exist in the past. 
However, in both cases each audience to each performance experienced it 
as the present. Yet, the fact that Abramović was able to re-open the wound 
from the 1975 performance 30 years after she created it suggests that the 
performance, the wound, and the scar have potential futures. The wound 
can be re-opened, the map of the scar re-traced and the piece re-performed. 
The use of the word re indicates multiplicity, if something can be repeated 
   205 
once it can be repeated many times, thus the wound, the scar and the 
performance belong not just in the past but simultaneously and multiply in 
the past, present and future. 
 The relationship between the scar and multiplicity is highlighted by 
Kuppers in her 2007 book The Scar of Visibility: Medical Performances and 
Contemporary Art in which she claims that ‘the scar knits multiplicity in time 
and space into living flesh’ (209). The suggestion here is that the scar, like 
the re-performance disrupts linear notions of time. Through scars and flesh 
we are able to simultaneously glimpse both the past and the future in the 
present. Audience members witnessing Abramović’s 2005 performance of 
Lips of Thomas experience the piece in the here and now of the present but 
were also able to glimpse the scar from the initial performance, which haunts 
the present version. The fact that Abramović was able to bring the past into 
the present is also suggestive of the possibility of re-creating these pieces 
again in the future. In this instance, Abramović’s body, the scar, the wound 
on her stomach, serves as the relic of the initial performance and this relic 
was then used in the creation of the re-performance in 2005.  
In the case of Lips of Thomas the scar operates in a similar way to 
Athey’s re-performance of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic, which I analysed 
earlier in the thesis, and which was part of Tolentino’s project, The Sky 
Remains the Same. Here I am developing what I described in chapter two in 
order to examine the act of re-cutting a scar in relation to the concept of 
legacy and the notion of the future of the performance. In The Sky Remains 
the Same, Tolentino re-performed Athey’s piece Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic 
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alongside Athey and, much like Abramović’s re-opening of her scar, Athey 
repeating his performative actions suggests multiple lives and possible 
futures of performance. If Athey can repeat his actions for Tolentino to copy 
then they are no longer confined to the past or present. The actions may be 
being performed in the present, but the fact that they are repeated actions 
which have already existed in the past suggests that performance has a past 
and, therefore, a possible future. This is particularly evident in Athey and 
Tolentino’s work because, as I argued in chapter two, the performance of 
Self Obliteration # 1Ecstatic as part of The Sky Remains the Same, serves 
as an act of passing on. Athey passes his performance onto Tolentino and 
she archives the performance onto her body. This suggests that the 
performance can survive multiple deaths. It can survive the death of the 
initial performance, the death of the re-performance and, finally, and 
perhaps most importantly when considering the notion of a performative 
legacy, the death of the initial performer. By passing on the work to another 
body (that of Tolentino), Athey ensures its survival after his own death and, 
therefore, creates a lasting legacy and prevents the annihilation of the work. 
 Whilst this may appear to threaten performance’s status as a transient, 
ephemeral art form, which is a central focus of this thesis, re-performances, 
such as those by Abramović, Athey and Tolentino, do not threaten this 
status because each performance and re-performance is, in itself, both 
transient and ephemeral. However, this does not mean that they exist in 
isolation. Rather, as I discussed earlier in the thesis in relation to 
intratextuality, they can be considered in relation to the body of work created 
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by the artist and in the wider context of live/performance art and, in this 
wider context, the performances can have multiple lives. This argument is 
supported by Schneider’s assertion that ‘the past is the stuff of the future’ 
(2011: 24). The past, like the initial performance, is never entirely over. The 
initial performance may disappear, but it does not do so entirely, and acts of 
re-performance enable performance to be passed on and provide a possible 
legacy of performance. 
 
The Drive to Archive - Bodily Transmission 
As discussed in the first section of this chapter and in previous chapters, I 
contend that re-performance can be used as a means of passing on a 
performance from one artist to another, and here I build upon the notions of 
bodily transmission on and bodily archives by exploring possible reasons for 
artists’ creating re-performance works. Using Abramović’s 2005 
performance series Seven Easy Pieces, which I have already discussed in 
this chapter, as well as her 2012 retrospective piece The Artist is Present. 
Together with the works of Wilke and Spence, which were discussed in 
chapter four, as examples I argue that the desire to re-perform, to create a 
bodily archive is driven by a desire to leave something behind.  
 Abramović’s 2012 retrospective The Artist is Present consisted of a 
group of artists re-performing works that had previously been performed by 
Abramović whilst she sat outside the gallery. Thus, Abramović was 
simultaneously present and absent; present outside the gallery but absent 
from the re-performances of her work. The Artist is Present functions in a 
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similar way to Tolentino’s The Sky Remains the Same, as a means of 
passing on a performance from the body of one artist to another and thus 
enabling the survival and legacy of the performance. Death is inevitable, as 
in most cases, it is the end of a performance but when we die we leave a 
legacy by which we are remembered and that these legacies are 
comparable to the re-performances discussed above. Tolentino’s 
performance of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic and the performances of 
Abramović’s pieces in The Artist is Present were created from the legacies 
of earlier performances and, therefore, function as a means for performance 
to survive. Survival is enabled by passing on the performances from the 
body of one artist to another, from Athey’s body to Tolentino's and from 
Abramović’s body to the bodies of the other artists involved in the project. 
 The desire to re-perform, to create a bodily archive, is the same as the 
desire some people have to be remembered after their deaths. This desire is 
highlighted by Harold Bloom in his  text The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory 
of Poetry in which he frames the relationship between generations of poets 
as a ‘battle between strong equals, father and son as mighty opposites, 
Laius and Oedipus at the crossroads’ (1997: 11). Despite the fact that 
Bloom’s theory has a patriarchal and heteronormative focus in which women 
don't figure it can still be usefully applied to the non-normative and fluid slant 
of the re-performances, such as The Artist is Present, that this thesis 
examines. Bloom’s positioning suggests that each poet, or in this case each 
performer, wishes to be considered and remembered in their own right. Here 
I develop Freud’s assertion that death is ‘an initial state from which the living 
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entity has at one time or other departed and to which it is striving to return’ 
(1955: 38), by reading it in relation to Bloom and adding that during our 
journey through life we wish to leave footprints in the sand, proof that we 
were once here and suggesting a longing to return. Whilst Freud suggests 
that the life and death drives are in opposition to one another itself I argue 
that actually this life and death drives serve to counter-balance one another 
and that it is the life drive which fuels our desire to make an impression, to 
leave an imprint and create a legacy. 
 
  Figure 14: Marina Abramović The Artist is Present (2012) 
 In Abramović’s The Artist is Present, the re-performances of her previous 
works such as Imponderabilia (1977) were performed by other artists. As I 
have already explained Abramović herself did not participate in any of the 
re-performances. However, she remained present in every aspect of every 
work performed during the six week performance exhibition. Throughout the 
exhibition Abramović presented a new, solo, durational performance (shown 
in figure 14) ‘starting before the Museum open[ed] each day and continuing 
until after it close[d],’ thus, she was physically present at the gallery 
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throughout the exhibition (MOMA 2010: 1). As can be seen in figure 14 
Abramović is seated at a wooden table facing visitors to the gallery, who sit 
opposite her. The positioning of Abramović in relation to spectators as well 
as the use of wooden table enable the performance to be haunted by 
Abramović’s 1981-87 performance series Nightsea Crossing, which she 
performed alongside her then partner Ulay. In Nightsea Crossing ‘Ulay and 
Abramovic sat at either end of the table, with their faces turned towards 
each other and the audience looking at their profiles’ (Lima 2019:1). The 
description of Nightsea Crossing immediately recalls the image of The Artist 
is Present in figure14 and as such I argue that the haunting created by 
Abramović’s presence is multiple. Abramović appears as a ghostly presence 
haunting the exhibition but is also herself haunted by the ghost of her 
previous work with Ulay. Enacting Derrida’s notion that we can both haunt 
and be haunted. In Specters of Marx Derrida describes Marx as a ghost 
hunter, asking ‘why this hunt for ghosts?’ but also as someone ‘haunted’ by 
the ghosts he seems to hunt (1994:139/140). In this sense Derrida presents 
us with a world in which everyone seems to be haunted, where no-one can 
escape the specter and it is this sense of haunting that I contend Abramović 
presents in The Artist is present. 
In addition to her physical presence ‘the exhibition [was] accompanied by 
an illustrated catalogue that include[d] an audio recording of the artist’s voice 
guiding the reader through the publication’ (MOMA 2010: 1). Therefore, 
Abramović was present in the exhibition through her pre-recorded voice 
guiding visitors around the space. I assert that this gives Abramović a 
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spectral presence; a disembodied voice, guiding visitors through her past, 
her performance history. This also gave Abramović a presence in each of 
the re-performance works, even though she did not physically participate in 
any of them. Her voice spoke about the past even as the re-performances 
were enacted in the present, thus, demonstrating Abramović’s control and 
asserting her power over the work . Abramović’s presence also complicated 
linear notions of time, the exhibition presented Abramović’s past in the 
present. The exhibition is described on the MOMA website as a 
‘performance retrospective [which] traces the prolific career of Marina 
Abramović’ (MOMA 2010: 1). It is clear from this statement that the works 
are Abramović’s. The exhibition was about her, not the artists who 
participated in the re-performances. Thus, Abramović was present in each of 
the re-performances. She haunted them like a specter. Her voice, her 
physical presence outside the gallery, the knowledge that every visitor to the 
gallery had that these were Abramović’s works all contributed to the 
exhibition being haunted by her. The re-performances were simultaneously 
Abramović and not Abramović, hers was not the physical body performing 
the work but she retained both presence and authorship in them because of 
the context of the gallery and the exhibition as a retrospective celebrating 
Abramović’s career. 
 From this point of view, The Artist is Present is interesting when 
considering notions of legacy and the desire to leave things behind. At the 
time of the exhibition Abramović was 64 years old. She had been creating 
and presenting live and performance art works in a career ‘spanning over 
   212 
four decades’ (MOMA 2010: 1). It can therefore easily be argued that 
Abramović was reflecting on her career and considering her legacy, both as 
an artist and a person. The Artist is Present, serves as Abramović’s means 
of leaving something behind, ensuring the legacy of her work and when this 
is considered in relation to Bloom’s theory in The Anxiety of Influence this 
can be seen as Abramović seeking to position herself as the Mother figure in 
the performances and those who re-perform her work as what Bloom 
describes as ‘weaker talents’ who ‘idealize’ her work (Bloom 1997:  5). 
 In comparison, Athey and Tolentino’s collaborative work on Self-
obliteration #1 Ecstatic can be read as more of a handing over of the work 
from one artist to another. Where in The Artist is Present Abramović seems 
to be  more concerned with her legacy, rather than that of the work, hence 
my earlier positioning of her in relation to Bloom’s theory and my assertion 
that The Artist is Present seeks to confirm Abramović’s status as the author 
of the work and what Barthes terms the ‘Author-God’ (1968: 4). In The Artist 
is Present, Abramović and the work appear inseparable, the work is 
Abramović and she is the work. Athey and Tolentino’s re-performance is 
about ensuring the legacy of the performance rather than Athey’s legacy and 
the focus is on the work rather than the artist. Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic is 
part of Tolentino’s ongoing project, The Sky Remains the Same. Tolentino 
describes the project as one in which ‘artists endow a signature work 
onto/into my body’ (Tolentino 2008: 1) This statement is suggestive of the 
fact that the project is about archiving the work, attempting to ensure its 
survival by passing it on. The fact that the performance archived onto 
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Tolentino’s body is a signature work  suggests that the performance 
epitomises the artist’s work, that it is representative of the body of their work. 
This in turn suggests that the artist is a star, someone with a recognisable 
style of performance which is captured in their signature work. Thus, the act 
of archiving it onto the body of another artist is not simply about the 
performance being archived but is also symbolic of the artist’s entire 
performance history. In the act of archiving the performance the artist is 
symbolically passing all of their work onto the body of another artist and this 
can be viewed as a way of ensuring their legacy. This also raises questions 
of authorship, when a performance is passed on in this way is authorship of 
the work passed on too or does the initial performer retain authorship? 
Alternatively, do the two performers become co-authors of the work? After 
all, both Athey and Tolentino performed in the 2011 re-performance of Self-
obliteration #1. So, does their positioning of themselves as co-performers 
equate to that of co-authors? These notions of authorship will be addressed 
in more detail in the next section of the chapter but for now it is important to 
consider the differences in the nature of the two re-performances being 
discussed and the impact that this has on the discussion of what drives the 
desire to re-perform. 
 In The Book of Dead Philosophers Critchley states that ‘what defines 
human life in our corner of the planet at the present time is not just a fear of 
death, but an overwhelming terror of annihilation’ (2011: 1). Critchley uses 
the term annihilation to suggest something more than death, describing it as 
‘a terror both of the inevitability of our demise with its prospect of pain and 
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possibly meaningless suffering, and the horror of what lies in the grave other 
than our body nailed into a box and lowered into the earth to become 
wormfood’ (2011: 1). This statement implies that the terror of annihilation is 
a terror of pain, illness, dying and death but also of what happens to us after 
death. Critchley’s use of the terms ‘possibly meaningless suffering’ and 
‘lowered into the earth to become wormfood’ are suggestive of the fact that 
annihilation is total destruction and disappearance (2011: 1). This is also 
evident when Critchley states that ‘the terror of annihilation leads us blindly 
into belief in the magical forms of salvation and promises of immortality 
offered by certain varieties of traditional religion and many New Age 
sophistries’ (2011: 1). If religion and belief in the afterlife offer comfort to our 
terror of annihilation, then it is not the actual event of death that we fear but 
the belief that death is the end, that once we die, we cease to exist. Our 
bodies are buried or burned, and we no longer have any presence, life or 
agency, in this life or any other. Death, without a belief in any form of afterlife 
or reincarnation, is the annihilation of which Critchley speaks. This would 
mean our total disappearance and the knowledge that eventually our lives 
may be forgotten, our graves untended and our loss no longer mourned. Or 
even our bodies never looked for or discovered. 
 I contend that what artists such as Abramović, Athey and Tolentino are 
engaging with in their acts of re-performance is an attempt to avoid 
annihilation by ensuring that if something of us remains after our deaths as if 
this is a way in which they can stave off annihilation. Critchley claims ‘death 
and life are never-ceasing transformations’ (2011: 56), and when viewed in 
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this way death does not have to mean annihilation, that by leaving 
something of ourselves and/or our work behind maybe artists and 
performances do not have to disappear completely. 
 This notion of legacy can be linked to Schechner’s concept of aftermath, 
something discussed in chapter three. The terms legacy and aftermath are 
evocative of things left behind. Humans leave behind legacies, 
performances leave behind aftermaths. A legacy is not a person, an 
aftermath is not a performance, but they are both things left behind, and 
both can be used to cross the boundaries of time by enabling us to bring the 
past back to life in the present. The legacy of a lost loved one remains within 
us and a performance can be made to remain if we gather up the aftermath 
and use it to create re-performances. Through this merging of past and 
present we can indicate possible futures and ensure that performances and 
lost loved ones are never lost forever. Schechner states that ‘the continuing 
life of a performance is its aftermath. This phase of the performance process 
may extend for years or even centuries – in fact, the duration of the 
aftermath is indefinite’ (2006: 246). Schechner’s use of the terms ‘continuing 
life’ and ‘indefinite’ are suggestive of the fact that performance does not 
always or does not entirely disappear. Schechner also claims that 
‘performance itself is categorically evanescent. Even the memory of 
performance fades quickly. Soon enough all but the most famous 
performances vanish’ (2006: 247), thus suggesting that even with the notion 
of aftermath all performances disappear. The word vanish makes it clear 
that in many cases performances are lost irretrievably. However, Schechner 
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also states that ‘sometimes the aftermath of a performance is open- ended, 
generating many new performances’ (2006: 247). This is an argument for re-
performance as a means of avoiding the vanishing and disappearance of 
performance. Through re-performance the initial performance cannot be 
retrieved but a performative legacy can be created, and this legacy can 
enable artists to walk in the footsteps of those who have gone before and 
prevent that annihilation of which, according to Critchley, we are so terrified. 
 
 
Performance’s Returns: The Return of the Author 
The third section of this chapter explores the notion of re-performance as a 
return, a way of bringing initial or earlier versions of the performance back to 
life in the present. This is something which has already been discussed in 
previous chapters but here I intend to expand those ideas in relation to the 
notions of legacy that I outlined earlier on in the chapter. Performance can 
return through re-performance and that in doing so the performance can be 
passed on from one performer to another through bodily transmission. Thus, 
when the performance returns it is altered, that each return is simultaneously 
marked by its difference  from the initial performance and haunted by the 
specter of that initial performance. This raises questions with regard to 
authorship, particularly when the re-performance is performed by another 
artist. Who owns/authors the work? In his essay ‘The Death of the Author’ 
Barthes asserts that ‘the author is a modern figure’ and is connected with 
the ‘prestige of the individual’ (1968: 2). The notion of individual prestige 
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suggests that in order for a work to be  considered prestigious it must be the 
work of a single author and that any act of co-authorship damages the 
prestige of the performance in some way. This concept is linked to my 
earlier posing of the question; does the process of bodily transmission pass 
the authorship as well as the performance on to the next artist? and 
suggests that the question of authorship in re-performance is a crucial one. 
Using the examples of O’Brien’s performance works, some of which can be 
seen as re-performances of Flanagan’s earlier works, Abramović’s Seven 
Easy Pieces and The Artist is Present, I contend that re-performance brings 
into question the notion of authorship. If performances can be passed on 
from one artist to another, thus enabling them to create a legacy which 
endures death, how can authorship be maintained when a performance is 
passed on? By contrasting re-performance works such as Tolentino’s The 
Sky Remains the Same and O’Brien and Rose’s work, I examine the 
similarities and differences between re-performing a piece when the initial 
performer is alive compared to when they are dead. I question whether 
Tolentino’s body acts as an archive in the same way as O’Brien’s because 
the “authors” of the work that she is archiving remain both present and alive, 
whilst, in O’Brien and Rose’s re-performances Flanagan is present but not 
alive and therefore, does not participate in the re-performance. 
 Whilst Tolentino’s body archives performances in a similar way to that in 
which O’Brien and Rose archive Flanagan’s work the notions of authorship 
are different in each case. Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic was a solo 
performance by Athey, as such he was the sole author of the work. The 
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manner of the re-performance, in which, as I described in chapter two, Athey 
performed the piece solo and then alongside Tolentino, suggests that Athey 
passed on the performance to Tolentino. In doing so Athey also passed on 
some of the authorship of the performance to Tolentino because the re-
performance of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic turned it into a collaborative 
performance, thus Athey and Tolentino became co-authors of the work. 
 Contrastingly in Rose and Flanagan’s performances they were always 
co-performers, and therefore, co-authors of the performances. This was also 
the case in Rose’s performances with O’Brien; she was also a co-author of 
the work.  Rose’s status as co-author of the performances that she created 
with both Flanagan and O’Brien and her presence in all of the performances 
allows authorship to be shared between the three artists. As I asserted in 
chapter two Rose and O’Brien’s performances retain Flanagan’s specter, 
and because of his spectral presence Flanagan retains some authorship in 
the performances that Rose and O’Brien created and, therefore, the three 
artists share authorship of Rose and O’Brien’s re-performances. 
 
 
Legacy and Posthumous Authorship 
Further developing the notions of authorship outlined in the previous section 
of the chapter here I examine notions of authorship in relation to death. 
Following on from my questions about the nature of re-performances in 
which the initial artist is no longer alive, I use Wilke’s Intra-venus Tapes and 
Martin Nachbar’s project Afects/Rework 2000, in which he created re-
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performances of Dora Hoyer’s dance ‘cycle Affectos Humanos (1962-4)’ 
(Burt 2006: 196). These re-performances will be used to question the ways 
in which artists can retain authorship over their work even after their deaths. 
Nachbar’s project has previously been examined by theorists such as 
Ramsay Burt in his 2006 text Judson Dance Theater: Performative Traces 
and André Lepecki in his 2016 text Singularities: Dance in the Age of 
performance however, my interest in the piece differs from both Burt and 
Lepecki’s because my primary concern is with the way in which Nachbar’s 
re-performances created a legacy of Hoyer’s earlier work.  
As I discussed in chapter four, Intra-venus Tapes was a project 
conceived by Wilke and her partner Donald Goddard, who helped to shoot 
‘over thirty hours of video … documenting the last two and a half years of 
her life’ (Burton 2007: 2). However, the project was completed by Goddard 
after her death and as Goddard has stated the initial idea was ‘to show all of 
this work, and the name of the exhibition was going to be “Cured”. (Goddard 
2008: 132). Thus, whilst they may have been working together when the 
idea was first conceived, Goddard saw it through to completion without 
Wilke’s input. This, together with the fact that the work began as a project 
about Wilke being cured rather than about her death suggests that Intra-
Venus Tapes became a different project after her death. This raises 
questions as to whether Wilke, Goddard or both of them are the authors of 
this work and it is these questions of authorship which I examine in this 
chapter. The fact that Wilke conceived of, planned and created the images 
and footage of herself that made up Intra-Venus Series and Intra-Venus 
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Tapes suggests that the work remains hers, that she was the author or 
creator of the work. However, in deciding to complete the work following her 
death Goddard became a co-author, so that they had shared authorship. 
This is the case because of the fact that Wilke initiated the work, as 
highlighted by the Friedman Gallery’s description of the piece, in which they 
state  that ‘almost from the beginning, she [Wilke] thought of these tapes, 
shot by herself, her husband Donald Goddard, and others, as a video 
installation, and she developed specific ideas about how it should be 
realized’ (2007: 1). This description clearly highlights Wilke’s plan for the 
installation and because of this Goddard cannot be the sole author of the 
work, in  much the same way that Wilke cannot be the sole author if the 
work either because she had no say in the final incarnation of the project. 
This is because spectators of the work have no way of knowing what Wilke’s 
ideas for the realisation of the work were and whether or not the work was 
realised in the way that Wilke intended. Thus, I contend that Wilke and 
Goddard should be viewed as co-authors of the work. Barthes states that 
‘though the Author’s empire is still very powerful…it is evident that for a long 
time now certain writers have attempted to topple it’ (1968: 3). This is what 
acts of co-authorship such as that between Wilke and Goddard are 
attempting to do. In works like these it is not the author that is the most 
important but the work itself. Goddard may have changed the work, it may 
have evolved following Wilke’s death, but this does not diminish the work, it 
enables the work to continue and to create Wilke’s legacy. 
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Nachbar’s re-performances of Hoyer’s work also occurred after her death 
but unlike Intra-venus Tapes it was never devised as a collaborative project. 
Therefore, the notions of authorship in this case are different to those 
between Wilke and Goddard in Intra-Venus. Nachbar took Hoyer’s work and 
re-performed it without her consent, collaboration or co-operation and I 
question whether this prevents Hoyer from having authorship over the work 
that Nachbar created. The notions of authorship in this case are further 
complicated by the fact that Waltraud Luley (Hoyer’s assistant and the 
guardian of Hoyer’s estate and work) passed these responsibilities onto 
Nachbar. This, I assert, shows how authorship as well as performances can 
be passed on so that the performances can continue to exist beyond the life 
of their initial authors and/or artists. Thus, privileging the continuing 
existence of the work over the author who, according to Barthes, ‘absents 
himself’ (1968: 4). In the author’s absence, the work continues and it this 
continuation of the work that creates its legacy. In this sense the author is 
never fully absent but retains a haunting, spectral presence in the future of 
the work. 
In the case of Dora Hoyer, Waltraud Luley and Martin Nachbar the sense 
of legacy, is one of a seemingly untraditional lineage, through which Hoyer 
entrusted her work and estate to her assistant, who in turn entrusted them to 
Nachbar. This is comparable to the notion of legacy that I explained in the 
introduction to this chapter. However, the crucial difference in Hoyer’s case, 
which links it to my discussions of bodily archives and bodily transmission 
earlier in this chapter, is that the work was passed onto Nachbar for him to 
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perform. Performance legacies cannot be contained in books, photographs 
or videos, much like Derrida’s fleshy, visceral, embodied specters (which I 
discussed earlier) they need a body, life, breath, flesh. They need to be 
performed. And this is the  kind of legacy that Luley and Nachbar were trying 
to create.  
However, owing to the embodied nature of the legacy, each re-
performance, each incarnation of the work is shifted, altered and 
transformed as Nachabar performs Hoyer’s works differently to the way in 
which she performed them. Therefore, performative legacies such as these 
pass authorship as well as the performances themselves. Nachbar’s works 
are not solely his, they are re-performances of Hoyer’s works. However, 
owing to the transformation the works undergo when performed by Nachbar 
they can no longer be considered solely Hoyer’s either. Thus, I claim that in 
order to understand the process of passing on a legacy of performance from 
one artist to another we should understand that they are acts of co-
authorship, of works devised and created by artists who are in dialogue with 
one another. I contend that re-performances enable performance to find a 
way to survive death, to continue living in a bodily archive that allows it to 
outlive the initial artist, albeit in a transformed way. As outlined above, 
following the example of Hoyer and Nachbar’s work, re-performances, can 
never be exactly the same as the initial performance.  
                                 
            
 
Figure 15: Martin Nachbar 
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Figures 15 and 16: Martin Nachbar Affects/Rework (2000) 
As figures 15 and 16 demonstrate, Nachbar is not Hoyer, his body is not 
hers, he can never perform the actions in an identical way to her. In the 
same way as I discussed in chapter two in relation to Athey and Tolentino’s 
re-performance of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic. As such, Nachbar’s re-
performances differ from Hoyer’s, his body transforms her actions in order to 
allow them to live on through him. Even in cases such as Abramović’s 
Seven Easy Pieces (which I discussed earlier in the chapter) in which the 
artist performing the works is the same in both the initial and re-performance 
the context of the performances are different and thus, the re-performance is 
still altered, still transformed in order to be performed again, in order to 
survive. Thus, rather than simply archiving a performance re-performance 
creates something new, transforming the initial performance as it creates its 
legacy. 
 The element of transformation evident in re-performance is one of the 
reasons that re-performance helps us to prepare for loss. As Butler states in 
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Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence ‘mourning has to do 
with agreeing to undergo a transformation’ (2004: 21). Butler’s statement 
refers to the transformative effect the loss of a loved one can have and this 
is something that I examine in connection with re-performance’s relationship 
with death. Drawing upon Critchely’s text The Book of Dead Philosophers I 
argue that it is not our own deaths that we fear the most, but, as Critchley 
states, ‘it is the deaths of those we are bound to in love that undo us, that 
unstitch our carefully tailored suit of the self, that unmake whatever meaning 
we have made’ (2011: 2). I assert that in witnessing the transformation and 
survival of these performances we learn how to survive those deaths which 
threaten to destroy us, those of the ones we love the most. Thus, the act of 
re-performance is not just one of legacy, of leaving something of ourselves 
and our performances behind, it is also one of survival, both the survival of 
performances and our own survival. Survival, is inextricably linked to legacy. 
We are not and cannot be immortal, death is one of very few inevitabilities 
and is something that we must all face. I assert that survival is not about 
cheating or avoiding death, it is about preventing death from becoming the 
total disappearance and annihilation that I examined in my earlier discussion 
of Critchley’s text. In order to do this, we must leave something of ourselves 
behind, our legacy. This, as I have already argued, can be done through re-
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Death, Loss and Legacy 
I also contend that it is possible for  individual performance works to serve 
as legacies and analyse this through Jill Hocking’s Cabbage Leaf Blanket 
performance 2002. Although not directly a re-performance I have positioned 
Cabbage Leaf Blanket in relation to re-performance because it shares re-
performance’s concern with legacy. Through my analysis I question the 
possibilities of performing the process of dying and creating a legacy in a 
single performance work. Hocking was only 24 years old when she died 
from Cystic Fibrosis in 2004 and her Cabbage Leaf Blanket performance 
can be read as a way for her to engage with her illness and the death that 
she knew would follow. 
 
Figure 17: Jill Hocking Cabbage Leaf Blanket (2002) 
 As can be seen in figure 17, in VHocking sewed together ‘a quilt out of 
cabbage leaves and it was displayed on a bed complete with Jill sleeping in 
it’ (2002: 1). According to her godmother Jeane, for Jill, ‘the rotting leaves 
represented her lungs’ (2002: 1). The image of Hocking lying under the 
blanket of cabbage leaves is one of slow decay, the leaves gradually rot, 
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mirroring the way in which her lungs gradually fail as sufferers from Cystic 
Fibrosis slowly loose lung function. This is in contrast to O’Brien’s 
performances, such as Mucus Factory, because the rotting cabbage leaves 
Hocking uses represent her lungs deteriorating the mucus that O’Brien uses 
is an actual symptom of his illness. However, both Cabbage Leaf Blanket 
and Mucus Factory performances serve as a way for Hocking and O’Brien to 
understand their illness, but in Hocking’s case it also serves as her legacy. 
The work has been written about not only on Hocking’s memorial website 
but also in a variety of journals and newspapers. The images of Hocking 
underneath the cabbage leaf blanket exist on several websites and journal 
articles, allowing me to witness something of Hocking’s act twelve years 
after her death. This may be a very different kind of legacy to the one that I 
discussed earlier with Hoyer and Nachbar but I argue that it is a legacy 
nonetheless. Something of Hocking has remained, she has not disappeared 
entirely, she has not been annihilated. Her actions can still be glimpsed, her 
life and work remembered and therefore, in some way she has survived. 
Hocking created an enduring legacy through her exploration of illness, dying 
and death within her performance. By making her illness visible and 
highlighting the fragility of her body Hocking caused audience members to 
re-consider their relationships with death.  
 A similar argument can be made for Henderson’s performance Taking it 
to the Grave which he performed in October 2016, shortly before his death 
from cancer. In the performance, which I will discuss in more detail in the 
next chapter, Henderson charged people to ‘literally take … [their] secrets to 
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the grave’ (Martin 2016: 1). In the performance Henderson, who lay on a 
bed under a canopy wearing white trousers and a frilly collar, asked people 
to tell him their secrets, he then had a symbolic representation of their secret 
tattooed on his body. The idea behind the performance was that ‘if Andrew 
tattooed other people’s secrets on his body, then by his death, he would fulfil 
the promises he made’ (2016: 1). Henderson is quoted in Martin’s article as 
saying ‘if someone dies, you have to get them to the funeral home right 
away. It’s this whole system of remove, remove, remove. Get the death out 
of the way. Let’s make it easy for you’ (2016: 1). What is striking to me is the 
contrast between the ‘system of remove, remove, remove’ (2016: 1) that 
Henderson describes and his and Hocking’s performances in which we 
witness the deterioration, the illness, the process of dying. Whilst neither 
Hocking or Henderson were visibly deteriorating during the performances, 
anyone who witnessed them in the knowledge of their illnesses could easily 
identify the parallels: the rotting cabbage leaves as a metaphor for Hocking’s 
failing lungs and the entire concept of Taking it to the Grave, which was 
premised on the fact that Henderson was dying and would take participants’ 
secrets to his grave with him. The identification of parallels forced a 
confrontation with death that we generally avoid. 
  Critchley would argue that we avoid this confrontation because of our 
fear of death and I would have to agree, particularly when the deaths in 
question are not our own but those of friends, or family members, those who 
we cannot imagine living without. As previously discussed, it is Critchley’s 
assertion that these are deaths which terrify us the most and perhaps this 
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terror is born out of confusion, our inability to understand how we can 
survive these deaths. How can we continue to live when someone with 
whom our lives have been so inextricably intertwined with has died? I 
conclude that works such as Hocking’s and Henderson’s enable us to face 
those deaths with a little more confidence by allowing us to rehearse 
witnessing an other dying and our own survival. As previously highlighted, 
Phelan has argued that ‘it may well be that theatre and performance 
respond to a psychic need to rehearse for loss, and especially for death. 
Billed as rehearsal, performance and theatre have a special relation to art as 
memorial’ (1998: 3), and performances, such as those analysed in this 
section, respond to the psychic need Phelan discusses. This is not only 
because they enable us to rehearse the act of loss, of witnessing the other 
dying and us surviving that death but also because they help us to 
understand that death does not equal annihilation. Therefore, each of the 
artists that I have analysed in this chapter created a legacy, a different kind 
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Chapter Six - Mourning and Memorial 
 
Monuments and Sculptures/Art and Memorial 
The relationship between art and memorial has always been a close one, as 
highlighted in Peggy Phelan’s statement, in her 1997 text Mourning Sex: 
it has always struck me as odd that cultural monuments to the 
dead, public attempts to acknowledge grief, usually take the form 
of sculpture. It would seem more sensible to use temporal forms - 
such as film and music - to commemorate those who are no 
longer with us. Sculptural monuments tend to re-member the dead 
by turning the work of mourning into an object that stands in for 
the long process of working through. Temporal art forms such as 
music and cinema are able to perform the working through of 
mourning in the work itself. (1997: 170) 
 
 Phelan goes on to assert that ‘Public sculptures in their very solidity and 
monumentality suggest the weight and scope of mourning. However, they 
sometimes also suggest that grief is there like a clear knife piercing the heart, 
cleaving us in two. The work of mourning is never clear, never complete, never 
solid’ (1997: 171). In this chapter, I argue, that Phelan’s comments about the 
work of mourning can be pertinently applied to the work of re-performance. This 
chapter examines the future lives created by re-performance arguing that 
through re-performance a performance is never over, never finished but 
constantly shifting, being reworked, re-shaped, re-developed, re-thought, re-
performed. This sense of working through, of mourning and grief being messy 
processes that require hard labour, can be seen more clearly in less traditional 
monuments, just as the live, physical and visceral nature of performance can be 
captured more easily through re-performance than it can through more 
traditional forms of documentation. This, of course, does not suggest in any way 
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that traditional monuments, just like the traditional archive, do not have their 
place, their importance, but that they could work together with the less 
traditional forms of memorialising and documenting in order to provide us with a 
fuller insight into the initial performance or the lost other. And that these insights 
may provide fruitful ways of memorialising and remembering those we have 
lost. 
 Monuments, sculptures and gravestones have all been used in order to 
represent and memorialise those that we have lost; solid, hardwearing objects 
that have a certain gravitas, grounding us in a place and a time. This can be 
seen in activist Cleve Jones’ comment about the AIDS Quilt. The AIDS Quilt 
was begun in 1985 when ‘marchers wrote the names of friends and lovers who 
had died of AIDS on placards and carried them in a candlelight parade. They 
[the placards] were stuck with tape on the San Francisco Federal Building’ (in 
Laqueur 2015: 428). This was the starting point for the quilt as it was the first 
time that the names of the AIDS dead had been placed on the federal building. 
However, the quilt in its current form did not begin to take shape until 1987 
when ‘Cleve Jones, a San Francisco activist, spray-painted the name of his best 
friend, Marvin Feldman, who had died of AIDS, on a quiltlike memorial panel’ 
(Laqueur 2015: 428). Others followed suit and ‘by 11 October… 1,920 panels’ 
contained the names of those who had died of AIDS (Laqueur 2015: 429). 
Jones, quoted in Laqueur’s text, The Work of the Dead, states that ‘I think 
people need something tangible, physical to touch, to look at’ (2015: 429). I 
contend that we memorialise life in such solid objects because they give us a 
sense of permanence and with this permanence comes remembrance and the 
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belief that the dead are gone but not forgotten. It is a reminder that they were 
once there, that they lived, existed and left their mark on the world. This 
argument is also evident in Laqueur’s discussion of the importance of the 
names of the dead being inscribed on monuments. Laqueur states that ‘the 
ubiquitous monument and its names represent many, many different memorial 
purposes: but in general, like the bodies of the dead, they make a claim on 
public space and attention’ (2015: 422). He goes on to say that ‘sometimes only 
by inference, sometimes in poignantly explicit ways, these names [inscribed on 
monuments] replace absent bodies’ (2015: 422). What Laqueur makes clear is 
that monuments help us to remember and to mourn the dead by simultaneously 
reminding us that they are dead and enabling us to interact with them.  
 
In his analysis of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington Laqueur notes that 
visitors to the monument leave offerings; notes, photographs or flowers, such as 
the one in figure 16 above. In doing so, these visitors ‘act as if they were in the 
presence of the dead body or, more precisely, in the presence of the dead’ 
(2015: 428). This, in turn, facilitates the process of mourning because it makes 
visible a representation of the echoes and traces of those that we have lost. We 
‘need something tangible’ to hold onto as a record, a remnant of a life so that 
Figure 18: Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial 
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we have somewhere to remember and to grieve (Laqueur 2015: 429). Building 
upon Laqueur’s argument, I assert, that the desire to memorialise is the same 
as the desire that drives us towards archival documentation. I claim that we 
value the archive, with its photographs and video footage, because we view it 
as a marker of existence; just as the person named on the tombstone must 
have lived once, the performance documented in the video footage must have 
taken place.  
 Throughout this chapter I will analyse the concept of performance, 
connected with re-performance, as memorial and position this in the context of 
the relationship between performance and documentation. The examination of 
performance documentation is based on examples of documentation which 
destabilise the notion of documentation as evidence of an event that actually 
happened or a life that was actually lived. To support this argument I analyse 
instances of fake or false documentation such as Anne Bean’s 2012 The 
Dubinski Project, Lynne Hershman Leeson’s 1974 performance of Roberta 
Breitmore, Aliza Shvartz’ 2008 untitled project and Valie Export’s 1969 
photographs Action Pants: Genital Panic. These examples also allow for the 
exploration of notions of multiplicity, in both life and performance, which I link 
back to this chapter’s focus on memorial. By drawing parallels between the 
interrelation of performance and documentation and that between traditional 
and performative monuments, this chapter aims to present the argument for an 
understanding of these relations not as dichotomous opposites, but as 
interrelated concepts. In order to support this argument I examine a range of 
memorials including: Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial (1982), The Aids 
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Quilt (1987), Chris Burden’s The Other Vietnam Memorial (1991), and contrast 
them with memorial performances such as Hannah Wilke’s Intra-Venus Tapes 
(2007), Andrew Henderson’s Taking it to the Grave (2016), Briar Bates’ Ankle 
Deep: A Water Ballet (2017) and Carolee Schneeman’s Mortal Coils (1994-5). 
 
Memorial, Multiplicity and Rebirth 
As I mentioned above, not all archival footage records the life of an actual 
person or a performance that actually took place and it is useful to examine 
these types of performance in relation to memorial because a memorial can be 
viewed as documentation. It records the facts of someone’s life and their death 
but the artists whose work I am going to examine in this chapter create 
documentation of lives that were never actually lived. Thus, I contend that they 
disrupt the notion of archival evidence through their creation of a second life in 
order to embody a persona and create a person who never really existed. Using 
examples of the work of artists Aliza Shvarts, Anne Bean, and Lynne Hershman 
Leeson, I will examine the ways in which fake or false documentation can be 
created and the impact that this has upon on our relationship with and 
understanding of the concept of archival documentation. Although Shvarts’ work 
is different from Bean and Hershman Leeson’s I have chosen to place it 
alongside them, in this section of the chapter because, like Bean and Hershman 
Leeson, Shvartz engages with ideas of death, re-birth and multiplicity. 
 In 2008, then a student at Yale University, Shvarts: 
repeatedly, over the course of the previous year, Shvarts 
inseminated herself, using a needleless syringe containing donor 
sperm…At the end of each of her 28-day cycles, she dosed 
herself with an abortifacient, thus inducing miscarriages (if she 
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had in fact conceived) or menstruation (if she had not). She kept a 
video blog of these monthly procedures, and she collected 
specimens of the resulting products - blood, tissue and zygotes, if 
any - for frozen storage of and later use. (Roach 2011: 277) 
 
 I position Shvarts’ work in relation to re-performance, not just because of 
Shvartz’ repeated acts of self-insemination and induced abortion, but also 
because the performance engages with issues of life, death, legacy and 
multiplicity which are central concerns of re-performance. Shavrtz’ performance 
sparked outrage from some who described her as ‘“a serial killer,” and “… a 
Monster”’ because of the fact that she may have been inducing miscarriages 
(Roach 2011: 276). Of course, Shvarts may never have actually conceived and 
all of the specimens collected during the project may have been menstrual 
blood. The ambiguity, according to Shvarts, is ‘the most poignant aspect… 
Because the miscarriages coincide with the expected date of menstruation… it 
remains ambiguous whether there was ever a fertilized ovum or not’ (in Roach 
2011: 281). What the ambiguity and outrage caused by Shvarts’ proposed 
installation highlights are the ethics surrounding life and death, specifically the 
ability of the woman to give life and the potential for her take away that life. This 
is most clearly examined in the case of Shvarts but is also evidenced in the 
other case studies examined in this section of the chapter. There are many 
ethical and religious arguments surrounding the issue of abortion which 
Shvartz’ work explores because she deliberately inseminates herself and then 
induces abortion. This argument, however, is complicated by the fact that it is 
unclear as to whether Shvartz ever actually conceived and therefore, whether 
she was actually inducing abortion or not. 
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 Shvarts’ work, according to Roach, ‘posed a question about where the 
limits were located’ (2011: 282). One can consider multiple limits in relation to 
Shvarts’ work: the limits of her body, as she opens it up to the other by 
potentially allowing another body to begin to grow inside her own; the limits of 
freedom, the freedom for women to choose whether or not to become mothers, 
the right of women to an abortion; the freedom of an artist to explore and 
challenge these limits, especially within the context of the university. Shvarts’ 
performance tested these limits and as a result was never completed. The 
installation never took place as ‘the Deans pulled the plug on her show’ (Roach 
2011: 282). The limits that this research is most interested in are the limits of 
Shvarts’ body; her ability to take control of her own body and its reproductive 
capabilities, by artificially inseminating herself with donor sperm and the 
inducing abortion. In doing this Shvarts positions the female body as capable of 
autonomously creating and controlling reproduction. She inseminated herself, 
thus taking control of the time, place and method of conception and then dosed 
herself with an abortifacient, therefore taking control of the time, place and 
method by which, any pregnancy would be terminated. It is this element of 
control over reproduction and the concept of giving life that links Shvarts’ work 
with that of Bean and Hershman Leeson. Although Bean and Hershman Leeson 
“created life” in a very different and non-biological sense, their work can still be 
viewed as a  form of both reproduction and re-performance, as both Bean and 
Hershman Leeson reproduced themselves through their performances. Their 
reproduction, like Shvartz’, took place without a male entity, and as such they 
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also explore the notion of the female ability to reproduce  and re-perform 
themselves autonomously. 
 In 2012 Artist Anne Bean ‘took on a different name, Chana Dubinski… 
[and] settled in a town  [Castlegate, Newark] where nobody knew me’ (2015: 
57). Dubinski became her own person with her own history. As Bean has stated 
‘I simply told acquaintances I was making a fresh start and that I had previously 
taught art,’ (2015: 7). Dubinski was not legally a person; she was an art work 
created by Bean and their lives were intertwined. This, in many ways, is similar 
to the creation of Roberta Breitmore by Lynn Hershman Leeson in 1974. 
Hershman Leeson lived as Breitmore, renting an apartment, opening a bank 
account and seeing a therapist as Breitmore, amongst other things. I assert that 
these performances differ from an actor playing a character because the people 
that Dubinski and Breitmore interacted with believed them to be actual people 
and were unaware that they were participating in Bean or Hershman Leeson’s 
performance. Additionally, the ways in which Bean and Dubinski’s and 
Herhsman Leeson and Breitmore’s lives were connected meant that Dubinski 
and Breitmore were more than just characters, they were part of Bean and 
Hershman Leeson respectively. Focusing on Dubinski first and then Breitmore, I 
will analyse the ways in which these performances were a doubling, multiplying 
or re-birthing of the artist, who had autonomous control over her reproduction. 
Thus, in each case what was created was an example of Schechner’s notion of 
Me, Not Me and Not Not Me (a concept that I discussed in chapter four). 
 In an interview, with Dominic Johnson, about the Chana Dubinski project 
Bean commented that ‘I introduced myself as Chana Dubinski, a name that 
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relates to my childhood, in terms of having known it then as the likely Hebrew-
Russian origin for the very plain name Anne Bean’ (2015: 57). The fact that 
Bean chose a name which was a translation of her own name is suggestive of 
the complex ways in which Dubinski and Bean were intertwined. In a sense 
Bean was re-performing herself as Dubisnki. She used elements of her life, 
from the origins of her name to the vague reference to her background in Fine 
Art, in order to create a second self, Chana Dubinski. Dubinski, is an imagining 
of who Bean could have become, the life she may have lived and, as such, she 
can be viewed as a re-performance. Dubinski can be perceived as something, 
or, in Dubinski’s case someone, who is not the initial performance (or person) 
but who provides us with new insights into the initial person (or performance) 
and is made up of the echoes and traces of that life (or performance). Despite 
this fact, Dubinski was in many ways her own person. As Bean explains ‘I won a 
national writing competition [the Mabel Marbour Prize for Creative Writing 2012] 
as Chana Dubinski’ (2015: 57). The fact that Dubinski could win a national 
writing competition implied that she had agency, that she was separate from 
Bean. However, Bean adds that she won the competition ‘with a true story 
about my childhood,’ thus implying that although people knew Dubinski as a 
person in her own right, Dubinski’s history was also Bean’s history. They shared 
a history, a body, and, in many senses, a life. Therefore, in relation to 
Schechner’s concept of Me, Not Me and Not Not Me, Dubisnki was not Bean 
but she was also Not Not Bean. 
 The same can be said of Lynne Hershman Leeson’s creation of Roberta 
Breitmore, a project which shares many similarities with Bean’s creation of 
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Chana Dubinski. Like Dubinski, Breitmore lived a separate life from Hershman 
Leeson, but Hershman Leeson arguably went further than Bean, as Breitmore 
‘undertook real-life activities such as opening a bank account, obtaining credit 
cards,’ (Maloney 2011: 1). These acts suggest that Breitmore was more 
independent than Dubinski but even so Hershman Lesson has stated that 
‘although I denied it at the time and insisted that she was 'her own woman' with 
defined needs, ambitions and instincts, in retrospect we were linked. ROBERTA 
represented part of me as surely as we all have within us an underside… To 
me, she was my own flipped effigy; my physical reverse, my psychological 
fears’ (Maloney 2011: 1). Thus, Breitmore was as intrinsically linked to 
Hershman Leeson as Dubinski was to Bean.  
 Therefore, when, in 1978, Hershman Lesson had Breitmore exorcised, 
she not only ended or killed off the re-performance, she lost part of herself as 
well. This can be compared with Shvartz work, which I discussed earlier in this 
section, because Shvartz also lost part of herself each time she took an 
abortifacient. Any pregnancies that she terminated were a part of her, just as 
any menstrual blood was. This can also be viewed in relation to Martin O’Brien’s 
production of mucus in his performances, which I discussed in chapter two. The 
mucus was part of O’Brien, the blood was part of Shvartz and Breitmore was 
part of Hershman Leeson. As Roberta Mock has stated, Breitmore ‘was 
eventually ritually killed by Hershman in order to close and transform a 
manufactured life which was perceived to be parasitically infecting that of the 
artist’ (2012: 2). What Mock’s statement makes clear is that Breitmore and 
Hershman Lesson did not exist separately, Breitmore needed Hershman 
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Leeson in order to exist and Hershman Lesson needed to kill Breitmore in order 
to free herself and live independently of Breitmore. This can be viewed in 
relation to my discussion of abjection in chapter two because, I argue that what 
Breitmore represented was the loss of Hershman Leeson’s ‘own and clean self’ 
(1980: 62), as Breitmore encroached upon Hershman Lesson’s life and body. 
This notion of Breitmore and Hershman Lesson as being part of one another is 
also highlighted by Mock when she asserts that ‘by exorcising her dark, 
shadowy “flipped effigy,” Hershman hoped at the time to encourage her ‘own 
individuation’ (2012: 2). Implicit in this statement is the notion of multiplicity, the 
existence of Breitmore multiplied Hershman Leeson’s own existence, Breitmore 
was more than a ‘fictitious character’ she was another version of Hershman 
Leeson and in order for Hershman Leeson to free herself from the multiplicities 
involved in living two lives, as different incarnations of herself, Hershman 
Leeson had to get rid of Breitmore (2012: 1). The fact that she chose to 
complete this process in a crypt and describe the activity as an exorcism further 
highlights the multiplicitous nature of the relationship between Hershman 
Leeson and Breitmore. Ending the re-performance and deciding to no longer 
live any part of her life as Breitmore was like exorcising a demon or a ghost, a 
part of herself from which she wished to be free. In this sense, Hershman 
Leeson can arguably be described as being haunted by Breitmore but in a way 
that is the reverse of the haunting that took place with Sheree Rose and Bob 
Flanagan, which I discussed in chapter two, because Hershman Leeson wishes 
to be free of the specter that she is haunted by. In contrast, Rose actively 
pursues Flanagan’s specter, seeking to make it visible in the work she creates 
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with Martin O’Brien. This fits with Mock’s narrative of Breitmore as a parasite 
and emphasises the concept of Breitmore as part of Hershman Leeson by 
suggesting that separation from Hershman Lesson would result in death for 
Breitmore but life for Hershman Leeson. In Specters of Marx Derrida suggests 
that we live in a world full of specters, and as I have explained elsewhere in the 
thesis, in choosing the word specter over ghost or spirit, Derrida underscores 
the physical nature of the specter, which he describes as ‘a paradoxical 
incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the 
spirit’ (1994: 6). Taking Derrida’s concept of the specter and applying it to 
Hershman Leeson’s performance of Breitmore I contend that Breitmore is a 
specter, that she needs a body in order to survive and that the exorcism acted 
as a separation between Breitmore and Hershman Leeson which forced 
Breitmore out of a physical, carnal existence and back into the realm of the 
formless ghost or spirit. This remained the case even when Hershman Lesson 
resurrected Breitmore via the online platform of Second Life. This is something 
that I will discuss in more detail later on in the chapter but here it is important to 
note that even in her resurrection Breitmore remained formless, without a body, 
because she was confined to a virtual world.  
 Prior to the exorcism ‘three other women known as ‘Roberta Multiples’ 
were performing (as) Roberta’ (2012: 2). This further multiplies the multiplicities 
created by Breitmore’s existence, as both Breitmore and Hershman Leeson, 
who I have already argued was multiplied by her creation of Breitmore, were 
multiplied in each of the ‘Roberta Multiples’.  
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Figure 19: Roberta Breitmore 
 
 
The sense of multiplication is clear in figure 19 in which we see several Roberta 
Breitmore’s looking at an image of Roberta Breitmore. This could be viewed as 
Hershman Leeson’s first attempt to rid herself of Breitmore, by passing her on 
to the three other women. Thus, this further reproduced both Hershman Lesson 
and Breitmore without the involvement of a male-identifying body. However,  the 
fact that Hershman Leeson then went on to have Breitmore exorcised suggests 
that this attempt was unsuccessful. As Kristine Stiles, one of the ‘Roberta 
Multiples’, has asserted ‘once Hershman projected Roberta’s character onto 
me, she released her authority over her artwork and simultaneously 
reestablished it, thus began the immediate process of multiplying “Roberta 
Breitmores” into multiple multiples, mapping her double onto any number of 
willing female subjects, a multiplication that became potentially endless” (Stiles 
quoted in Mock 2012: 2). What Stiles’ comment emphasises is the potential for 
Breitmore to continue without Hershman Leeson’s physical presence. Much like 
my previous examples of re-performances which have been performed by 
another artist, Breitmore was no longer reliant on Hershman Leeson’s body for 
her existence.  In chapter two I discussed the notion of bodily transmission, of 
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performances being passed on from one body or artist to another and I argue 
that this is what Herhsman Leeson was doing when she created the ‘Roberta 
Multiples’. Breitmore ceased to be embodied solely by Hershman Leeson and 
was entrusted to the other women who performed her. This act, which can 
arguably be viewed as a democratic sharing of life, enabled the possibility of 
many more Breitmores in the future.  
 The crucial difference between this example of bodily transmission and 
those that I have discussed earlier is that Breitmore was simultaneously passed 
onto more than one person and at the same time she continued to be 
performed by Hershman Lesson herself. In the earlier examples, such as, Ron 
Athey and Julie Tolentino’s re-performance of Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic the 
performance was passed from one performer to another. Athey performed the 
piece with Tolentino watching and then Tolentino re-performed it. During 
Tolentino’s performance Athey performed alongside her, in a similar way to that 
in which Hershman Lesson continued to perform as Roberta Breitmore. 
However, Athey passed Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic onto Tolentino alone, thus, 
entrusting Tolentino and only Tolentino with archiving his work. In contrast, in 
Hershman Leeson’s case she simultaneously passed Breitmore on to three 
women, thus creating not only a bodily transmission in which the Breitmore was 
passed on from her body to the bodies of others but also one in which the 
performance (Breitmore) was multiplied. 
  This is a key example of how re-performance disrupts the relationship 
between performance and ephemerality. Breitmore did not cease to exist once 
Hershman Leeson stopped performing as her and she could potentially have 
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continued existing long after the three women that  Hershman Leeson passed 
her onto stopped performing as her, because she could have continued to be 
passed onto, embodied and performed by other women. In passing Breitmore 
on to anyone, Hershman Leeson released the potential for her to be continually 
passed on and, hence, for there to be an infinite number of Breitmores who 
could exist long into the future. This, therefore, presents the possibility that, 
contrary to Phelan’s assertion, which I discussed earlier in the thesis, that 
performance disappears as it is being performed, Breitmore could have 
continued forever, being embodied by an endless stream of artists. This links to 
Phelan’s later argument in her book Mourning Sex that the dead ‘fall away from 
us piece by piece’ (1997: 41). With each multiplication of Breitmore a piece of 
her fell away. She was changed in some way by being embodied by a different 
person. It is this process of repetition, multiplication and change which, I argue, 
creates a relationship between the processes of re-performance and mourning. 
Central to this is the fact that no matter who Breitmore was being embodied by 
and how she changed throughout this process her personality, history and 
psychology remained the same. In this way Breitmore’s existence was still 
entangled with Hershman Leeson’s and the only way for Hershman Leeson to 
fully disengage from Breitmore was to kill her or have her exorcised. The ability 
for Breitmore to be passed on from artist to artist and Hershman Lesson’s 
attempt to free herself from Breitmore through the exorcism are also, I contend, 
linked to notions of memorial. Breitmore is passed on, like a valuable 
possession, entrusted to another, so that Breitmore may serve as a means of 
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remembering both Breitmore herself and Hershman-Leeson. 8 The exorcism, 
which, I assert, can also be seen as both a performance of death and as a 
performative memorial, an issue which I will address later in the chapter. 
 The exorcism, therefore, functioned as a form of funeral for Breitmore 
and the fact that it took place in a crypt adds to this reading of the action. 
However, it can be argued that Breitmore could not have a funeral as she never 
lived. Whilst this argument depends on your interpretation of the term ‘lived’, 
here I employ the term in a social and cultural sense to argue that although 
Breitmore undertook many acts which can be considered to denote an 
engagement with lived experience and the fact that she opened a bank account 
and rented an apartment mean that there was official documentation of 
Breitmore’s life. These documents could be viewed as false because Breitmore 
was essentially Hershman Leeson’s creation. The terms fake and false here 
refer to documents which appear to record an event that never actually took 
place or the life of a person who never actually existed. Of course all 
performances and resulting documentation, such as photographs and video 
footage, can be viewed as the creation of the artist or the viewer’s, but in terms 
of their existence as documents in everyday life they can be described as fake 
or false because the life which they document and of which they can, therefore 
be seen as proof, did not actually exist. Breitmore’s life was a performance and 
                                                 
8 This is much like Iain Forsyth and Jane Pollard’s 1998 resurrection of David 
Bowie’s alter ego, Ziggy Stardust in a live art performance. Stardust was 
created by Bowie and then killed off by him during a concert. Forsyth and 
Pollard’s resurrection of him could be seen in contrast to Breitmore because 
Stardust, was resurrected by other performers following his performed death by 
Bowie. 
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although one may argue, as Richard Schechner has, that all life can be viewed 
as a performance. Schechner asserts that ‘any event, action, or behaviour may 
be examined “as” performance’ (2013: 48). I assert that Breitmore’s existence 
as a multiple of Hershman Leeson prevented her from being a person in her 
own right9  and as such renders the documentation of her existence as an 
independent person, fake. This raises the question what if the lives that we 
memorialise and the objects contained within the archive were unreliable? What 
if they complicate notions of life and truth, just as each of the performances that 
I have addressed in this section did? 
 
False Documentation 
This was the case, for example, with Valie Export’s 1968 performance of Action 
Pants. Export performed this piece 'in Munich in an art cinema where 
experimental film-makers were showing their work. Wearing trousers from 
which a triangle had been removed at the crotch, the artist walked between the 
rows of seated viewers, her exposed genitalia at face-level’ (Manchester, 2007: 
1). The title of the piece draws attention to the way in which Export’s exposed 
genitalia was used to provoke shock and fear in audience members who may 
have viewed her actions as threatening or aggressive, particularly when 
confronted with them at face level and in close proximity. This can also be 
linked to a psychoanalytic fear of castration as audience members encountered 
                                                 
9  This was also the case in Nando Messias’ creation of Sissy, a persona that  
he performed as and killed off in ‘a theatricalised funeral’ (2018: 3). Sissy was 
created, embodied and then killed off by Messias in a similar way that Breitmore 
was by Hershman Lesson. 
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Export’s perceived feminine lack when faced with her exposed genitalia. This 
fits with Export’s own writings on her work where she describes her style of 
performance as ‘a kind of “feminist” Aktionism, using the body… as a code or a 
sign’ (1991: 189). Therefore, in Action Pants Export’s exposed female genitalia 
can be seen as a sign of her perceived feminine lack and the threat of 
castration. This threat of castration can also be seen in a less physical sense in 
the works of Shvartz, Bean and Hershman Lesson. In Shvartz, Bean and 
Hershman Lesson’s cases the threat of castration is created by the female 
ability to reproduce, to multiply, to create life without the input of a male- 
identifying body whereas Export confronted her viewers with a physical symbol 
of castration. 
 Export later produced a series of posters to commemorate the piece 
entitled Action Pants: Genital Panic. However, the posters ‘show EXPORT 
sitting on a bench against a wall out of doors wearing crotchless trousers and a 
leather shirt and holding a machine-gun. Her feet are bare and vulnerable, as 
are her genitals, and she holds the gun at chest level, apparently in readiness 
to turn it on the viewer towards whom her gaze is directed’ (Manchester, 2007: 
1). These images present the piece in a more aggressive light due to the 
addition of the gun, which adds further connotations of death and transgressive 
female behaviour. These ideas link Export’s work with that of Shvartz 
(discussed earlier in this chapter) and Rose (discussed in chapter two) because 
each of these artists create work which engages with the female body 
performing aggressive actions. However, despite the differences between the 
performance and the images the images can clearly be linked back to the 
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performance in Munich and the threat of castration which is suggested by 
Export’s exposed female genitalia. The posters are arguably the image most 
associated with the performance, but they are not actually a representation of 
what happened. As Windrich has noted in Performative Monuments, ‘these 
images [of Export] have acquired historical significance, even if they cannot be 
regarded as documentary proof of the performance’ (2015: 28). As such, they 
don’t fit with traditional notions of the archive but they do memorialise the 
performance. As such, they also serve as a form of re-performance because re-
performance is a means of memorialising performance and the photographs 
memorialise Export’s performance. 
 The photographs might not document the actual event, they cannot claim 
to show the exact events that took place in the Munich cinema, but this does 
not prevent them from being valuable. Windrich asserts that ‘even though 
performance photographs are not always the mechanical reproduction of a first 
version of a performance, they do almost always refer to it’ (2014: 28; emphasis 
in original). Thus, I assert that the photographs of Export denote the actual 
event that took place in the Munich cinema and provide anyone who looks at 
them with an insight into the event, in much the same way that a re-
performance does not re-create the initial performance but still provides us with 
an insight into it. It is worth considering however that in Export’s case there is a 
tension between the performance and photographs and this tension is 
enhanced by the fact that in many cases the photographs are treated as 
documenting the actual performance event in Munich. This may not have been 
Export’s intention when creating the photographs but this does appear to be 
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how they have been treated by many who have sought to engage with the 
piece. For example, when artist Marina Abramović re-performed Action Pants: 
Genital Panic as part of her 2005 performance project Seven Easy Pieces 
Abramović chose to re-perform the photographs rather than the initial 
performance in the cinema. In her description of Abramović’s performance 
Watanabe states that: 
When you enter the museum, Abramovic, wearing a leather jacket 
and black jeans and holding a machine gun, is sitting on the chair 
at the center of the stage, and stares at the spectators. The 
athletic Abramovic carrying a machine gun gives off a powerful 
impression, but a part of a crotch of the black jeans which she 
wears is completely removed. Her pubic hair and sexual organs 
were visible. The eyes of the audiences were naturally drawn to 
her crotch. (2005: 3) 
 
 Abramović’s decision to include the images in a project which has been 
described by the Guggenheim museum, that involved her re-performing 
‘seminal performance works by her peers’ (2005: 1), supports my reading of the 
images as being able to provide an insight into the piece and the issues that 
Export’s initial performance explored. This is the case despite the fact that the 
act depicted in the image never happened and that what actually took place 
was a different act. Yet, in this sense, they can be viewed as fake or false, in 
much the same way as the literary prize awarded to Dubinski or the statements 
from Breitmore’s bank account. Export never entered a Munich cinema with a 
gun, just as Dubinski and Breitmore were never actual people, but the 
documentation cited above suggests that they did and that they were. 
 I wonder what would happen if we began to create false documents and 
fake memorials. If, as I argued earlier, we are drawn towards these objects 
because they provide solid, hardwearing, undeniable proof that the person or 
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the performance existed, what happens when the archive and the memorial 
become unreliable? What if the memorial was as transient and ephemeral as 
the life it memorialised? Phelan states that ‘the work of mourning is never clear, 
never complete, never solid’ (1997: 170). If this is the case perhaps, we should 
create memorials which are equally, unclear, incomplete and fragile. How might 
this force us into re-thinking the dichotomy of life and death, the notion that 
once someone dies, they cease to exist, they stop having a presence, an 
agency? And how it might provoke us to rethink the dichotomy between 
performance and documentation? Fake documentation and transient memorials 
suggest that documentation and death can be as messy and unstable as 
performance and life and therefore, I argue that they provide opportunities for 
us to develop our understanding of loss and death. The idea that performance 
and documentation are not dichotomous opposites is highlighted by Windrich10 
in her discussion of what she terms ‘the tension between acts and performance 
documents’, as she argues for us to not consider them as dichotomous and 
instead ‘to locate the interest of performance art precisely in its ability to bridge 
bodily presence and its representation?’ (2014: 25,26). This idea is more 
extensively examined by Windrich, as she asserts that ‘An act of 
commemoration does not relive the past but is itself a present fact of public 
conduct. The insistence on real presence and experience is thus radically 
ambiguous, pointing to the past while carrying its political and aesthetic effects 
                                                 
10 This idea has also been examined by others including Diana Taylor in her 
2003 text The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the 
Americas and Philip Auslander in his 2008 book Liveness: Performance in a 
Mediatized Culture. 
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into the future’ (2014: 10). What Windrich foregrounds through his emphasis on 
past and future is the way in which acts of commemoration allow us to 
remember the past and use it to help us shape the future. Also evident in this 
statement is the notion that what Windrich calls ‘performative monuments’ work 
in a similar way to what I term the bodily archive (2014: 10). They 
commemorate an event in a way that highlights the transient and ephemeral 
nature of said event, the performance or the life that they commemorate. 
 
The Interrelation between The Archive and The Bodily Archive: Substituting and 
Doubling 
A trend can be viewed in Performance Art for creating objects which 
simultaneously memorialise a performance and challenge traditional notions of 
the archive. For example, in his 2015 performance, Anatomy of a Bite, artist, 
Martin O’Brien, collected petri-dishes full of mucus and polaroid images of bite 
marks, which were then displayed in a gallery following the performance. Like 
Export’s posters of Action Pants: Genital Panic, O’Brien’s collection of mucus-
filled petri-dishes and blurry polaroid images memorialise the performance but 
do not reproduce it. They could be considered to operate in opposition to the 
archive because of the messy, leaky, unreliable nature through which they 
document the performances, but I assert that in reality they work together with 
the archive to enable a different kind of witnessing. As I have already referred, 
in my discussion of Diana Taylor’s The Archive and The Repertoire in chapter 
three of the thesis, the archive and the repertoire, or bodily archive, are not 
dichotomous opposites, and can work together to create engaging ways of 
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viewing and understanding performances. In these cases, the archival material 
would be the reviews and any photographs of the piece that were not close ups 
of O’Brien’s bites. These objects work together with the petri-dishes of mucus 
and polaroid images of the bite marks to provide anyone viewing the aftermath 
of the performance with an insight into the performance event that took place. 
These traces and leftovers serve a different, but, I contend, equally important 
purpose in terms of documenting the performance.  
 Parallels can be drawn between viewing the leftovers of O’Brien’s 
performance and looking at the photographs of Export. We may not be able to 
understand exactly what happened in an Art House Cinema in Munich in 1968 
from the photographs, just as when looking at the photographs of O’Brien’s bite 
marks, we cannot make out which part of his body was bitten or by whom. What 
we can do however, is understand that Export was interested in challenging 'the 
perceived cliché of women’s historical representation in the cinema as passive 
objects denied agency' (Manchester 2007: 1) and that O’Brien was examining 
the intimate and aggressive nature of the bite as well as the blurring of the 
boundaries between the self and the other that occur in the act of biting 
someone. This is, I contend, the very essence of memorial. The memorial is not 
the lost other, just as the posters are not the performance, but they do provide 
us with a more permanent reminder of the life and existence of the thing which 
they memorialise. They are a stand in, a substitute for that which we have lost. 
In this sense they can be understood as an uncanny doubling of the lost other. 
In his writing on the uncanny Freud asserts that the themes he explores in 
relation to the uncanny ‘are all concerned with the idea of “double”’ (1919: 9). 
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Freud goes on to describe the uncanny as something that happens ‘by 
doubling, dividing and interchanging the self’ (1919: 9). From this point of view, 
the works discussed in this chapter can be perceived as uncanny because they 
produce a doubling of the self, the body or the performance. This is particularly 
the case in the works of Bean and Hershman Leeson in which they multiply 
themselves and in doing so create a “fake” life. Dubinski and Breitmore 
appeared, to the people that they interacted with, as real people. However, they 
were not, because, as I suggested earlier, they could not exist without Bean 
and Hershman-Leesson. The idea of them appearing real can be linked to Kara 
Reilly’s discussion of the automaton in her text, Automata and Mimesis on The 
Stage of Theatre History. Reilly describes the automaton as something which 
‘are often perceived as if they’re alive’ (2011: 1). Reilly links the automata to the 
uncanny through a discussion of ‘anxiety about their proper place in the social 
order’ (2011: 112). Stating that women ‘ grow increasingly unfamiliar and 
uncanny in the late nineteenth-century when they begin to enter the public 
sphere’ (2011: 112). Although Reilly’s discussion is routed in the late 
nineteenth-century it can still be usefully applied to the work of Bean and 
Hershman Leeson, the difference here is that their uncanniness is not the result 
of women entering the public sphere but of women re-performing and doubling 
themselves through the creation of alter-egos, which can be viewed as acting 
like automata’s.  
  The notions of doubling and substitution can also be understood in 
psychoanalytic terms in relation to mourning. As previously outlined, Freud 
asserts that in order to complete the process of mourning one must let go of the 
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lost other and the substitution of the other with someone or something else can 
be perceived as part of that process (1917: 244). The substitute is not the lost 
other but it is something which remains, something which we can hold onto in 
order to ease the pain caused by letting go of the lost other. It is, I contend, a 
step towards adjusting to life without them, accepting their loss. The concept of 
the substitute is also present in Martin O’Brien’s work with artist Sheree Rose, 
in which he could be considered to be operating as a substitute for Rose’s 
partner Bob Flanagan. By creating performances with O’Brien, Rose is arguably 
memorialising her earlier work and relationship with Flanagan. Whilst the 
substituted performances are no more permanent than the earlier work with 
Flanagan, they are potentially more pertinent because they represent the nature 
of Rose and Flanagan’s performances, just as the petri-dishes of mucus 
represent O’Brien’s Cystic Fibrosis and the performances that he creates in 
relation to it. In these cases, the traces of the performance and the visceral, 
ephemeral nature of the re-performances created from them are more able to 
represent a fuller sense of the performer and the performance. Perhaps posters 
that do not really record the performance, messy, blurry photographs, petri-
dishes of mucus and ephemeral performances are a more appropriate way of 
memorialising those whom we have lost, than stone statues and enormous 
monuments. 
 
Performative Monuments: Alternative modes of remembering and memorialising 
As I discussed earlier in the chapter, in traditional monuments the names of the 
dead are inscribed and Laqueur discusses the importance of this act of 
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inscription in his statement that ‘names of the dead, like exhumed bodies, can 
remake history for the present’ (2015: 424). The gravitas and permanence of a 
monument seems to suggest a false longevity. They imply that the lost other will 
never be entirely or completely lost, but they also provide us with little more 
than names and dates by which to remember them. Thus, they only serve to 
remind us that those that they memorialise lived and died, without providing us 
with any insight into their life. Despite this fact, the act of inscribing names upon 
monuments is hugely important in our relationship with death, loss and grief. As 
Laqueur has argued ‘many acts of naming the dead, like putting their bodies in 
the ground, are explicitly political: these and not other names - or bodies - can 
legitimately claim space, and attention, and a part in a publicly important 
narrative’ (2015: 424). Not only does the naming of the dead highlight their 
legitimacy and importance but it also creates a narrative. For example, on the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial the names are ‘in chronological order of death’, 
enabling the monument to tell the story of the war and of the veterans’ deaths 
(2015: 426). However, I assert, that the story of their deaths is not the same as 
the story of their lives. The act of inscribing the names of the dead on 
memorials may well allow people to remember and to mourn the dead, as I 
have already argued, but it does not provide an insight into who they were and 
how they lived. 
 Artist Carolee Schneeman, talking about the loss of seventeen of her 
friends, which she endured between 1992 and 1995, has argued that ‘our forms 
of grief seemed inadequate: mourning rituals are inadequate if they don’t 
involve our bodies, if we are not held, clutched, touched, contacted - as a 
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correlative to powerful emotions of loss. We want to be dispassionate, 
frightened as we are of morality, of grief’s isolating absorptions’ (2002: 279). 
Schneeman’s statement suggests  an alternative mode of mourning and 
remembering, one which foregrounds both the body and the relation to the lost 
other. In 1995 Schneeman created Mortal Coils, a multi-media installation which 
included ‘images of faces, bodies, public death notices, projections, mirrors, and 
ropes coiling slowly in sand’ (1995: 1). Mortal Coils attempted to create what 
Schneeman has described as a ‘physicalized form or mourning’ by addressing 
‘symbolic and figurative representations of death and the incapacity of our 
culture to attend to personal loss and grief’ (2002: 279). Mortal Coils was 
Schneeman’s response to the personal losses that she had suffered and 
although it was not a performance art piece her installation highlighted the faces 
and bodies of those that she had lost through its images of them. Thus, this 
enabled a more visceral relationship with the dead than that afforded by more 
traditional monuments, such as the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. This is why I 
have positioned the work in relation to re-performance, because it shares re-
performances concerns with mourning and memorial. 
 
Living Memorials 
The notion of a more personal and physical style of memorial is also evident in  
the memorial style performances planned by artists, Briar Bates and Andrew 
Henderson. There is a difference between their work and Schneeman’s, not 
only in the form of the performances but also because Schneeman was 
memorialising friends who had died whilst Bates and Henderson were creating 
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memorials for their own impending deaths. These performances, whilst 
transient, reflect the artists’ lives and personalities. Henderson’s 2016 
performance, Taking it to the Grave, (which I described in the previous chapter) 
was planned as a living funeral, allowing Henderson to design his ‘“funeral the 
way I would want it as a queer person who wants it to be fabulous and 
wonderful" (Henderson quoted by Beaudette 2016: 1). Henderson was 
diagnosed with lymphoblastic lymphoma in 2014. In 2015 his diagnosis became 
terminal and it was this which triggered the idea for Taking it to the Grave. As 
Martin has explained ‘He [Henderson] lived with the terminal diagnosis for more 
than a year. He developed his big performance. He brainstormed ideas for a 
fabulous funeral and joked about his death. He surrounded himself with friends 
and, in a way, that was his gift to them’ (Martin 2016: 2). The performance, I 
contend, was Henderson’s way of coming to terms with his illness and imminent 
death. It was also his way of leaving something of himself behind, and so 
having control over the way in which he would be remembered. The 
performance took place the weekend before his death and therefore it served 
as Henderson’s legacy because during the performance, ‘Andrew was a star. 
Taking It To The Grave was a sensation. Television news reporters flocked to 
interview him. So did the Toronto Star. He posed for photos and talked about 
his hopes of changing the conversation around death and dying’ (2016: 2). 
  The performance enabled Henderson to plan and execute his own 
memorial, allowing him to take control of how he would be remembered. Live 
performance as memorial may not be as durable as gravestones or 
monuments, but like the echoes and traces of Export and O’Brien’s 
   257 
performances, which were discussed earlier, it provides an insight into 
Henderson’s life.  
 
Figure 20: Andrew Henderson Taking it to the Grave (2016) 
Henderson’s friend, Erica Nicols, who worked on the project with him, described 
the piece by stating that ‘“Mourning can happen in a queer, bright, beautiful 
way. It doesn't have to happen with everybody hanging their heads and wearing 
drab black”’ (Nicols quoted by Beaudette 2016: 2). Nicols’ statement, which 
refers to elements of the piece, such as the use of bright colours and glitter (as 
seen in figure 20) is suggestive of the fact that there is no correct way to mourn 
and that perhaps the way in which we mourn loss can be as unique as the loss 
that we are mourning. Henderson’s funeral performance also queers the 
somber normativity of the funeral ritual, turning it into a queer event and a 
celebration of Henderson’s life.  
 Of course, a crucial factor in Henderson’s case was the fact that it was a 
living funeral, taking place before he died. Much like Hershman Leeson’s 
exorcism of Roberta Breitmore, which I discussed earlier in this chapter, 
Henderson’s performative funeral contained an element of haunting. The 
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specter of his death haunts the funeral performance and his creation of a living 
funeral  also turns him into a specter, ‘some “thing” that remains difficult to 
name: neither soul nor body, and both one and the other’ (Derrida 1994: 6), not 
dead but dying. He was present at his own funeral like a physical representation 
of the spirit that he will become following his death.  
 Henderson’s decision to create a living funeral also meant that he was 
not only able to plan but also to participate in his memorial, thus epitomising 
Windrich’s notion of performative memorial, which is designed to be both 
ephemeral and participatory. This was also the case for artist Briar Bates who 
chose to be memorialised through a water ballet. Following her death Bates’ 
‘friends … [performed] a joyful and awkward water ballet titled “Ankle Deep” in 
the kiddie wading pool at Volunteer Park’ in Seattle (Kiley 2017:1). Dressed in 
green swimsuits and caps Bates’ friends danced to a soundtrack in front of 
passersby. Although Bates, who died from cancer in 2017, was not able to be 
present at her own memorial in the way that Henderson was in his, her 
memorial was still participatory as she, ‘wanted her friends … to perform a joyful 
and awkward water ballet titled “Ankle Deep”’ (Kiley 2017: 1). Bates conceived 
and planned the idea, but, unlike Henderson, did not intend to participate in its 
execution. Bates was involved in choreographing and directing the ballet: 
‘“she’d watch video of the proceedings and give detailed director’s notes”’ (Kiley 
2017: 1). Despite her involvement in the planning and rehearsal stages the 
piece itself wasn’t performed until after Bates’ death. As Kiley has stated, 
‘“people don’t normally memorialize death by doing cartwheels in a wading 
pool” (Kiley 2017: 1).  
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Figure 21: Ankle Deep (2017)                           Figure 22: Ankle Deep (2017) 
As figures 21 and 22 and show Ankle Deep appears bright and fun, contrasting 
it with more traditional forms of memorial, and the unusual way in which Bates 
chose to be memorialised links it with Henderson’s living funeral. Both artists 
explored their power and agency, their ability to control the ways in which they 
would be remembered. This is in contrast to Hannah Wilke, who I discussed in 
chapter three of the thesis. Wilke’s piece, Intra-venus Series, was a project that 
Wilke began but which was continued by her husband Donald Goddard and not 
realised until after her death. As such, Wilke’s involvement and agency in the 
realisation of the piece, unlike Bates’, was limited. As one of Bates’ friends who 
participated in Ankle Deep said ‘“let’s face it — she [Bates] still has creative 
control as a dead lady”’ (Kiley 2017: 1). 
 But Bates and Henderson’s work also share another crucial element, the 
fact that they are as temporal as the life they memorialise. Each performance 
will end but it will leave behind it echoes and traces which allow for the 
possibility of re-performances, thus indicating the ways in which Henderson and 
Bates will be leave behind echoes and traces in the memories of those who 
knew them. In this sense at least, I contend that live performance as memorial 
is more fitting than concrete, bronze or marble used in statues and gravestones. 
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Live performance, as memorial, reminds us of the fleeting and fragile nature of 
life and the very real fact that nothing lasts forever, because of the transient 
nature of live performance. Like the cinema which Phelan discusses in relation 
to the film Silverlake Life: The View from Here, which I will examine later in the 
chapter ‘such art forms might lead us to believe that like the dead who have 
reached the end of life we will reach an end to grief’ (1997: 171). Of course, not 
even the more traditional memorials will last forever; the statues and 
gravestones will eventually erode, disappearing slowly until what remains barely 
resembles the monument that was originally created. This is highlighted in 
Percy Shelley’s poem Ozymandias, in which he describes the remains of a 
monument as ‘two vast and trunkless legs of stone’ and ‘a shattered visage’ 
(1818: 1). Shelley’s poem foregrounds the permeability of the monument but 
also the rather romantic notion of nature and its ability to destroy everything, 
even stone monuments which are generally considered solid and impermeable. 
 Moreover, just because a monument is made of a solid material does not 
mean that it cannot be performative, nor does it prevent spectators from being 
able to interact with it. The interaction between spectator and monument is, for 
Windrich, a key feature of a performative monument, which he describes as ‘an 
object or site that contractually binds its audience in self-aware acts of 
commemoration’ (2014: 35). Windrich examines the relationship between more 
traditional forms of memorial and the potential for monuments to be 
performative when she asks: 
 ‘Could a monument consisting of two 75 meter-long granite walls function 
as a performative monument?’ (2014: 10). She answers ‘it does. Visitors to 
   261 
Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington trace the names 
engraved into the stone on pieces of paper to take home. Indeed, the 
volunteers, organised by The National Park Service, hand out pencils and 
tracing paper, cementing what was at first a spontaneous and personal (if 
foreseeable) mode of interaction’ (2014: 10).  
 The issue here is the way in which documentation and re-performance 
and more traditional monuments and performative monuments are viewed in 
opposition to one another. As the example of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
makes clear, the two things are not mutually exclusive and one is not 
necessarily more appropriate as a memorial or as performance documentation 
than the other. It is the ways in which the two ideas interact with and work 
alongside one another that make them so interesting. Hershman Leeson’s 
documentation of Breitmore is yet another interesting example of the 
relationship between re-performance and documentation. As Mock explains 
‘starting in 2006, Hershman also began to restage and remediate Roberta 
Breitmore’s work in the online virtual community of Second Life. Here, wearing 
the same dress, and looking rather more glamorous, she is called Roberta 
Ware.’ (2012: 4). Through this remediation Hershman Leeson effectively 
reincarnated Breitmore almost 30 years after her death/exorcism in an Italian 
Crypt, multiplying Breitmore once again in Ware. Within Second Life ‘a Roberta 
Breitmore gallery was created… in which visitors can view images of Roberta 
Breitmore and the ‘ephemeral’ documentation of her life,’ (2012: 4). Ware is 
Breitmore in avatar form but crucially she exists ‘trapped in her own virtual 
archival gallery, surrounded by images of her past lives’ (2012: 15). Ware 
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simultaneously documents and multiplies Breitmore. Her existence, together 
with the virtual gallery, both re-perform and document Hershman Leeson’s 
performance of Breitmore. Hershman Leeson’s decision to document Breitmore 
in this way links to the multiplicity evident within her creation of Breitmore, 
making it a fitting form of documentation for the performance. Breitmore was a 
multiplication of Hershman leeson, the ‘Roberta Multiples’ were multiplications 
of Breitmore and in turn further multiplications of Hershman Lesson and Ware is 
a further multiplication of all the previous incarnations of Roberta Breitmore. The 
crucial difference here is that Ware is less vulnerable than all the previous 
versions of Breitmore. As Mock notes ‘I find her glossy surface difficult to rend 
apart; her blonde hair is no longer a wig liable to slippage; her body is never at 
risk’ (2012: 15). Ware, like traditional memorials and forms of archival 
documentation, is presented as durable and as such she not only documents, 
re-performs and further multiplies Breitmore, she also memorialises her. As I 
suggested earlier, perhaps there is no correct way in which to document a 
performance or memorialise a loved one, and the way we choose to do this 
could be determined not by tradition but by the way in which we can come to 
terms with the loss, or, in some cases the way in which they have asked to be 
remembered. 
 A further example of an unconventional memorial can be found in the 
creation of the film Silverlake Life: The View from Here. The film, which is 
analysed by Phelan in Mourning Sex, can be viewed as a way of memorialising 
the lives of Tom Joslin who ‘died of AIDS on July 1, 1991’ and his lover Mark 
Massi who died ‘eleven months later’ (1997: 154). Sliverlake Life and Phelan’s 
   263 
analysis of it should be considered in relation to the AIDS epidemic as this is the 
context in which Joslin was living, dying and creating the film and, as I have 
already mentioned, in which Phelan wrote Mourning Sex. Phelan states that the 
film was ‘intended in part as a love letter to Massi, and in part as a political 
statement about the impact of AIDS on the material, familial, and cultural body, 
the film is also a thanatography, a  study in dying’ (1997: 154). What Phelan’s 
comment makes clear is that whilst Silverlake Life can be seen as a study in 
dying in a broader sense it remains clearly rooted in the social and political 
context in which it was created. It is not only a study in dying but a study of the 
impact death, and specifically deaths from AIDS in America in the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s, has on the body. Here I use the term body to refer to the ‘material, 
familial and cultural’ bodies cited by Phelan (1997: 154). Silverlake Life 
examines the effects AIDS has on Joslin’s physical body, but also on the bodies 
of his friends and family members as well as on the cultural bodies of which he 
is a part. In a similar way to that in which Schneeman’s installation Mortal Coils 
(1994-5), which I discussed earlier in the chapter,  examined the effects the 
deaths of her friends had on her. 
 In her description of the film Phelan explains how ‘shortly after his 
diagnosis, Joslin began a video diary and plotted a film that would document his 
life and death’ and how for Joslin ‘the making of the film, rather than the taking 
of his pills, is the way to enhance, if not prolong, his life’ (1997: 154 and156). 
According to Phelan Joslin’s desire to create the film can be linked with a desire 
to enhance or prolong his life because, although it will not prevent or postpone 
his biological death, the film will provide Joslin with a way to continue, to be 
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remembered and memorialised. This is similar to the ways in which artists Jo 
Spence and Hannah Wilke, memorialised their lives through photography and 
film, which I analysed in chapter four, and can be understood in relation to 
Barthes’ theory of photography as a way to capture the dead. Phelan points to 
this link when she states that ‘Theories of photography, and especially those 
proposed by Susan Sontag and Roland Barthes, have emphasized the link 
between death and the still image captured by photographic camera…the film 
[Silverlake Life] suggests that…cinema is one place where the still moving body 
leaves a trace’ (1997: 156). As Phelan observes ‘transferring his life to film, 
Joslin renders his body a body of film. This film can be edited, replotted, 
revised’ (1997: 155) Life on film can be replotted, revised and re-lived but, 
depending on whether or not you believe in re-incarnation, actual life can’t, you 
only get one life and one death. By making the film Joslin provides himself with 
a way to continue existing beyond the end of his biological life, his body can 
become a filmic one, one that in theory at least, is less vulnerable than his 
physical body and that will survive his death. In actuality of course nothing lasts 
forever and eventually the discs or tapes containing the film will become 
damaged and decayed but they will live longer than Joslin and in doing so 
enable him to create his own memorial.  
 In a similar way to Henderson and Bates Joslin takes control over the 
way in his life/death will be remembered. He selects the ways in which his life, 
and death will be captured and recorded. However, there is a crucial difference 
between Silverlake Life and Bates and Henderson’s work. Joslin died before the 
film was completed. Following his death Massi filmed Joslin and ‘after the 
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deaths of Joslin and Massi, their friend, Peter Friedman, a former student of 
Joslin’s, edited over forty hours of video into the two-hour film, Silverlake Life: 
The View from Here’ (1997: 154). Joslin may have come up with the idea for the 
film and begun the process but it was Friedman who edited it. This can be 
compared with Hannah Wilke’s Intravenus Series which, as discussed earlier, 
was a project that she conceived and began during her battle with Lymphoma 
and which her husband Donald Goddard completed after her death. The links 
between Wilke and Joslin are further enhanced by the fact that as part of the 
Intravenus Series the exhibition Intravenus Tapes was created and these tapes, 
like Silverlake Life, explore the ways in which cinema ‘allows time itself to be 
edited, cut, replayed’ (1997: 160). As Phelan argues, ‘for Silverlake Life… much 
of the art of the film is its editing. Friedman edited images  that Joslin and Massi 
created. Joslin, however, also wrote a script for the film that contained material 
Joslin was never able to shoot. Friedman, … turned the forty hours of footage 
into a two-hour film’ (1997: 160). It is obvious from Phelan’s discussion that it 
was Friedman and not Joslin who ultimately decided how Joslin’s death would 
be recorded and commemorated because it was Friedman who selected and 
edited the footage in order to create the film. Yet, despite Joslin’s lack of 
agency over the final film it is clear that for him creating Silverlake Life was 
important. In the film Joslin states that ‘all of his desperation…, is reserved for 
making Silverlake Life’ thus suggesting that finding a way to memorialise 
himself is his key concern (1997: 156).   
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The Temporalities of Illness and Death 
Phelan describes Silverlake Life as ‘an empathetic interrogation of what it is to 
die, and by extension, of what it is to witness death’ (1997: 156). She also 
asserts that  ‘Sliverlake Life reminds us that we still have no idea what death “is” 
- what being the being of death comprises - but the film wagers that the dead 
body might well have some movement in it’ (1997: 156). What Phelan is 
suggesting here is that death is the one thing that we will never be able to 
understand because we cannot live through it and that even witnessing the 
deaths of others cannot help us to comprehend our own demise. Witnessing the 
death of the other through film further complicates our understanding of death 
because in Silverlake Life Joslin’s death is not the end. Whilst ‘temporality 
constructs a causality that is apparently precise in regard to life and death; the 
body lives before it dies. The living body is healthy; without health it dies’ 
(Phelan 1997: 159). This can also be applied to the work of Martin O’Brien, 
whose work I discussed earlier in the chapter. O’Brien as a Cystic Fibrosis 
sufferer, lives with a terminal illness, which I assert disrupts the ‘precise 
causality’ that Phelan discussed in relation to Silverlake Life (1997: 159), 
because O’Brien’s body is a living body but not necessarily a healthy one. 
Whilst he may fit into the logic that ‘death happens when the illness within the 
body surmounts the health within the body’ (1997: 159), he proves that the path 
from life to death, from healthy to dying is far from linear. In O’Brien’s 
performance Anatomy of a Bite the performance begins with him lying 
motionless on a metal bed covered with a white sheet and his illness is evident 
in one of the first actions, the beating of his chest, which causes him to cough 
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up mucus. Contrastingly, later actions such as biting O’Brien’s body produce 
exactly the response you might expect and therefore do not indicate illness or 
lack of health. Thus, O’Brien is presented as a corpse, then as ill and then as 
healthy, subverting the linear temporalities of illness and death. 
 Similarly, in Silverlake Life time does not follow this linear path but rather 
like Derrida’s notion of time in Specters of Marx ‘time is disarticulated, 
dislocated, dislodged … both out of order and mad’ (1994: 18; emphasis in 
original). As Phelan has noted, at the start of the film ‘we see Joslin’s first tape, 
in which he announces with great happiness that he is about to embark on the 
diary, and then we see his emaciated profile as the title sequence rolls’ (1997: 
162). What this non-linear notion of time enables Silverlake Life to do is 
‘suggest that dying, like living, is an “is” - its being fills the present. Dying is not 
in the future; death is not in the past. Dying is’ (1997: 167).  Within this non-
linear structure of time gone mad, to which both Derrida and Phelan refer, the 
dead, like performance, are not confined to the past but have the potential to 
leave something of themselves behind which can be used in future lives and 
future performances. Thus, re-performance and other performance works which 
examine issues related to death and memorial, such as those analysed in this 
chapter, provides performance with a possible future. 
 This is as true for Sliverlake Life as it is for Wilke’s Intra-Venus Tapes 
because just like Intra-Venus Tapes in Silverlake Life we witness Joslin’s death 
not in chronological order but in a non-linear order which provides Joslin the 
opportunity to wager ‘that the dead body might well have some movement in it’, 
because we are able to witness Joslin alive after his death (1997: 156). This is 
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evident both within the narrative of the film, in which Joslin’s illness is not 
presented as a linear path in which his health deteriorates until his death, but 
also because we watch the film in the knowledge that both Joslin and Massi’s 
deaths have already happened. Just like when we experience the exhibition 
Intra-Venus Tapes we do so in the knowledge of Wilke’s death. With Silverlake 
Life we also know that the film has been edited, that there are things that we do 
not see, events which we do not witness. Phelan asserts that ‘the “theory” of 
time proposed by Silverlake Life is one that raises a general question about the 
status and function of art as memorial’ (1997: 156), and I contend that far from 
preventing our ability to read Silverlake Life as a memorial, the construction of 
time within the film enhances this ability. Life is not linear; the dead do not exist 
solely in the past but also in the present as we carry them with us in our 
memories and potentially in the future as we pass on stories and share 
memories with others who may only come to know them from these stories. 
This system of passing on is the bodily archive that I discussed in chapter two in 
relation to re-performance and Diana Taylor’s notion of repertoire, as it is, I 
contend, something which enables us to take the echoes and traces of the lives 
of those we have lost and hand them over to future generations. This is much 
like the system of repetition and passing on that I have claimed is an integral 
part of the process of re-performance. 
 
Militant Mourning, Public Grief and Grievable Lives 
The case studies examined in this chapter all serve as pertinent reminders that 
death and performance have an unusually close relationship. Live performance 
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is predicated on the notion of bodies sharing a space and a lived experience, 
but just like life, the experience of a live performance cannot last forever. 
However, the work of the artists that have been explored in this chapter also 
reminds us that, just like performance, the dead live on in our shared 
experiences and memories and that those experiences and memories can be 
passed on to future generations. This notion of sharing experiences of loss and 
memories of the dead is explored by Phelan in her discussion of grief. Phelan 
states that, ‘I’ve been wondering about the relationship between private and 
public grief and trying to figure out if there is any political agency in public grief’ 
(1997: 130). Phelan goes on to discuss the relationship between mourning and 
militancy, drawing on Douglas Crimp’s 1989 essay ‘Mourning and Militancy’ to 
assert that ‘mourning can itself be a form of militancy - an expression of the 
ego’s defence against its own death’ (1997: 130). For Phelan, and for Crimp, 
militant mourning can provide not only political agency but also a way for the 
ego to survive the process of mourning and the loss of the other.  
 It is important to note here that Crimp and Phelan were writing in the late 
1980’s and 1990’s respectively and that their writing is situated within the 
context of the AIDS epidemic, a time when many deaths from AIDS could not 
be publicly acknowledged. Now, over twenty years after Phelan was writing, I 
am writing in a different context but one which retains echoes of what Phelan 
and Crimp were arguing, because we still live in a world in which mourning can 
be militant. This is a world in which mourning can be used as a political tool and 
a world in which some deaths cannot be publicly mourned. This is something 
highlighted by Judith Butler in her 2004 book Precarious Life: The Powers of 
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Mourning and Violence. Here Butler argues that post 9/11 the American 
government encouraged militant mourning in response to the loss of American 
lives in the terror attacks and the subsequent War on Terror. Butler asserts that 
‘it is important to ask what, politically, might be made of grief besides a cry for 
war’ (2004:XII), whereas Crimp and Phelan were suggesting that militant 
mourning could be used as a means for protesting against the government’s 
lack of action in response to the AIDS crisis. This is evident in Phelan’s 
statement that ‘Crimp argues that for gay men responding to the AIDS crisis, 
mourning has been efficiently converted into political action’ (1997: 130). 
However, in the context of 9/11 Butler argues that the American government 
used militant grief as a tool to support the war on terror, ‘President Bush 
announced on September 21 that we have finished grieving and that now it is 
time for resolute action to take the place of grief’ (2004: 29; emphasis in 
original). Despite the fact that President Bush called for an end to grief, I 
contend that what he was doing was exactly what Crimp said gay men had 
done in response to the AIDS crisis, using grief in order to provoke people into 
action. Bush and Crimp were arguing for a militant form of grief, in which those 
lives that had been lost were mourned actively. These are  ways that would 
hopefully prevent further deaths in the future. However, in Bush’s call to action 
he did not prevent more deaths, instead he caused more deaths by entering 
into the war on terror. The deaths of soldiers, civilians and those suspected of 
terrorist activity. In this very real sense, Bush’s call for an end to grief was 
actually the trigger for much more grief. 
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 Phelan links the idea of militant mourning to the concept of narcissism by 
stating that ‘Narcissism emerges not out of an excess of self-love, as is 
commonly assumed, but rather as a “militant” acknowledgement of loss. It is 
that loss and the ego’s aggressive response to it, that motivates cultural and 
psychic reproduction’ (1997: 130). What Phelan’s statement suggests is that 
narcissism is a necessary part of the process of mourning, a way for the self to 
re-build in the face of loss. Phelan goes on to explain than in a Freudian view of 
mourning ‘the psychic process of mourning can take one of two paths, 
depending upon the prevailing form of identification between the one who 
grieves and the lost object’ (1997: 130). Thus, 
 if identifications are expressions of “something in common,” the 
mode of recognising that commonality differs. If the person who is 
mourning has had a hysterical identification with the lost object, he 
or she retains that cathexis and develops what we might call a 
contiguous relationship to the lost object. … Narcissistic 
identifications, on the other hand, cause the person who mourns 
to abandon the cathexis when the object is lost. This 
abandonment, however, is not accomplished simply. The object-
cathexis must be aggressively killed off and discarded. This is the 
work of mourning. (1997: 131)  
 
Phelan’s argument then is that a militant, narcissistic form of mourning allows 
the mourner to overcome their loss by separating themselves from the lost other 
and re-creating themselves without the person or thing which they have lost. 
This is much like Hershman Leeson freeing herself from Breitmore by 
exorcising her, which I discussed earlier in the chapter. In this sense, it can be 
argued that in order to survive the death of the other we must undergo our own 
exorcism. We must exorcise that part of ourselves, which is entangled with 
them, like amputating a trapped a limb in order to free the rest of the body. The 
limb analogy highlights the transformative power of mourning. This notion is 
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emphasised by Butler’s statement that ‘one mourns when one accepts that by 
the loss one undergoes one will be changed, possibly forever’ (2003: 21). Butler 
goes on to state that in mourning ‘I think I have lost “you” only to discover that 
“I” have gone missing as well’ (2003: 22). Butler’s statements foreground the 
transformative effects of mourning and loss and the fact that in order to survive 
the loss of the other we must also survive loosing part of ourselves. This can be 
linked to performances such as O’Brien’s 2015 piece Anatomy of a Bite, which I 
discussed earlier in the chapter, because works such as this focus on the 
relationship between the performer and the audience member(s). Crucial to 
both Butler and Phelan’s arguments is the idea that our lives are entangled with 
the lives of others and that it is these ties which ‘constitute what we are, … that 
compose us’ (Butler 2003: 23). Butler goes on to say that ‘what grief displays,… 
is the thrall in which our relations with others holds us, in ways that often 
interrupt the self-conscious account of ourselves we might try to provide, the 
ways that challenge the very notion of ourselves as autonomous and in control’ 
(2003: 23). Butler’s comment suggests that the impact of grief and mourning is 
caused because we cannot come to terms not only with the loss that we have 
endured, but also with who we have become, who we are in a world without 
someone to whom we were previously tied to in ways which we did not 
comprehend until we were forced to answer the question “Who “am” I, without 
you?’ (Butler 2003: 23). 
 According to Phelan, as I have highlighted above, in order to survive 
such losses, the mourner must create a substitute for their loss. She states that 
‘narcissism is the name of both the wound and the cure: the ego attempts to 
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“become healthy” - to recover from the loss of the ego-ideal by creating out of 
itself a substitute object for that loss.’ (1997: 131). This, I assert, is also what 
happens in the process of creating a re-performance, as seen in my earlier 
analysis of Hershman Leeson’s performances of Roberta Breitmore. The re-
performance becomes a substitute for the initial lost performance, a way of 
understanding the initial performance, just as the ego must create a substitute 
in order to survive its loss. The motivation to re-perform, I argue, is the same as 
the motivation that Phelan claims lies behind the motivation to imitate or create 
a substitute for lost other, ‘the desire to retouch, revise, re-interpret how one 
has lost, is lost’ (1997: 150). Crucial to Phelan’s discussion is the notion that 
grief and mourning are highly personal and the way in which we mourn is 
determined by our relationships and identifications with those we have lost. 
Building upon Phelan’s discussion and linking it with the examples of Bates and 
Henderson’s memorial performances I question whether our ways of 
commemorating and memorialising the dead should be as individual as the 
work of mourning and therefore whether it is possible to step outside social 
conventions surrounding memorial in order to do so. I am not suggesting here 
that there is a dichotomy with social convention on one side and individual ways 
of mourning on the other. Rather I am suggesting that the ways in which we 
mourn could encompass both elements and the two operate in relation to one 
another, much like the relationship between public and private grief that Phelan 
suggests and the relationship between performance and documentation, which 
was discussed earlier. Exploring these relationships between individual loss 
and social conventions of mourning and between public and private grief may 
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also enable us to find ways to grieve for the lives of those who are viewed as 
ungrievable.  
 As Butler has stated ‘some lives are grievable, and others are not; the 
differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must 
be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operated to produce and 
maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human; what 
counts as a liveable life and a grievable death?’ (2003: XV). Here, Butler is 
referring to ‘the erasure from public representation of the names, images and 
narratives of those the US has killed’ during the War on Terror but this is not the 
first and only time that lives have been seen as ungrievable. The AIDS Quilt, 
which I discussed earlier in the chapter, also sought to memorialise ungrievable 
lives by placing the names of the dead ‘on the San Fransisco Federal Office 
Building at a time in the history of the disease when it was little understood, 
often seen as a stigma, and invisible to those in power’ (Lacqueur 2015: 428). 
The AIDS Quilt then, attempted to highlight deaths which had been ignored or 
disavowed by the American government and this is also what Chris Burden did 
in his ‘1991 sculpture, The Other Vietnam Memorial, ‘in which Burden attempted 
to name the Vietnamese military and civilian deaths from the war’ (Laqueur 
2015: 430). What these examples show is that throughout history there have 
been lives which have been politically ungrievable in a conventional sense and 
which, as a result, have been erased from public view and works such as those 
discussed in this chapter may enable us to find alternative ways to grieve for 
these deaths.  
 




In summary, this research has applied a range of Performance Studies theories 
focused on ephemerality, re-performance and documentation together with 
various philosophical notions of death, loss and mourning in order to examine 
the relationship between performance and death. In doing so, it has questioned 
the impact that the recent trend for re-performance has had on the relationship 
between re-performance and death. In her 1993 text, Unmarked: The Politics of 
Performance, Peggy Phelan states that ‘performance cannot be saved, 
recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of 
representations of representations: once it does so it becomes something other 
than performance’ (1993: 146; emphasis in original). This statement became 
the starting point for this research project in which I have examined the impact 
that the recent trend for re-performance has had on the ontological belief that 
performance is predicated on disappearance. The research has examined the 
relationship between re-performance and death and has questioned whether re-
performance can be seen as a way of documenting performance and allowing 
performance to continue “living” in the present. Through demonstrating that it 
can be seen this way, it has then examined, the implications, stemming from the 
presence of  re-performance, for performance’s status as a transient and 
ephemeral act that disappears once the performance is over.  
 This thesis works in dialogue with Phelan’s essay in Unmarked as well 
as her later writing in Mourning Sex and other performance studies texts such 
as Diana Taylor’s The Archive and The Repertoire and Rebecca Schneider’s 
Performing Remains. It builds upon Phelan’s axiom that performance cannot be 
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saved, recorded or documented without being transformed into something other 
than performance. Thus, emphasizing that the results of this transformation can 
be just as important and significant as the initial performance itself. Through an 
investigation of its case studies this research has argued that, whilst 
performance may become transformed through the process of documentation, it 
does not necessarily disappear. It  also argues that this transformation is key, 
not only to our understanding of notions of performance and re-performance, 
but also to the relationship between performance and death. In Mourning Sex 
Phelan contends that ‘theatre and performance have especially potent lessons 
for those interested in re-assessing our relations to mourning, grief and loss’ 
(1997: 3). In this thesis I argue that performance does not teach us these 
lessons because it disappears, but because it can be transformed, just as those 
left behind are transformed by the losses that they suffer, the deaths of loved 
ones which they survive.  In Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and 
Violence Butler asserts that mourning is an ‘experience of transformation’ 
(2003: 21), and this is one of the parallels that this thesis draws between the 
process of mourning and the process of re-performance. With each re-
performance there is a transformation, as though through each attempt to retain 
the initial performance a little more of it is lost. Yet, it never disappears entirely 
and it is these transformed versions of performances and the echoes and traces 
that have been leftover in archives and memories that, I claim, enables re-
performance to teach us about death, loss and mourning. 
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Echoes and Traces 
In Mourning Sex Phelan describes how as a child she tore a pop up anatomy of 
a man out of children’s science book. Phelan explains that she ‘wanted the 
outline of that body, its paper ghost, much more than I wanted the illustrated 
body’ (1997: 2). What Phelan’s story encapsulates is the way in which absence 
can be signified. The space, the hole where the pop up anatomy had been was 
an indicator of its absence, its loss but also its presence. As Féral has 
explained, in her article ‘How to define presence effects: The Work of Janet 
Cardiff’, there is a view ‘that presence is more strongly felt when there is a 
rupture, a straying away or a failing of presence, an absence of presence’ 
(2012: 32). This thesis has analysed signifiers of absence, asserting that when 
viewed as an ‘affective outline’ such signifiers can help us to understand and 
interpret loss (Phelan 1997: 3). This thesis has argued that what Richard 
Schechner terms the ‘aftermath’ of a performance (2002: 248), much like the 
echoes and traces of a life, can be used to create new performances and new 
meanings which can help us to examine the concepts of death, loss and 
mourning. Making links between Phelan’s idea of an ‘affective outline’ (1997: 2),  
Schechner’s notion of ‘aftermath’ (2002: 248), and Freud’s concept of mourning 
(1917), this research has argued that re-performance mirrors the process of 
mourning. This is because in the absence of the initial performance or the lost 
other we cling to the echoes and traces in order to try and retain something of 
what we have lost. 
 In her discussion of mourning, which is influenced by Freud’s earlier 
writing on the subject, Phelan states that ‘the hollow of the outline might allow 
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us to understand more deeply why we long to hold bodies that are gone’ (1997: 
3). Throughout this thesis I have examined this longing, both in terms of bodies 
and death but also in terms of re-performance, demonstrating the  parallells 
between the desire to hold onto the lost other and the desire to re-perform. 
Drawing upon examples of the work of artists Sheree Rose, Bob Flanagan and 
Martin O’Brien I have examined the use of a substitute in order to help us come 
to terms with loss, arguing that in O’Brien and Rose’s collaborative 
performances O’Brien has been used as a stand in for Flanagan. This thesis 
has used this example together with Ron Athey and Julie Tolentino’s 2011 
performance Self-obliteration #1 Ecstatic to contend that through the process of 
re-performance performances can be passed on from one body to another 
through a form of bodily transmission. 
 
Bodily Transmission: The Bodily Archive 
 
This thesis demonstrated that performances as well as memories can be 
inscribed upon and stored within the body, and that they can be passed on from 
one body to another in a form of bodily transmission. This builds upon Diana 
Taylor’s notion of repertoire as outlined in her text The Archive and The 
Repertoire and led this thesis to present the idea of a bodily archive. It argued 
that the re-performance works of Rose, Flanagan and O’Brien and Athey and 
Tolentino all seek to create a bodily archive of initial performances. The 
research has also argued that the notions of a bodily archive and bodily 
transmission are crucial to the process of re-performance and that re-
performance is a means through which performance’s disappearance can be 
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slowed. However, like Taylor, this thesis emphasises the interaction between 
the archive and the repertoire. It follows Taylor’s assertion that the repertoire, or 
here,  bodily archive, is not the only way of recording a performance and that 
the bodily archive can work in relation with rather than in opposition to more 
traditional archival forms. As a consequence, this research focused on the 
echoes and traces of a performance, once again utilising Richard Schechner’s 
theory of aftermath in order to explore the ways in which the leftovers of a 
performance can be fruitfully employed within the practice of re-performance. It 
also analysed the ways in which these objects, some of which may not 
traditionally be viewed as archival material, can interact with the more formal 
records of the performance to not only assist with the process of re-
performance but also to allow a fuller understanding of the performance event 
that took place. Here the work of Martin O’Brien and Ron Athey was once again 
analysed but this time the thesis focused on the visceral, bodily remnants of 
their performance, in O’Brien’s case, mucus and in Athey’s, blood. Using these 
case studies as examples the research asserted that whilst objects such as 
bodily fluids are viewed as abject and do not normally fall within the realm of 
traditionally archivable material they are significant in terms of the aftermath of 
the performances which produced them. Therefore, I contend that the fluid 
aftermath should be considered part of the aftermath of the performance and 
examined alongside the more traditionally archived objects and re-
performances within the bodily archive. Taylor has argued that the traditional 
archive and the repertoire should not be viewed in binary opposition. This thesis 
builds upon this by emphasising the physical nature of the repertoire through its 
   280 
use of the term bodily archive and suggesting that the bodily archive and the 
traditional archive provide a fuller insight into past performances when they are 
considered in relation to one another. 
 
Haunting and Specters 
This research has also examined Jacques Derrida’s concept of the specter as 
discussed in Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, The Work of Mourning and 
The New International. Placing this concept in dialogue with Taylor and 
Phelan’s ideas and applying it to the performances created by the artists used 
as case studies, I have argued that the bodily archive and re-performances 
more generally are haunted by the specters of the initial performance. In 
chapter two this research examined Rose, Flanagan and O’Brien’s work in 
relation to the specter, asserting that Flanagan is a specter who haunts Rose 
and O’Brien’s performances. These notions of the specter and hauntology, also 
conceptualised by Derrida, were linked to the concepts of mourning and non-
linear time, as this thesis contended that performance, the specter and the dead 
do not remain in their own time. This is because  ‘the present can disrupt the 
past … neither are entirely “over” or discrete but partially and porously persist’ 
(Schneider 2011: 15). Here the research made connections between Derrida’s 
concept of time and Rebecca’s Schneider’s exploration of it in her 2011 work, 
Performing Remains, in order to argue that in re-performance, as in mourning, 
the linearity of time is disrupted as through re-performance past performances 
can be made to “live on” in the present. This notion has also been examined in 
relation to death and survival in order to claim that re-performance can allow 
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performance to survive because it provides a way of documenting performance 
whilst allowing it to remain a performance. If a performance can be passed on 
through a process of bodily transmission, if its aftermath can be gathered up 
and used to generate new performances and if each of these performances can 
be stored in a bodily archive, then, this thesis contends that a performance can 
potentially live on forever. Thus, like mourning, it may never be ‘clear, never 
complete’ (Phelan 1997: 171). As Phelan has said, she does ‘not believe there 
is an end of grief’  (1997: 171), and through re-performance I do not believe 
there is an end of performance. Therefore, this thesis has asserted that the 
processes of re-performance, mourning and grief share many similarities and 
that it is through these similarities that re-performance allows for the 
strengthening of the relationship between performance and death. 
 
The Process of Dying 
Throughout this research I have argued that re-performance, mourning and 
grief are all processes, something which requires a working through. However, I 
have also argued that in performances which seek to document death dying 
can also be viewed as a process. This is not the same type of process as those 
suggested above and does not require an active working through but is, I 
contend, a process nonetheless. Through its analysis of the performative 
documentation of illness and death in Hannah Wilke’s Intra-venus Series and 
Intra-venus Tapes as well as Jo Spence’s The Final Project and Tom Joslin’s 
Silverlake Life: The View from Here this thesis has examined the ways in which 
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performance can enable dying to be viewed, not only as a process, but as a 
non-linear one.  
 Here, the research once again drew upon Schneider’s Performing 
Remains and her discussion of the ‘temporal leak’, which she asserts occurs in 
acts of re-performance (2011: 10). The thesis argued that in the works cited 
above dying is seen in non-linear ways. For example, in Silverlake Life because 
the film has not been edited in a linear way, we jump from seeing Joslin near 
the end of his life to seeing him at the start of his journey with AIDS. As Phelan 
explains, ‘like the disease it documents, Silverlake Life barrages the viewer with 
highs and lows, with upswings and depleting views. As the temporal 
discrepancies continue, the notion that death is a straight turn off the road 
marked “health” is undercut’ (1997: 162-163). I contend that this is the case not 
only because of the way in which Silverlake Life has been edited but also 
because of the fact that when watching the film, the spectator is witnessing 
Joslin dying in the knowledge that he is already dead.  
 This idea is also explored in relation to Wilke and Spence’s work, in 
which I argue, that the act of witnessing someone dying when you already know 
the outcome of that process disrupts linear notions of time. If the dead are 
confined to the realm of the past how can we witness their demise after the 
event? In the case of Wilke’s Intra-venus Tapes this research argues that the 
way in which the footage is edited compounds the non-linear temporality 
experienced when viewing the piece. In the exhibition the tapes are shown on a 
series of monitors, each of the screens shows a different excerpt of the tapes 
and as a result the spectator witnesses a ‘temporal tangle’ as each 
   283 
multiplication of Wilke shows her at a different time (Schneider 2011: 10). Thus, 
in Wilke’s work, just as in Spence’s and Joslin’s we witness someone dying in a 
non-linear way. Therefore, we are witnessing a past event in the present as the 
bodies that we are watching appear alive despite the fact that we know they are 
not. 
 This analysis of photographic and cinematic documentation of the 
process of dying is supported by a reading of Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida 
which assists with this thesis’ reading of our desire to retain or capture the lost 
other in films, photographs and memories. In Camera Lucida Barthes claims 
that in being photographed ‘I am truly becoming a specter’ and describes the 
act of photography as ‘death in which his [the photographer’s] gesture will 
embalm me’ (2000: 14). What Barthes’ comments make clear is the arresting 
impact of photography, its ability to capture and retain a moment. Whilst there is 
a crucial difference between photography and film, in the sense that 
‘photography, stops the body, arresting its movement through time’ whist film 
retains the body’s movement (Phelan, 1997: 156), I assert that it still captures a 
moment or period of time, a glimpse of a life or a performance which can be 
retained for future viewing. Thus, this thesis argued that both photography and 
cinema present dying as a non-linear narrative which disrupts an understanding 
of time and of life as being things which only ever move forward. The film and 
photographic performances analysed in this thesis deliberately play with the 
non-linearity of both time and life. Therefore, enabling us to return to the past, to 
review and remember lives in much the same way that re-performances allow 
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us to return to, review and remember initial performances. Thus, this prevents 
them from being confined to the past and suggesting possible futures. 
 
Afterlives, Survival and Re-performance 
The idea of the future has been examined alongside notions of re-performance, 
mourning, survival and annihilation through this thesis’ analysis of Simon 
Critchley’s 2011 text, The Book of Dead Philosophers and Judith Butler’s 2004 
book Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. In The Book of 
Dead Philosophers Critchley asserts that ‘it is, finally, the fear of death that 
enslaves us and leads us towards either temporary oblivion or the longing for 
immortality’ (2011: 3). Biologically speaking immortality is impossible but 
Critchley contends that it is out ‘longing for immortality’ that drives us to create a 
legacy, something which we can leave behind when we die (2011: 3). It is a 
way for us to prevent our complete annihilation and ensure that we will be 
remembered. This desire is analysed through works such as those created by 
Andrew Henderson and Briar Bates who devised, and, in Henderson’s case, 
performed in, their own memorials. 
 This research has argued that performances like those of Henderson and 
Bates exercise a desire to have authorship and authority over the way that we 
will be remembered and to be memorialised in more personal, less traditional 
ways. Drawing upon Mechtild Widrich’s 2014 text, Performative Monuments, 
Thomas Laqueur’s The Work of the Dead and Phelan’s Mourning Sex this 
research has argued that performative monuments are predicated on 
interaction and provide ways for those left behind to mourn and remember 
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those that they have lost. By analysing less traditional memorials such as those 
by Bates and Henderson, as well as Wilke’s Intra-Venus Tapes and Joslin’s 
Silverlake Life alongside more traditional memorials such The Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial, this thesis has proposed that both types of memorial are as 
significant as one another in terms of helping us to understand loss and 
mourning. 
 I have also asserted that this is particularly pertinent in the current global 
climate of war and terror and in light of what Critchley describes as ‘an 
overwhelming terror of annihilation’ (2011: 1). This is also something which is 
addressed in Butler’s text, written In the context of America post September 
11th 2001, events which Butler asserts ‘were, and are, cause for fear and for 
mourning;’ (2004: XI). In this current climate it is important to ask how we can 
survive, particularly how we can survive the loss of the other, and this research 
has argued that performance, and more specifically re-performance can help us 
to understand how to survive these loses. This is not because they allow for 
exact repetitions of initial performances, not because the dead can be brought 
back to life or because they can in some way help us to prevent our own deaths 
but because the process of re-performance mirrors the process of mourning. 
Mourning is not something which is done singularly, it is a process of letting go 
which must be undertaken bit by bit, just as through re-performance the initial 
performance is transformed bit by bit. It is also important to note that through re-
performance new performances and meanings are created, just as we must 
learn to re-make ourselves in light of our loss. 
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Final Conclusion 
Through an analysis of a diverse collection of case studies of performances by 
different artists which range from purposeful attempts to re-perform an initial 
performance to re-performances which reference the initial performance in 
some way and performances which seek to memorialise the life of the artist; this 
thesis has argued that rather than destabilising performance’s ability to prepare 
us for loss re-performance strengthens this. It has asserted that this is the case 
because the way in which re-performances transform initial performances 
mirrors the way in which people are transformed by loss. 
 The research has also examined the desire to re-perform, claiming that 
this can be compared with the desire to hold onto the echoes and traces of a 
loved one, and is therefore reflective of the process of mourning in which in 
order to survive the loss of the other we must learn to let go of them, but that 
this cannot be done all at once. Much like re-performance, this is a process and 
one through which our understanding of death can be enhanced by 
experiencing re-performances in which something new and meaningful can be 
made from the leftovers or aftermath of a performance. 
 This thesis has developed upon existing dialogues in Performance 
Studies by placing them in conversation with one another and with the 
philosophical discourses in a unique way. This, and by relating notions of re-
performance and death, which are pertinent in the current political climate, has 
enabled it to add its own voice to the existing dialogues. This thesis has argued 
that the world we inhabit is one in which we have increasing ‘exposure to 
violence … with our vulnerability to loss and the task of mourning that follows’ 
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(Butler 2004: 19). In light of this, having an understanding that the works 
discussed in this thesis afford us of what it means to suffer loss, to mourn, to be 
transformed by the process of mourning and to survive that process, is crucial. 
 If this thesis were to be developed further it would examine the concept 
of Anticipatory Grief. Anticipatory Grief was defined by the American 
Comparative Literature Association, as the notion of ‘mourning something 
before it has been lost’ (Vennemann and Bury 2019:1). This concept could be 
applied to this thesis’ examination of the performance work of artists Briar Bates 
and Andrew Henderson who planned, and in Henderson’s case, participated in 
their own memorial performances. The concept of anticipatory grief could be 
usefully applied to develop our understanding of the relationship between 
performance, re-performance and death by allowing us to consider the 
possibility that under some circumstances we begin grieving in anticipation of a 
loss. This focus on different concepts of grief could also be analysed in relation 
to Achille Mbembe’s theorisation of Necropolitics which is something which this 
thesis touches upon but which could be examined further within a discussion of 
different cultural and political circumstances and the impact that these 
circumstances have upon the way in which we grieve. 
In relation to Mbembe’s notion of Necropolitics and sovereignty the thesis 
would also be interested in examining case study performances and re-
performances from other cultures, cultures with a different relationship with 
death in order to further expand our understanding of the relationship between 
acts of re-performance, mourning, loss and death. A relationship which this 
thesis has asserted is crucial to our understanding of both mourning and death 
   288 
as it enables us to explore the ways in which we are each haunted by our own 
specters. Highlighting the fact that mourning, like performance, is never over. It 
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